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The purpose of this research study is to examine a
specific and significant period of time in the development
of the Soviet bloc—1956 to 1958. As considered in this
dissertation, the Soviet bloc consists of the Soviet Union
and its East European "satellites": Albania, Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania,
Yugoslavia and China are treated only to the extent that
their policies affected Soviet-East European relations
during this time period.
The writer has discussed how Stalin forgot the Soviet
bloc in Eastern Europe, the events leading up to the crisis
of 1956, and the manner in which the Soviet leaders reacted
to this crisis. How the bloc evolved under Khrushchev's
leadership, especially the sweeping and perhaps irreversible
effects of his so-called de-Stalinization policies has been
shown. The manuscript shows how rapid military and indus-
trial growth of the Soviet bloc relative to the United
States and her allies altered significantly the power rela-
tionship that had obtained for a decade following World War
II.
At this time, the campaign against imperialism and
colonialism reached its peak. The Soviets, quick to take
advantage of deteriorating Western influence, were able to
rs»
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2provide a political leadership apparently sympathetic to
the desires of the new nations for independence and rapid
growth.
An additional factor in the growth of the Soviet
variety of socialism, at this time, was the obsession of
the former colonies and other under-developed nations to
rush headlong into industrialization. It was only natural
for Premier Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders to encour-
age and exploit to their advantage the breakdown in the old
colonial order and the new emphasis on industrialization
through socialism.
Effective strengthening of the socialist camp and
realistic planning to extend bloc influence required that
the bloc members continued to submit to centralized leader-
ship. The writer points out that force or the threat of
force by the Soviets is not the only basis of the Soviet
bloc. There has heen considerable economic integration
within the bloc since 1956.
Of critical importance in an analysis of Soviet-East
European relations during this period, however, has been
the inability of the communist bloc leadership to promote a
style of economic growth, cooperation, and integration that
could permit the Soviet Union and the East European social-
ist countries to press their highly-publicized economic





3The manuscript comes to an abrupt halt, as the can-
didate, a Commander in the United States Navy, was killed










I. MOTIVATING FORCES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY ... 1
II. THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
SOCIALIST SYSTEM 32
III. FORMATION OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM 63
IV. THE EVENTS OF 1956 96
V. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 130





Several years ago, the official organ of interna-
tional communism published--perhaps with justifiable
optimism—the following assessment of the world situation:
Historic events of world-wide importance are
taking place on our planet. The transition from
capitalism to socialism is being realized on a
world scale. The face of the world is changing,
and it is chanaing precisely as Marx, Engels and
Lenin foresaw.*
Most of us would agree that historical events are
taking place and that the face of the world is changing,
even that traditional political and economic systems are
being subjected to challenge and transformation. But what-
ever visions Marx, Engels, and Lenin had of the future, it
is extremely doubtful that they "precisely foresaw" the
nature of political change in the mid-twentieth century.
This process of political change applies, of course,
2
to the Soviet bloc as well as to other political systems.
World Marxist Review (Problems of Peace and Social-
ism), I (September, 1958), 3.
2As considered in this paper, the Soviet bloc con-
sists of the Soviet Union and its East European "satel-
lites" : Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany,
Hungary, Poland, and Rumania. Yugoslavia and China are
treated only to the extent that their policies affected
Soviet-East European relations during the period under con-
sideration. Although no longer a member of the Soviet bloc,
Albania is felt to be of little consequence except as a
symbol of the Sino-Soviet dispute in the early 1960 's
before that struggle became completely open. The terms
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If not apparent a few years ago, the nature of this process
of change has been spectacularly demonstrated by the bitter
quarrel conducted openly, since 1960, by Communist China
and the Soviet Union, The somewhat less dramatic, yet per-
haps much more meaningful, struggle between Rumania and the
Soviet Union in recent years also underscores the depth of
this change.
Students of political science attempting to analyze
contemporary developments in the Soviet bloc would find
their understanding enhanced by a thorough knowledge of how
the bloc evolved under Khrushchev's leadership, especially
the sweeping and perhaps irreversible effects of his so-
called de-Stalinization policies. The purpose of this
paper, then, is to examine a specific and significant period
of time in the development of the Soviet bloc: 1956 to
1958. In order for such an examination to be meaningful,
it is necessary to consider not Just the chronology of
events but also the theoretical foundations, in Marxism and
Leninism, for relations among communist governments. It is
also necessary to review briefly the methods by which
Stalin forged the Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the events
"socialist camp" and "socialist commonwealth," allegedly
preferred by Khrushchev and others , more adequately describe
the broad grouping of communist countries and parties rather
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Vleading up to the crisis of 1956, and the manner in which
the Soviet leaders reacted to this crisis* The nature of
the economic organization of the Soviet bloc should also be
considered in some detail. And, finally, the evolution of
the bloc structure, in the years 1956 to 1958, should be re-
lated to that of the present.
The time span 1956-1958 has been selected as the
focus of attention of Soviet-East European relations for
several reasons. First and most obvious, the significance
of this period lies in the momentous events of the fall of
1956, when upheaval in Poland and revolution in Hungary
threatened the complete disintegration of the Soviet bloc.
The success of the Soviets, in at least partially repairing
the structure of the bloc during the ensuing months, was
such that two years later the Soviets viewed the world
situation with considerable optimism, as expressed in the
opening quotation of this Introduction ( supra , p. iii).
When considering Soviet-East European relations dur-
ing the period in question, the world situation existing at
that time must be taken into account in order to place the
policies of the various members of the bloc in proper per-
spective. Several broad developments were operative during
the later 1950 f s to alter significantly the power relation-
ship that had obtained for a decade following World War II.











of the Soviet bloc relative to the United States and her
allies: these closely-related developments were spectacu-
larly accented by the launching of Sputnik in October, 1957,
and subsequent Soviet successes in space exploration. Dur-
ing the same years, the United States, as the leading indus-
trial power of the free world, was plagued by relative
economic stagnation; and the American space program, no
matter how sophisticated, was second in terms of time and
prestige*
At about this time, also, the campaign against im-
perialism and colonialism reached its peak. The dissolu-
tion of huge empires controlled from Western Europe and the
proliferation of politically unstable and economically
under-developed nations throughout Asia and Africa left a
political void waiting to be filled by a dynamic world
force capable of providing forceful political leadership
and substantial economic aid. The Soviets, quick to take
advantage of deteriorating Western influence, were able to
provide a political leadership apparently sympathetic to
the desires of the new nations for independence and rapid
economic growth. Since the highly-industrialized capitalist
countries of Western Europe and the Americas were dis-
credited, at least partially, by the stigma of colonialism
and imperialism, an optimistic Soviet leadership might
visualize this era as a golden opportunity for the U.S.S.R.
It
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and Its associated powers to extend their influence, how-
ever inadequate their economic resources might be, through-
out major portions of Asia, Africa, and even Latin America*
An additional factor was the obsession of the former
colonies and other under-developed nations to rush headlong
into industrialization* This attitude was usually accom-
panied by the conviction that the best—if not the only-
solution to the problems of a backward country was to be
found in socialism* The attractiveness of the Soviet
variety of socialism, as a means to achieve industrializa-
tion was rarely accompanied by a careful consideration of
the economic and political costs involved* It was only
natural for Premier Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders to
encourage and exploit to their advantage this breakdown in
the old colonial order and the new emphasis on Industriali-
zation through socialism* Whether the Soviets, after the
severe crisis within the bloc in 1956, could refurbish the
economic vitality of the bloc in order to take advantage of
these new developments is subject to question* Lasting
economic ties between the bloc and the emerging nations, if
they could be established, would hopefully serve as the
3For a brief treatment of this subject, see Leon M*
Herman, "The Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid," in
United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions
of Soviet Economic Power (Washington! Government Printing
SFfice, i9fi2), pp. 43S-435 and 478-482.
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basis for future political penetration and increased influ-
4
ence by the Soviet bloc countries.
effective strengthening of the socialist camp and
realistic planning to extend bloc influence required that
the bloc members continue to submit to centralized leader-
ship, not only in matters of ideology but also in the politi-
cal, economic, and military spheres. How could Khrushchev
reconcile the contradiction between the policies of de-
Stalinization and alleged equality of bloc members with the
requirements for economic—-and perhaps eventual political-
integration under Soviet domination? There is no precise
answer to this dilemma which still confronts Soviet leader-
ship. The reduction of terror and relaxation of the brutal
Soviet methods of control of Stalin's era might improve
economic productivity and brighten relations between the
Soviet Union and the satellites, but, at the same time,
these Dolicles inevitably increased the appetites of the
East European countries for still greater measures of
political and economic independence.
The degree of political freedom achieved by the
satellites in the mid-1950* s must not be exaggerated,
Additional support for statements made in this
Introduction may be found in Richard Lowenthal, "The End of
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however. The Soviet leaders may not dictate the policies of
East European governments, as in the past; but, on the
other hand, they would not likely sit idly by should the
communist structure of any East European government or the
integrity of the bloc be threatened*
Force or the threat of force by the Soviets is not
the only basis of the Soviet bloc. There is still the
presence of large numbers of Soviet troops in or near the
various satellites* As shall be discussed in Chapter IV,
there has been considerable economic Integration of the
Soviet bloc since 1956: the construction of oil pipelines
from the Soviet Union to several of the satellites and the
continued dependence of East European countries on Russian
raw materials serve as two examples. East Europe remains
more than merely a Soviet sphere of influence in the tradi-
tional sense, and the realistic political leaders of East
Europe are well aware of this fact.
A study of the years 1956-1958 should not only
illuminate, in the historical sense, a critical era in the
development of the Soviet bloc. It should also aid in an
understanding of the nature of relations among communist
governments at the present time. We should be able to con-
clude whether there are any marked differences between the
relations among communist governments and, say, relations
among various capitalist states. On the theoretical level,
iimbSBL is
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we should also be able to frame some relationships between
economic and political power.
In the few short years of Khrushchev *s leadership,
the once monolithic Soviet empire has revealed all the
strains and stresses that have afflicted traditional
military and political alliances of the past* If we recog-
nize that the Soviet empire has been substantively altered,
it is only natural to ask "why?" Was Khrushchev, in the
relative sense, more a political liberal than Stalin? Or
have there been external forces operative that would have
determined the course of bloc development regardless of the
nature of Khrushchev* s policies? Or did Khrushchev, in his
de-Stalinization campaign, not anticipate the nature and
extent of the changes he would call into being?
Looming just over the horizon during the years being
examined was the impending Sino-Soviet squabble, of his-
toric origin and over traditional problems, yet still
camouflaged by the veneer of "socialist cooperation and
fraternal relations." Detailed discussion of this subject
is outside the parameters of this paper, but the Sino-
Soviet struggle did have its affect on the course of devel-
opments in the Soviet bloc during the period in question.
Of critical importance in an analysis of Soviet-East
European relations during this period, however, has been













style of economic growth, cooperation, and integration that
could permit the Soviet Union and the East European social-
ist countries to press their highly-publicized economic
competition with the West. In another decade or two, this






MOTIVATING FORCES OF SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY
Many volumes have been written on Soviet foreign
policy. One recent study of international politics sug-
gests that there are two basic interpretations of the moti-
vations for Russian expansionism: traditional Tsarist
imperialism and revolutionary communist ideology. To say
that Soviet policies are inspired ideologically or a mani-
festation of historic Russian drives is both begging the
issue and ignoring the complexity of the framework of
factors motivating the foreign policy of any large and
powerful state. Many analyses of international politics,
especially the political confrontation of East and West,
are insufficient because of a failure to provide a proper
balance between the heritage of Russian foreign policy and
the rather unique features of Marxist philosophy, warped by
2decades of Soviet interpretation and revision.
Andrew Gyorgy and Hubert S. Biggs (eds.), Problems
^ International Relations (second edition; Englewood
"Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962), p. 15.
2Ambassador Bowies' recent article "Is Communist
Ideology Becoming Irrelevant.', " Foreign Affairs , XL (July,
1962), 554-558, fails to distinguish between the effective
ideology of the present time and Marxist doctrine of a cen-
tury ago. The erosion of Marxism through the passage of
time has produced basically a new doctrine; it does not
follow from this that ideology is irrelevant, even though







2It has also been suggested that Soviet foreign
policy can be summed up neatly as either revisionist or
status quo, which supposedly avoids the sticky question of
Marxist theory. Yet, it soon becomes obvious that these
two classifications, which tend by definition to be mutu-
ally exclusive, are inadequate. If it is assumed that the
Soviet Union is fundamentally a revisionist power, then it
must be determined to what extent the revisionist motiva-
tions are the product of Marxist ideology or historic
factors. In addition, the proponent of the revisionist
theory must stipulate whether a revisionist foreign policy
involves a willingness on the part of the political leader-
ship to risk the security of the state in international
adventures*
The second general category above holds that, in-
stead of being revolutionary or revisionist, Soviet policy
is devoted to the conservation and strengthening of its
present world position. According to this view, the Soviet
Union is concerned primarily with the status quo and is not
4
really interested in revolution of any form. This school
3Perhaps the most detailed exposition of the theory
of the Soviet leadership plotting the course of world revo-
lution through the precise application of doctrine is found
in Elliott R. Goodman, The Soviet Design for ja World State
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1960).




3of thought has gained increasing influence in recent years
because of the "thaw" in Soviet foreign and domestic policy
since Stalin's death, and the success of the Soviet leader-
ship in building a gigantic industrial-political empire
that the Soviets are naturally anxious to preserve. Most
proponents of the conservative Soviet attitude in world
affairs argue either that the Party leadership is extremely
reluctant to risk its position, as well as the future of
Soviet Russia (which they feel grows relatively stronger
each year), to challenge the West in a possible military
showdown or that the modernization of Soviet society has
5produced a "mellowing" of Soviet leadership and a crude
type of public opinion in the Soviet "middle class" which
is strongly opposed to adventuristic policies. However, an
unusual dissent to this view was expressed recently, claim-
ing that the Soviet Union "• • • is today what she has
been throughout her modern history: the paradox of a great
power founded on a weak society." This critical economic
imbalance, the author states, is not disguised by a rapid
Erich Fromm, but is stated cogently in his analysis of the
bases of Soviet foreign policy in May Man Prevail. (Garden
City, New York; Anchor Books, 196TT7 pp. 86-88.
5
For a strong argument against the "mellowing"
theory, see Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and












4growth rate; Soviet foreign policy is conservative, even
defensive, because of its weak economic structure. 6
Two problems of definition require clarification.
First, it is accurate to state that all governments are
concerned with the status quo. They favor the status quo
to the extent that the political leadership thinks primarily
in terms of the perpetuation of its power, within the con-
text of the existing political system and wishes to avoid
any unsettling international development which might
threaten this position. This leadership is, in addition,
committed by necessity to the protection of the interests
7
of the state it is sworn to serve. Since security of the
state is identified (even if subconsciously) by the politi-
cal leadership with its own security in office, all states
Peter Paul Stender, "The Paradox of Soviet Power,"
Daedalus , XCI (Fall, 1962), 779.
7It is interesting, but not crucial, to stress, as
has one renowned student of Soviet affairs, that "World
revolution and the traditional national interests of Russia
frequently march together but when they diverge the former
is temporarily sacrificed for the sake of the latter."
From the introduction to Waldemar Gurian, "The Two Main-
springs of Soviet Foreign Policy," in Hans J. Morgenthau
and Kenneth W. Thompson (eds.), Principles and Problems of
International Relations (New York! Alfred A. Knopf, I$5uT,
p. 280. It is often indicated that the Soviet Union, in
its early years, would hazard its national security for
world revolution, yet Lenin made it abundantly clear during
the Brest-Litovsk negotiations that the Bolshevik regime
could not hope to promote international socialism by sacri-
ficing its own existence. Thus, at a very early date, the
cause of international Socialism was deferred to the inter-
ests of the Soviet state.
-SO
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5are to this extent "status quo oriented." In addition, a
government can pursue a status quo policy relative to the
international system itself, in that it does not seek to
transform the system unless it believes it possesses the
capability to dominate the new system.
The second definitional problem is the interrelation-
al
ship between ideology and national interest. Some students
of Soviet politics separate these conceptions too severely.
There is no necessary, inherent divergence between ideology
9
and national interest, even though there will be a degree
Ideology and interests are seen as not necessarily
being in opposition, when Soviet policy is visualized as a
broad spectrum, "... beginning with a minimum protection
of the Soviet Union and its socialist character—up to a
maximum—to win over the rest of the world to the same sys-
tem." Klaus Tornudd, "Soviet Attitudes Towards Non-Military
Regional Co-Operation, " Commentatlones Humanarum Litterarum
,
XXVIII [Helsingfors, Finland, 1961 J, 255; Alfred G. Meyer
•^ Leninism (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957),
p. &6, briefly describes Lenin's concept of minimum and
maximum programs, noting that the minimum program easily
becomes an end in Itself: "The means thus turn into abso-
lutes, and the end, at least for the time being, becomes a
mere myth." Alexander Dallin (ed.), Soviet Conduct in
World Affairs (New York: Columbia University Press ,"T960 )
,
p. 313, presents this view when he says that, in Russian
policy, "ends and means interacted and reinforced each
other." In a discussion of Bolshevik nationality policy,
Oscar I. Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1945), p. '96, observes
that "... like all ultimates, the Soviet variety tends to
recede into the distant future, while the transitory hardens
into permanence."
9When considering a single socialist country, such as
the Soviet Union. The situation radically changes, as shall
be seen, when considering the socialist system or relations
I-
.
6of conflict between ideology and national interest, just as
there is conflict between various interests in all devel-
oped societies. Rather than divergence, there is often a
natural affinity between ideology and interests, with one
affecting or determining the other. Interests are, after
all, what the statesmen determine them to be (within
limits), and "• • • it is the very nature of ideology that
it deceives not only others but also those who use it."
Where there is conflict in a political system, between
ideals and requirements, ideology usually is not abandoned
but stretched to include the political requirements of the
time. To reject the ideological bases of Soviet foreign
policy is just as misleading as it is to assume that the
sole motivation of the Soviets can be found in "pure"
Marxist doctrine. The foreign policy of each state is
governed, to some extent, by its peculiar form of ideology.
Before attempting to formulate the role of ideology as a
factor in the analysis of Soviet policy, we should briefly
consider the concept of ideology itself.
among two or more socialist states. For example, communist
ideology could be considered to prescribe certain broad
forms of economic cooperation and specialization; but the
implementation of such cooperative measures may contravene
traditional national interests.
Fromra, op_. cit








7The original meaning of the term "ideology" is based
on the notion that all ideas originate from sensation or
human experience. Both the word and the thought were de-
veloped in the eighteenth century, and the view of ideology
as being the summation of individual human experience soon
found favor with the leaders of the French Revolution, who
realized that this concept of reason based on experience
could be employed in a political sense to combat the dogmas
of such authoritarian institutions as the church and the
aristocracy. In this manner, ideology became associated
with the political forces in power, and their officially-
adopted political doctrine became the only acceptable
ideology. Because of this association of the term "ide-
ology" with the forces of the French Revolution during the
Napoleonic era, the concept of ideology was linked with any
political belief that was in opposition to Napoleon. Al-
though the notion of ideology has broadened in recent years
because of its extensive use, it still retains an aura of
deliberate deception from the Napoleonic era.
Marx and Engels conceived a similar function for
ideology. Although, at times, they used ideology to signify
broadly any form of consciousness reflecting the attitudes
and beliefs of a social class, they usually distinguished
between the "ideological" consciousness (or "false conscious-






8revolutionary class, or proletariat. From this position,
as one student of ideology has argued, it was logical for
Marx and Sngels to reason that
ideological doctrines are social myths or "opiates"
of the people, and that the "reasons" for their ac-
ceptance have, at bottom, nothing to do with con-
siderations of evidence or fact. This suggestion
clings to the concept of ideology to this day.il
In this view, ideology consists of a body of doc-
trine, theoretical in its basis but intended primarily as a
guide for action. Ideology is rooted in philosophy; but in
a sense that it is a "false consciousness" and is generally
restricted to political relationships, ideology may lose
12the core of its philosophical orientation. The extreme
form of this interpretation visualizes it as a sort of in-
tellectual fraud, a deliberate hoax manufactured and per-
petuated by power-seeking politicians who have no genuine
belief in, and little understanding of, the idealistic
13goals of the ideology that they wear as a mask.
Henry D. Aiken, The Age of Ideology (New York:
Mentor 3ooks, 1961), pp. 18-19. Also see Karl Mannheim,




12Niebuhr considers ideology to be the "process of
self-deception." See Reinhold Niebuhr, Christian Realism
and Political Problems (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
19T3), p. 79.
13For an illustration of this view, see Hans J. Mor-
genthau, "lower and Ideology in International Politics," in
James N. Rosenau (ed.), International Politics and Foreign




9Misunderstanding and misuse of the term "ideology"
leads to confusion and an inability to communicate with
14
mutual understanding. Mannheim has separated helpfully
the concept of ideology into two meanings, the particular
and the total. Both meanings have a common element in that
neither participant in a dialogue accepts at face value
what the other has said but attempts to gain an understand-
ing of the other* s view by analysing his statements within
the context of his social milieu.
Ideology in Mannheim's "particular" connotation,
however, implies a much more narrow meaning than that of
the "total" conception. The particular conception refers
to only a part of the sum of the individual's views, whereas
the total conception encompasses the idea-system of a spe-
cific "historico-social group," or class, or of a certain
age or period of time. Marx's notion of the ideology of
the bourgeoisie, for example, would fall within the total
conception devised by Mannheim. The particular conception,
as the terminology implies, is concerned with the ideology
of an individual, rather than an entire group or class; it
refers to an analysis of only a segment of the individual's
ideas, on a purely psychological level. This requires a
sharing of "common criteria of validity" between two
14Mannheim, o£. cit
• , pp. 49 ff.
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persons whose ideologies, in the particular sense conceived
by Mannheim, are divergent. The total conception, as the
terra implies, refers to basically divergent thought systems,
The important differences, then, are that the particular
conception is limited in the scope of ideas it encompasses;
it is conceptually restricted to the individual; it is
"interest-motivated;" and, it involves more than a modicum
of deception. The "total" conception devised by Mannheim
refers to the entire thought processes or systems of ideas
of an age or broad social group; the systems analyzed are
fundamentally divergent; and, only a modicum—if any at
15
all—of deception is involved.
The question of deliberate deception as an element
of ideology is responsible for most of the divergent views
of the nature of ideology that presently exist, Mannheim,
as this writer understands him, is not explicit on this
point, Mannheim apparently considers deception to be an
element of the conception of ideology, both particular and
total, although to a lesser extent in the latter.
15Robert V. Daniels, The Nature of Communism (New
York; Random House, 1962), p, lYI "Tdeology is not ordi-
narily a conscious fraud, but is taken seriously by its
beneficiaries." In the historical study of East-West rela-
tions, Barbara Ward suggests Ideology as one of three
"levels" of contact to be studied. Her very broad concept
of ideology includes the whole area of religion and philoso-
phy, Barbara Ward, The Interplay of East and West (New
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Mannheim* s study has special relevance to contempo-
rary political science. The growth of totalitarian politi-
cal systems in the last forty years has broadened the
meaning of the term "ideology," so that, in its "popular"
sense, ideology, although the concepts just discussed are
still valid, now generally means the summary construct or
system of ideas perceived by an individual or group and
used to describe the past, present, and future course of
the development of man, his nature and societal relations,
and his notions of the origin of the cosmos and a supreme
being. The element of deception is no longer a necessary
factor, although ideologies may be—and undoubtedly are-
manipulated and shaped by ruling groups. Totalitarian
political leadership is affected by the "feedback" of the
Ideology they promulgate, so that it is difficult to deter-
mine the point at which conscious deception might have
16
ceased and actual belief commenced. For this reason,
Niebuhr's conception of ideology as a process of self-
deception, and Morgenthau's idea of the separation of
Some students of Soviet politics have decried the
pronouncements of Premier Khrushchev as lacking "sincerity."
It is difficult to believe that Khrushchev "sincerely"
means all that he says, certainly. Yet, to what extent do
other political leaders speak with "sincerity, " which is
often a useless yardstick in political analysis . On the
other hand, it is even more difficult to accept the notion
that the Soviet leaders could have two completely different
sets of standards, one for public pronouncement and the
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ideology and action are illustrations of the incorrect use
of the notion of ideology; or, if not incorrect, these
views are incomplete.
The Soviets, in one interpretation, visualize ide-
ology as both a statement of ultimate objectives and a
17detailed guide for action. Within the reality of the
Soviet state, according to this view, contemporary Marxists
would claim that ideology has shed its false consciousness
and has assumed instead the cloak of Marxist infallibility,
as interpreted by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
It has become all encompassing, a detailed
action program suitable for mass consumption, derived
from certain doctrinal assumptions about the general
nature of the dynamics of social reality, and combin-
ing some assertions about the inadequacies of the
past and/or present with some explicit guides to
action for improving the situation and some notions
of the desired eventual state of affairs. Ideology
thus combines action—and since its object is so-
ciety, it must be political action—with a conscious-
ness both of purpose and of the general thrust of
history. It gives its adherents a sense of consist-
ency and certainty that is too often absent among
those who have been brought up in the tradition of
short-range pragmatism and empiricism.*®
It should be realized that, when Brzezinski speaks of
the role of ideology in shaping Soviet policy, he is not
discussing Marxism in its pristine form, but rather the
17Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, Ideology and Power in
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product of the evolution of Marxist theory within the total
19Soviet experience,
Brzezinski points out that, in the formulation of
ultimate purposes, the ideology of the Soviets "... has
remained basically unchanged throughout Communist his-
tory." Rather than attest to the strength of the ideology,
however, this conclusion simply underlines the fact that the
ultimate objectives of Communist ideology have not been
challenged by practical realities* Wherever the content of
Marxist theory has been applied to practical problems (the
requirements of the exercise of political power, for ex-
ample), a revised Soviet ideology has evolved.
The relationship between long-range objectives and
short-range tactics is a difficult subject to analyze* It
is both difficult and dangerous for the leadership of a
messianic movement to scrap the fundamental ideals of the
movement. The ultimate objectives and ideals are con-
stantly projected before the faithful to inspire lagging
spirits. Temporary expediency, occasional cynicism, and
compromise do not necessarily alter the ultimate objectives*
Policy need not immediately, or constantly, be directed
21towards the achievement of distant objectives.
1 9Ibid
., pp. 98-99.
2 Ibid ., p. 104.








Concentration on the immediate and more pressing problems
may cause a diminution in the appeal or significance of the
final goal. For this reason,
• • • the very thought of longer-range goals might
constitute a distraction that would interfere with
the pursuance of the more pressing immediate tasks.
The means thus turn into absolutes , and the end. at
least for the time being, becomes a mere myth. *
There is a difference of opinion, among those who
claim a role for ideology in the making of policy, regard-
ing the extent to which ideology shapes either short-range
tactics or long-range objectives. One of the more knowl-
edgeable students of contemporary Soviet politics, discus-
sing the relationship of ideology and politics, writes that:
What has been generally overlooked ... is the fact
of substantial change in the meaning and role of the
Marxist doctrine itself. Marxism is manifested in
everything the Communists say and do, but it does
not enter into policy except in the short run.
Theory is utilized by the Communist leadership to
justify their power and policies, and its meaning is
periodically reinterpreted to this end. Theory, in
operate contrary to distant aims or objectives, and in this
sense, is impossible to analyze—or apply. Professor Sharp,
who claims that the "ultimate aims** of the Communist creed
are not "operative in policy determinations , warns that
"•
• • the term policy, if properly applied, excludes aims,
ambitions , or dreams not accompanied by action visibly and
within a reasonable time capable of producing the results
aimed at or dreamed of." Samuel L. Sharp, "National Inter-
est: Key to Soviet Politics," in Alexander Dallin (ed.),
Soviet Conduct in World Affairs (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 15*60), pp. 52-53.















Communism, does not determine the nature of action;
action determines the meaning of theory. 23
As Professor Daniels has so vividly demonstrated
24
elsewhere, the manipulation, modification, or blatant re-
vision of Marxist doctrine to serve specific political ob-
jectives has been a conspicuous feature of Communists since
Lenin's time. In this sense, in the requirements of politi-
cal activity, action does determine the substance of theory.
It is also correct to note that all policy decisions are
justified and expressed in theoretical terms, but policy
decisions, in the opinion of this writer, are more demand-
ing in short-run, tactical matters, than in terms of long-
range, vaguely-defined objectives. After all, it is not
too difficult—and perhaps even stimulating—to the "be-
liever" in Marxism, to talk of the "new Soviet man," the
construction of communism by 1980, or the new principles of
international relations based upon the fraternal socialist
commonwealth. These distant or vague objectives do not
contradict Marxism, but instead can be supported easily in
Marxist theory. Tension between theory and policy arises
in the short-range decisions that are designed to reach
23Robert V. Daniels, "What the Russians Mean,"
Commentary , XXXIV (October, 1962), 314.
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25these objectives. In other words, this writer is sug-
gesting that "Marxism is manifested in everything the Com-
munists say and do," but seldom determines policy decisions
except to shape the general outline. The idealistic char-
acteristics of Marxist theory enable the Soviet Marxist to
identify—or equate—the interests of international commu-
nism with the interests of the Soviet state. This, in
itself, presents no insurmountable problem for the Soviet
(or other communist) politician; as was suggested earlier
( supra , pp. 5-6), the problems multiply when non-Soviet
Communists identify the needs of the communist movement
w^tn their national interests and possess some capability
to advance these interests. This is essentially the nature
of the problem that neither Marxist theory nor Soviet im-
perialism can master, and now seriously threatens the so-
called socialist commonwealth.
The crux of the argument, in the opinion of this
writer , is not whether ideology is a factor in Soviet for-
eign policy. The foreign policy of each nation is shaped
to some extent by its ideology. The subject for discussion
25The everlasting debate over such questions of eco-
nomic theory as value and price, for example, is the per-
sistence of these and other similar issues caused by ques-
tions of ideology or national interest? This is not simply
stimulating speculation, because the economic failure
(relative to Western Europe) of the bloc to integrate is
centered on these questions.
. .
r


















should be (1) what is the nature of this so-called Soviet
ideology; and (2) in what manner is it different, if at
all, from that of any other great power,
Brzezinski has formulated a framework for an analy-
sis of the relationship between Soviet ideology and foreign
26policy. This framework consists, first, of three basic
Marxist principles: dialectical determinism in history,
largely in terms of the class struggle; the inevitable
triumph of socialism; and the inherent evil of private
ownership. Superimposed on these Marxist principles are
some further Soviet concepts which have grown out of the
experience of Bolshevism: the necessity of the leadership
of the Communist Party for the successful establishment of
socialism in any given state; the supremacy of "conscious-
ness " over "spontaneity"; and an international dichotomy
consisting of irreconcilable hostility of the remainder of
the world to the socialist states. The extent that the in-
dividual factors in this framework presently bear upon
Soviet external relations is a matter of individual inter-
pretation, but the structure itself serves as an excellent
vehicle for analysis.
The question of the differences between Soviet ide-
ology and that of any other state is central to the topic of
Brzezinski, o£. cit






this paper. Do the Soviets have as an ultimate objective
the "communiaation" of the world (whether "realistic" or
not), or are their policies simply consonant with "tradi-
tional" Russian goals? Do the Soviets act as any other
great power would act under similar circumstances, or is
their basic motivation determined by its Marxist foundation?
Brzezinski has commented that the Soviets have a
27
sense of "compulsive obligation" to spread communism. In
this writer's opinion, Soviet ideology is different—in the
political sphere—from that of any other great power in its
ambition, its scope, thoroughness, and—most important—in
this matter of "compulsive obligation" to extend the power
of the Soviet regime through the international communist
movement (again, it is not material to question the via-
bility of the movement for this purpose, the "sincerity" of
the professions of the Soviet leaders, or whether the
Soviet leadership would risk the safety of the Soviet Union
to advance the cause of the international movement).
The uniqueness of the Soviet system is exemplified
28
in two characteristics: its internationalism and its
27Ibid.
, p. 107.
28On the subject of the internationalist aspect of
Soviet communism, E. H. Carr has suggested that "... the
success of Soviet propaganda has been largely due both to
its appeal to the masses and to its international charac-
ter," Edward Hallett Carr, The Soviet Impact on the Western
8X





attitude toward the legitimacy of the existing inter-
national order. These attitudes are mutually reinforcing.
Because Communist theory does not recognize the legitimacy
of the present world order, especially that of the capital-
ist powers, the Soviet Union does not feel the same inhibi-
tions against taking measures to change the international
political structure as do the Western powers (whose inhibi-
tions should not be exaggerated). The motivating force for
such a policy is supplied by the internationalism of the
communist ideology, which projects the concepts of a class-
less society and the withering away of the state to the
international sphere, where all states will have arrived at
equality under socialism (communism), and national boun-
daries, armaments, and other artificial international
obstacles will "eventually" disappear. These two concepts,
the socialist internationalism of the future and the ille-
gitimacy of the present international system, have not heen
challenged by the exigencies of the last forty-five years
and found to be unworkable, as have so many communist
World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954), p. 75.
Professor Carr goes on to warn Western civilization that if
it ". • • fails to develop ideas which appear equally valid
in these respects, the advantage will continue to be on the
side of the Soviet propagandists," Perhaps Professor Carr
has misinterpreted both the need for Western civilization










principles that have been applied and soon jettisoned. 29
On the contrary, the idealistic communist goals of inter-
nationalism coincide with the aspirations of most men for
brotherhood, mutual respect, the elimination of coercion in
30human relationships, etc. In addition, the success of
the capitalist system has not removed the distrust felt by
large numbers of those people who still consider capitalism
a form of economic slavery. The very nature of the arms
race provides a natural, strong impetus toward some form of
international system that, many hope, will preclude one
state from making war on another. The internationalist
image of communism, a sort of authoritarian "one world"
system, could provide this type of international harmony,
its advocates claim. It is all too easy to emphasize the
apparent cynicism of contemporary Soviet methods, to dwell
29Bertram D. Wolfe, "Communist Ideology and Soviet
Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs , XLI (October, 1962), 152,
speaks of the "enduring elements of Soviet ideology." Cyril
E. Black, ''Soviet Political Life Today," Foreign Affairs
,
XXXVI (July, 1958), 580, claims that if Marxism has any role
in Soviet politics today it is in the realm of foreign
policy objectives: "It is perhaps natural that the further
a problem is removed from practical Soviet knowledge, the
more a solution is sought in ideology." Adam Ulam expresses
essentially the same idea in "Soviet Ideology and Soviet
Foreign Policy," World Politics , XI (January, 1959), 155.
30Daniels, The Nature of Communism , op . cit • , p. 13,
comments that "it is in its moral aspect that Marxism has
made and still makes its great appeal ... Marxism has
gathered much more force as a moral rebellion than an eco-
nomic one • "





on the radical evolution of Soviet ideology from its origi-
nal Marxist content, and to ignore the motivating drive,
impetus, and consistency supplied to the communist hier-
archy by the principles contained in internationalism. 31
The Soviet view of the international structure is
one of the keys in assessing the Soviet Union either as a
traditional, conservative power, or as a revisionist power
that does not accept the present system and feels unre-
stricted in its efforts to transform that system to the
greatest extent possible, maximizing its national power in
the process*
The uniqueness of Soviet motivations is not to be
found solely in Marxist doctrine, or in historic Russian
nationalism, pan-slavism, etc., but in the resultant ide-
ology that has been fused from and strengthened by these
32
and other factors. The class struggle was mentioned by
Brzezinski as one of the Marxist bases upon which Soviet
experience has developed "Soviet" ideology. Through the
policies of Lenin and subsequent development, the concept
31The theoretical bases of socialist internationalism
are discussed in the succeeding chapter.
32Adam B. Ulam, "Nationalism, Panslavism, Communism,"
in Ivo J. Lederer (ed.), Russian Foreign Policy (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962)
,
p. 61, says that "Marxism-
Leninism has been able to synthesize and assimilate the most





of the class struggle has been all but abandoned in favor
of the international struggle between socialism (the
"forces of peace") and imperialism—capitalism (the "forces
of reaction and war"). The clamor over peaceful coexist-
ence has not altered this view significantly. Peaceful
coexistence does not negate the traditional communist no-
tion that hostility is the normal feature of international
affairs, and that the socialist states can have no lasting
community of interest with the West. Some authors, includ-
ing scholars in the field of international law, have argued
at great lengths to support the view that it is difficult,
if not impossible, to conduct a "meaningful comparative
33
study" of the records of the Soviet Union and the United
States in the observance and violation of treaties. This
writer would suggest that Professor Lissitzyn could make a
valuable comparative study if he would select just one area
of international law that is well established by both
custom and treaty: the respect, on the part of each member
of the international community, for the lawful existence of
the other members of the community. Soviet ideology and
policy openly vow to transform all states into socialist
33Oliver J. Lissitzyn, "Western and Soviet Perspec-
tives on International Law—A Comparison, M Proceedings of
the American Society of International Law, Report of the
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states. This policy has been implemented thoroughly when-
ever Soviet authorities have considered it to be within
their interests
,
despite the norms of international law and
specific treaties entered into by the Soviet Union (such as
those with Great Britain in 1924, and the United States in
1933, providing for diplomatic recognition of the U.S.S.R.).
Yet, Professor Lissitzyn equates an avowed, deliberate
policy of disregard for the accepted norm of international
law with the occasional violations of specific principles
of international law committed by other world powers, in-
34
eluding the United States and Great Britain.
Professor Lissitzyn, it seems, then revises his pre-
vious attitude regarding Soviet views of the legitimacy of
the international system.
Since "peaceful coexistence" is regarded as tempo-
rary and implies no long-range accommodation with the
West, Soviet decision-makers feel free to reinterpret
and use international law norms to serve their own
distinctive interests with seemingly less restraint
34
Ibid., pp. 23-24. Professor Lissitzyn then carries
this distortion of logic even farther by noting, p. 25, that:
"The sense of moral obligation can hardly be relied upon as
a firm basis for the continued observance of treaties," but
that the processes of diplomacy must seek mutual self-
interests. The question might be raised, what is "mutual
self-interest" if it does not include the notion of moral
obligation- The absence of moral obligation implies that
physical punishment is the ultimate sanction; this hardly
is in accord with the notion of "mutual self-interest."
Professor Lissitzyn is quite correct in observing that "we
must beware of the naive assumption that [morality and the






than is normal In the West, less regard for consist-
ency or reciprocity, and less concern for stability. 35
Whether or not a comparative study of the attitudes
of the Soviet Union and any other power is conducted, the
unique position of the Soviet leadership in regard to inter-
national order and stability is reflected in their attitude
toward international law, one important segment of their
general structure of ideas.
Many students of Soviet politics have missed the
dynamism of Soviet ideology because they have failed to
place the evolution of Marxist theory in the Soviet Union
within the framework of an understanding of Russian history
and the nature of the Russian people. Marxist theory, we
are often told, is a product of Western culture, and, of
course, this is at least geographically correct. But,
there is a great divergence between Marxist theory and
Leninist political practice, not only because one was
theory and the other practice, but because Marxism was pri-
marily a product of—or reaction to—Western political
thought, and Lenin was a "typical" Russian authoritarian:
37





. , pp. 103-184, has described Marxism
as ". . . radical and deliberate break with all the major
social traditions of Western culture."









It is wise to caution, as von Rauch does, against
an automatic conclusion that Russian character and Russian
history have predetermined an authoritarian or totalitarian
political system in Russia. Von Rauch correctly reminds us
that democratic elements have always existed in Russia, but
he fails either to note the comparative weakness of Russian
democratic elements as a political force of consequence, or
to point out where these forces failed to set the course of
39Russian political development.
Berdyaev's study is one of the more scholarly at-
tempts to relate Soviet ideological dynamism to Russian
character and tradition; his thesis seems to contradict von
Rauch' s claim that a democratic strain has always been
40present in Russia. Berdyaev has described the historical
background of the messianic movement in early Russia,
especially Moscow as the Third Rome or the "true church" of
(Ann Arbor, Michigan: The University of Michigan Press,
1960), p. 15.
Georg von Rauch, A History of Soviet Russia (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger , 1957),' p. vi. Von Rauch em-
phasized his opposition to the belief "... that present
conditions are a national consequence of a Russian predis-
position for autocratic, despotic forms of government."
39For the antithesis to von Rauch's opinion, see Lev
E. Dobriansky, "The Roots of Russia," United States Naval
Institute Proceedings , LXXXIX (April, 1963) , 45-51, in which
Dobriansky outlines the disposition of the Russian people
for authoritarian rule.
Berdyaev, op_. cit
, , pp. 10-11.













Christianity, providing a motivating force for world evan-
gelism* Peter the Great is described as the precursor of
Lenin, a true bolshevik, a "revolutionary from above."
Peter *s exhortations to the Russians to catch up to the
West has been echoed many times by Soviet leaders, and is
more akin to Soviet ideology than is Marxist theory. The
history and characteristics of the Russian intelligentsia
also indicate the form that Sovi, I Communism would assume.
The Russian intelligentsia has been historically apart from
42the people, distinguished by its dogmas and intolerance.
Berdyaev pictures ". • • a most characteristic frame of
mind of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia—the love
43
of the man far off, not the love of one's neighbor."
This attitude might explain, in part, the excesses of col-
lectivization, industrialization, and other harsh schemes
imposed by Soviet bureaucratic despots upon their own







, pp. 19 and 20-21.
43
Ibid., pp. 32-33. Compare this with Wolfe's com-
ment that Soviet ideology "... nourishes not so much love
of the future which is vague, as hatred of the present,
which is clear and visible ... hatred for * the oppressor 1
predominates over hatred of oppression as such or love for
the oppressed . . . ." Wolfe, 0£. cit . , p. 168.
-.









We have mentioned the uniqueness of the internation-
alism, the "compulsive obligation" of Soviet Communism.
This, also, is as much Russian as Marxist, although the two
forces are mutually supporting. Berdyaev states that "the
Russian spirit craves for wholeness," it seeks absolutes,
it takes ideas totally, without that quality of "sk Leal
44
criticism" so prevalent in the West. rdyaev notes that:
In Delinsky there was the characteristically
Russian search for an integral outlook which will
give an answer to all the questions of life, unite
the theoretical and practical reason, and give a
philosophical basis to the social ideal • • • • The
same idea of wholeness will be found ... in
Marxist Leninism. 4 5
Once having found the "integral outlook," the Rus-
sian intelligentsia accepts it wholly, as a complete doc-
trine, and is distrustful of those who have not been so
"enlightened." It then becomes a matter of necessity, or
compulsion, to force others to accept reality:
In order to bring happiness to the greater part
of mankind you may cut off the heads of hundreds of
thousands. Belinsky was the forerunner of bolshevik
morals. He says that people are so stupid that you
must drag them into happiness by force. ^6
This sampling of Russian character emphasizes the
affinity the Russians have felt for a totalitarian system
of ideas (such as that devised by Lenin) and their











inclination to force this system upon other nationalities,
48
as in the Baltics and East Europe.
Sovet ideology obviously cannot be accepted on face
value as an iron-clad determinant of Soviet policy. As was
stressed in the introduction, ideology is only one part of
the "policy equation." Ideology is pertinent to the deter-
mination of policy only to the extent that it shapes the
broad outline, the framework. There can be no final deter-
mination of this influence.
There are indications that ideology, the messianic
Marxist variety, no longer plays as significant a role in
Soviet politics as it may have in the past. Revolutionary
forces invariably lose some of their original dynamism and
atmosphere of crusade. The successful revolutionary move-
ment is involved with managing affairs of government, a
task far more complicated than the process of seizing power.
And once great power is achieved , as is the case with the
Soviet leaders, there is less inclination to be concerned
obsession with conspiracy can easily be exaggerated , as can
the nature of the threat pos^d by the Soviet system. As an
example, Dobriansky, o£. cit . ,pp. 45 and 50-51, writing of
the continuum of Russian politics from early Tsarist days,
warns that "... there can be no greater danger to civili-
zation than the combination of modern technology and a
barbaric scheme of Institutions as found in the U.S.S.R."
Fortunately, policy is not determined solely by mystical
heritage!
no
See Wolfe, 0£. cit . , p. 157, for a brief comparison








with risking all in order to establish the kingdom of
"heaven on earth" for others. Perhaps Soviet ideology is
meeting its greatest test through the requirements, demands,
and contradictions imposed by the construction of a "social-
ist system."
But the need for a unifying theory still remains.
The loyalty and sacrifice of the rank and file is not pur-
chased with visions of increased power for those holding
the reins of government. And, of course, there is the
great sense of material accomplishment, the pride of having
converted an agricultural state into a mighty industrial
power within two generations , despite the open hostility of
49the West. The impetus provided by past success, the
49As an example of the many factors impinging on
foreign policy, this writer suggests an examination of the
reasons underlying Soviet foreign aid expenditures, for a
short discussion of this subject, see Leon M. Herman, "The
Political Goals of Soviet Foreign Aid," United States
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Dimensions of Soviet
Economic Power
,
87U> Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1962), pp. 477-485; hereafter cited as
Dimensions ; Marxism-Leninism could be quoted extensively to
support either massive foreign aid ( "proletarian inter-
nationalism")
,
or none at all ("prevent the restoration of
capitalism-imperialism") • Foreign aid could be inspired
politically, as a means to influence the policy of the
recipient country. Foreign aid could be an economic device
of tactical importance. Also, foreign aid could be a pres-
tige program designed to demonstrate the superiority both
of socialism as an economic system and the capabilities of
the Russian people. The final decision most likely re-
flects a mix of these and other attitudes; but, as Mr.
Herman points out (p. 477), although there are logical








prestige of present power, and the future goals of social-
ism provide the heart of Soviet ideology today. This ide-
ology may represent a radical transformation of Marxism,
but it is, nevertheless, an internationalist ideology, one
that cannot satisfy its believers with the status quo. The
Soviet leaders
... may even want to extend the communist system
wherever possible for no better reason than that the
acquisition of power breeds a desire for more power.
We do know at least that few regimes in history have
been more obsessed with power. As single-minded
practitioners of the arts of power, they may not
know how else to use their energies and express them-
selves. The conclusion that revolutionary Marxism
no longer commands their passionate loyalty does not
prove at all that they have abandoned expansionist
aims. 50
The combination of fear of the West and national
ambitions fortified by an internationalist ideology make up
the dominant motivating force in Soviet foreign policy.
The uniqueness of Soviet ideology may whet a nationalist
appetite, but it does not transform the methods of employ-
ing power. The present international system is much more
analogous to the traditional pattern than an excessive con-
centration on "irrational" ideology would indicate. The
aid, "... the decision ... was taken by the Soviet
inner circle some 8 years ago . • • [and] the Soviet commit-
ment of resources to foreign aid has grown steadily from
year to year • • • •
"
John A. Corry, Soviet Russia and the Western Alli-









intended emphasis of this chapter has been directed toward
the motivating forces of Soviet foreign policy, not its
form or structure. The uniqueness of Soviet ideology in
itself serves to reinforce expansionist policies and pro-
vide some rather effective tools for implementing those
policies, but the methods and objectives of power expan-
sionism have not suddenly been transformed by ideology,
• . • it does not follow that the Communist doc-
trines of the Russian revolution must be accounted
to have ceased to have an influence on world af-
fairs, for even if there is no Communist grand
design there are Communist pre-conceptions which,
whether obtrusively or unobtrusively, conditions
the thoughts and policies of Russian ... states-
men • • • • Communists have inherited from their
forebears and indeed still learn for themselves a
missionary zeal, a capacity for intrigue and for
organization of revolution, and an attitude toward
peace as a sort of refined war, a war without overt
physical onslaughts. 51
An attempt has been made to sketch the broad nature
of ideology as it is conceived today , and the relationship
between ideology and the foreign policy of a great power,
such as the Soviet Union. The next task is to examine the
theoretical foundations of the Soviet bloc.
51Peter Calvocoressi, New States and World Order
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CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE
SOCIALIST SYSTEM
Marxist theory and Leninist practice, voluminous and
pervasive as they are, left little in the nature of specific
guidance for the construction of the new socialist world,
following the establishment of the "peoples* democracies"
in Eastern Europe after World War II. Marxist theory had
concentrated on a detailed condemnation of the state of the
world—the capitalist world, mostly—in the mid-nineteenth
century. The future would take care of itself, once the
existing economic structure had been overturned. When the
proletariat gained control of the productive forces, man
would be able to realize his full potential. Marx often
alluded to the achievement of freedom, "the resolution of
the conflict between man and nature," and the realization
of a society in which man is no longer alienated from him-
self. Marx also referred briefly to the possible, tempo-
rary requirement for a dictatorship of the proletariat:
Betv/een capitalist and communist society lies the
period of the revolutionary transformation of the
George Lichtheim, Marxism ; An Historical and
Critical Study (New York: FrederickT. Praeger, 1961), p.
50, citing Karl Marx. Economic-Philosophical Manuscripts





one into the other. There corresponds to this also
a political transition period in which the state
can be nothing but the revolutionary dictatorship
of the proletariat.
2
But beyond these rather vague pronouncements, there
is little in Marxism to guide the contemporary communist in
the problems of relations among socialist states.
Lenin was more concerned with the problems of seiz-
ing and holding power. One of the keys to the success of
the proletarian revolution, in Lenin's view, was the
national question. Lenin wrote rather extensively on
nationality, nationalism, and the right to national self-
determination. From these writings and from other rather
isolated, yet specific references to these issues, the theo-
retical framework for Lenin's attitudes on relations among
socialist countries may be deduced.
Despite the paucity of Marxist-Leninist theory on
the world socialist structure as Marx and Lenin might have
visualized it, contemporary Marxist scholars claim a vast
heritage bequeathed by Marx and Lenin. Their claim is
somewhat contradictory, however; while they extol the "huge
ideological wealth" of Marxist-Leninist theory pertaining
to the world socialist system, they also recognize the
"important problems," the "many new problems" in relations
2In a letter written by Marx in 1875, quoted in V.
I. Lenin, Marx-Engels-Marxism (Moscow: Foreign Languages
Publishing House, 1951), p. 441.
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among socialist states that demand the "creative develop-
3
ment" of Marxism-Leninism,
To support their argument that Marxism-Leninism
treats the question of the socialist system in some detail,
the Soviet authors mention the obvious fact that:
The founders of Marxism-Leninism . . . also had some
practical experience in establishing relations be-
tween nations based on internationalist principles
which had been accumulated prior to the formation of
the world socialist system.
4
It seems hardly likely, in view of Soviet claims
that the socialist system is a new development in inter-
national politics, that this "practical experience" would
have heen of much value. But this question is of little
practical concern, b. cause the "creative development" of
Marxism-Luninism is capable not only of filling in any gaps
that exist in the theory, but also of altering the theory
to satisfy the requirements of the moment. It is of
greater value to us to attempt to describe, in brief form,
Lenin's treatment of the problem of nationality and how
this applies to the issue of relations among socialist
states and th;_ creation of a "world socialist system."
3
.indamentals of harxism-Leninism (Moscow: Foreign










Then it will be seen how Lenin's views have been "crea-
tively developed" by latter-day Marxists.
As Lenin (who considered himself an orthodox Marxist)
interpreted the evolution of history, he saw nationalism as
5
a temporary phenomenon, one of the evil characteristics of
the capitalist system. Since capitalism was doomed to in-
evitable disappearance, so was nationalism. This, in part,
explains the- inherent contradiction within Lenin's theory
of the right to national self-determination. Nationalism,
prior to the completion of the socialist revolution, pre-
sented a threat to the success of the socialist movement.
The attractiveness of nationalism to the bourgeoisie could
serve not only to strengthen the bourgeois revolution but
might also prevent the later assimilation of nationalities
under socialism. For this reason, and others as tactics
dictated, Lenin continually emphasized that the proletariat
of all nations was absolutely opposed to nationalism, and
was unified in the alliance of the working class of all
nations. The proletariat looks beyond national boundaries,
and "... evaluates every national demand, every national
separation, from the angle of the class struggle of the
5
V. I. Lenin, "Who Are the Friends of the People.,"
Sochinenlia . I, 73.
V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determina-














workers." This evaluation, consistently demanded by
Lenin, required that separation (secession) be interpreted
in the interests of the class struggle. It partially ex-
plains Lenin's concept of "right to union."
Lenin 1 s thesis on nationalism and the nationality
question hinges on the Marxist futuristic concept of the
3
eventual proletarian society. The fact that the course of
history, since the latter part of the nineteenth century,
has not moved in this direction dilutes the basis of
Lenin's argument, and partially explains his animosity
toward the Social-Democratic movement in Western Europe in
the era just prior to and during the First World War. It
seems logical to assume that, if nationalism is a bourgeois
manifestation and if the proletariat of all nations have
more in common with other proletariat than with the bour-
geoisie of their own nation, then the success of the prole-
tarian revolution will usher in the stateless, nation-less
era of proletarian internationalism. Since workers, by
definition, are inherently incapable of exploiting fellow
7Ibid.
g
As Alfred G. Meyer has described the basis of this
society, "to a worker, the fellow proletarian across the
border is closer than the bourgeois at home ... [Marxists]
therefore believed that as soon as the proletariat had
assumed power over society, the system of nations would
wither away Just as the state would wither." Alfred G.










workers, there will be no need for state institutions,
which are simply an expression of class domination. From
this line of reasoning, Lenin developed his theories of the
right to national self-determination and its less familiar
corollary, the right to union. As these two concepts are
discussed, it should be remembered that Lenin was interested
primarily in the seizure and maintenance of power as a
means of effecting the world-wide proletarian revolution.
The slogan of the right to self-determination was one of
the tactics to be employed in this struggle; it, therefore,
receives much more of Lenin's attention than his notion of
the "right to union." This latter idea was less signifi-
cant to Lenin than self-determination not only because it
was considered natural, in Marxist theory, that the prole-
tariat would desire to be united, but also because it was a
subject for the future, after the success of the revolution.
It was expected that such an issue would be easily disposed
of, if it should arise at all.
Lenin was a practical revolutionary. Despite his
professed distaste for bourgeois nationalism, he recognized
the facts of international life and felt that it would
probably ~uc necessary for the proletarian revolution to be
9
accomplished primarily within national bounds. He was,
9Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-De termination
,








therefore, determined to employ the issue of nationalism to
pursue the revolution both in Russia and throughout the
world. This was not a simple task for Lenin, and it has
not been easy for his successors who have faced, and still
face, the very delicate issue of nationalism. Lenin pur-
sued the "correct" center path, between the "leftists" such
as Rosa Luxemburg and others who felt that national isra was
an obsolete bourgeois characteristic that had no place in
the proletarian revolution, and the "rightists" who tended
to compromise on the issue of nationalism to the extent that
they ignored the revolution. The leftists, or ideological
purists, have nearly always been much fewer in number and
significance, even in the early days of communist inter-
nationalism, for the simple reason that few people—even
revolutionaries—are readily willing to sacrifice them-
selves and their carefully-developed organization for
ideological principles. The path of least resistance is
temporary expediency, or the compromise of principle for
the sake of the movement.
The more insidious threat has been posed by the
rightists who prefer a form of "national-cultural autonomy"
which, in effect, negates the internationalist objectives
Refers to rightist and leftist views. Robert V.











and characteristics of the revolution. As the Resolution
on the National Question, approved by the April 1917 Con-
ference, stated:
The Party of the proletariat decisively rejects
what is known as "national-cultural autonomy" ...
[which] strengthens the ties between the workers and
the bourgeois culture of the individual nations,
whereas the aim of Social-Democracy is to strengthen
the international culture of the proletariat of the
world.
H
The urge for "national-cultural autonomy" was
strengthened, nevertheless, by Lenin's insistence on the
right to national self-determination, which he defined,
from the ''historical-economic point of view," as "• . .
political self-determination, political independence, the
12formation of a national state." The most consistent
13
characteristic of Lenin* s nationality policy is his per-
sistent reiteration of the premise that national self-
determination is neither absolute nor automatic. National
J. V. Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial
Question (London: Lawrence and Wishart" 1947)
, pp. 269-270.
12Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination
,
op . cit .
,
p. 14.""
13For an excellent interpretive study of Lenin's
treatment of the nationality problem, see Alfred D. Low,
Lenin on the Question of Nationality (New York: Bookman
Associate . 1958) . A somewhat less orderly, but useful,
study of the same subject is Samad Shaheen, The Communist
( Bolshevik ) Theory of National Self-Determination (The










self-determination is a "bourgeois-democratic demand," and
is to be supported by the proletariat only when it suits
their interests, not the interests of the bourgeoisie.
Lenin makes it clear that the policy of the proletariat may
temporarily parallel—but never coincide with—that of the
bourgeoisie. "The working class supports the bourgeoisie
... in order to secure equal rights and to create better
14
conditions for the class struggle .
"
Lenin* s nationality policy was wholly opportunistic.
Designed to support the working class movement, its objec-
tives were international in scope. The right to national
self-determination was a tactical weapon and was not to
contradict or supersede the higher Interests of proletarian
internationalism. Even within Lenin's time, nearly four
decades before the 1956 Soviet repression in Hungary in the
name of "socialist" solidarity, these "higher interests"
became so broadly defined as to become equivalent to the
maintenance of socialist authority already established.
Instead of the interests of world socialism being placed
above the interests of any national unit in the socialist
system, the national interests of the largest entity in the
former Tsarist empire, the interests of Great Russia,
became identified as the interests of all of the nationality
Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination ,
op . cit . , p. 24. Italics added.
0*
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15groups. After World War II, a similar process took place
in eastern Europe.
As a slogan, then, the "right" to national self-
determination was designed, first, to weaken the authority
of the Tsarist regime and thus aid the cause of the revolu-
tion in Russia and, secondly, to break down the traditional
world order which had been established by, and was now con-
trolled by, the capitalist-imperialist powers, thus enhanc-
ing the cause of world revolution. Once the revolution had
been achieved in Russia, in late 1917, and a socialist
"system" had been established, conditions became entirely
different, of course. The right to self-determination than
Several scholars have commented on the "consist-
ency" of Lenin's nationality policy. Low , o£. cit . , p. 126,
describes Lenin's position as logical in the Marxist sense
in that it furthers the Interests of the proletarian revo-
lution. Still, ". • . there are a large number of sharp
contradictions and basic incongruities in Lenin's thought
on nationality, to say nothing of wide gaps." Oscar I.
Janowsky, Nationalities and National Minorities (New York:
The Kacmillan Company, 1945)
,
p. 76, comments that "...
the Bolshevik position in the national question has been at
once consistent and highly practical." This is correct but
of little meaning when one considers Janowsky' s accurate
description of the purpose to be served in the nationality
issue: "National policy was ancillary to the broader aims
of social revolution • . . • " Janowsky is trapped by a
self-defining definition: Lenin believes in national self-
determination, so long as it does not contradict the in-
terests of the working class; Lenin himself (or "the Party")
determines when these interests are contradicted. This
writer suggests that Lenin's opportunistic nationality







was to be interpreted in terms of the interests of the es-
tablished socialist state, and the corollary of the slogan
of self-determination, or the "right to union," came into
16
effect.
From the socialist point of view, self-determination
is inherently a destructive principle; the "right to union"
is its constructive opposite. The right to self-determination
is a proletarian tactic designed to spur the socialist revo-
lution; the right to union is the theoretical basis for the
construction of the socialist state or socialist system
during and following the revolution.
To support his notion of the right to union, Lenin
emphasized the economic advantages of the large state.
But beyond these advantages and the natural inclination of
1 6
As explained in Pravda , July 11, 1956, pp. 2-3
[translated in Current Digest of the Soviet Press , Volume
VIII, Number 28~ p. 21; this publication is hereafter cited,
for example, as CDSP-VIII-28, p. 21]: "V. I. Lenin set the
task of uniting the Soviet republics into a single allied
state and pointed out the major significance the accomplish-
ment of this task had for the fate of socialist construction
• • .
• " The purpose of this Pravda article was to de-
emphasize the role of Stalin in early nationality policy,
and to underline the "truly paternal concern Lenin always
showed for the development of the national republics ...
[and] how he brought up the Communist Parties in these
republics in the spirit of internationalism and how he
struggled implacably against great-power chauvinism and
local nationalism."
17Lenin referred to this subject in "Discussion of
Self-Determination Summed Up," Sochineniia , XIX: 256, and in
"Letter to Shaumian," Sochineniia, XVII: 89-90.
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the proletariat to unite, Lenin stressed that the prole-
tariat of oppressed nationalities have a socialist duty, or
18
obligation, to insist upon the right to union* Lenin's
rather obtuse definition of a Social-Democrat provides the
theoretical concept: a Social-Democrat w . . • must fight
against small-nation narrowmindedness ... he must fight
for the recognition of the whole ... and the subordina-
tion of the interests of the particular to the interests of
19the general."
It is not difficult to determine the nature of "the
interests of the general." The April 1917 Resolution on
the National Question, written by Stalin at Lenin's request,
stated emphatically that:
The interests of the working class demand the
amalgamation of the workers of all the nationalities
of Russia into common proletarian organisation
.... Only such amalgamation of the workers of
the various nationalities ... will permit the
proletariat to wage a successful struggle against
international capital and bourgeois nationalism. 20
Lenin's theory of the form and organization of the
state is not of direct interest to us here. Lenin, the
practical revolutionary, was primarily concerned, prior to
18
"Discussion of Self-Determination Summed Up,"




20Stalin, Marxism and the National and Colonial




1917, with the problems of achieving power. After the suc-
cess of the October Revolution, Lenin's interests naturally
were directed toward maintaining and expanding the power of
the new Soviet state. The emphasis on practical problems
and the exercise of power is typical of Lenin; his ideal-
istic work, The State and Revolution , is primarily a reflec-
tion of the revolutionary fervor that struck Lenin in
211917. The practical problems of controlling huge terri-
tories and administering a large state, independent of the
problems of survival generated by civil war and foreign
intervention, soon overwhelmed and displaced the syndical-
ist, anarchist revolutionary slogans. The possibility that
early failures to establish a truly socialist form of
government consonant with Marxist theory might indicate a
basic misconception in this theory apparently did not enter
the minds of Lenin or his successors.
21
•3 Meyer, Leninism , op . cit . , pp. 195-196; Pro-
fessor Meyer notes that the idealism of State and Revolution
is incongruous with the typical realism of Lenin. Simi-
larly, Robert V. Daniels, in "The State and Revolution: A
Case Study in the Genesis and Transformation of Communist
Ideology, " The American Slavic and Sast Suropean Review
,
XII (1953), 24, calls State and Resolution, an "aberration"
of Leninism. Even more significant, as Daniels points out,
p. 22, is that this aberration has heen "... made to
serve as the reference point for rationalizing the subse-
quent evolution of the Soviet State in an entirely different
direction." For a brief treatment of Lenin's theory of the
state, see C. H. Carr , The Bolshevik Revolution 1917-192 3







Parallel to the development of the massive Soviet
state was the formulation of the concept of "socialism in
one country." Whereas the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk
demonstrate the value superiority of national interest over
ideology (or the desirability of world revolution, in this
instance) in Lenin's view, so the New Economic Policy and
its related endeavors of the early 1920 's represent the
abandonment of basic ideological concepts to the demands of
expediency. The failure of the anticipated world revolu-
tion to materialize made necessary the concept of "socialism
in one country" even in Lenin's time, although Stalin is
22
credited with its authorship.
Although Lenin's theoretical characteristics of the
state as described in State and Revolution were not real-
ized, Lenin did provide some brief descriptions of what the
future socialist system would be like. The subservience of
the "interests of the particular" to that of the whole
serves as a theoretical point of departure. This is the
23foundation of Lenin's views on socialist internationalism.
22
/er > Leninism , op . cit . , pp. 221-230, convinc-
ingly describes how Lenin is really the father of the idea
of "socialism in one country," despite statements by Lenin
that indicate otherwise. However, Gunther Nollau, Inter-
national Communism and Wor Id Revolution ( New York
:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1961)
,
p. 282, claims that Stalin
". • . invented the 'Leninist' teaching 'Socialism in one
country,'" and that (p. 93) ". • . this theory broke with
the ideas of Marx, Engels and Lenin."
23
In The Right of Nations to Self-Determination , op .










The problem, of course, is to define the "interests of the
whole" that are of superior value to the interests of the
particular. By reference to ideology alone, it can easily
be demonstrated that there is no contradiction. The inter-
ests of the whole are the interests of the proletariat, and
these interests, in turn, are determined by the socialist
government in power. The idealistic goals of international
socialism are soon equated to the needs of the regime, and
socialist internationalism becomes—in effect—the equiva-
lent of the single Soviet state. It has been expedient (and
one of the constants of Soviet policy) to recognize the
prerogatives of sovereignty and the traditional state system
as somewhat permanent characteristics of international
24politics. As a derivative of this attitude, it might be
anticipated that the formation of a "soviet union" would be
based on the principles of federalism. Although the Soviet
Union was to become federalist in structure, early
cit
. , pp. 25-26, Lenin briefly records his allegiance to
equality among states , but then remarks that the proletariat
"... attaches supreme value to the alliance of the prole-
tarians of all nations, and evaluates every national demand,
every national separation, from the angle of the class
struggle of the workers."
24
The editors of The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism ,
op . cit
. ,
p. 769, representing contemporary Marxist theory,
claim that "Lenin pointed out that national and state dis-
tinctions between peoples and countries would continue to
exist for a very long time even after the victory of the




theoretical controversy and later practice centered on the
concept of a unitary state, whether through governmental or
party structure. During the revolutionary period, Lenin
was consistently and adamantly in favor of a centralized,
25
rather than a federalized, state. The desire fcr a strong,
centralized state and the concept of a future socialist
26
world state are both reflections of the theory of social-
ist internationalism, referred to by Marx and made doctrine
by Lenin.
Socialist internationalism should be considered in
its historical concept, because its meaning has been
altered considerably in the last forty-five years, espe-
cially in the last decade. In addition, socialist inter-
nationalism, as the theoretical motivating and unifying
force of the socialist system, is much more than a mere
slogan. It is incorrect to consider the idea of socialist
internationalism either a complete sham or the sole link
between socialist countries; it is also incorrect to view
socialist internationalism as a synonym for either a
25
Low, o£. cit
. , p. 89.
25Discussed in Klaus Tornudd, "Soviet Attitudes
Towards Non-Military Regional Co-Operation, " Commentationes
Humanarum Litterarum , XXVIII (Helsingfors, Finland, 1961)
,
18. Tornudd references Stalin ( Sochineniia , V: 15 7-158) as
suggesting the Soviet Union as a prototype for such a state.
-I
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monolithic world socialist system or a loose socialist
"commonwealth" of fraternally-associated states.
In Lenin's revolutionary sense, it was mandatory to
maintain—in the face of occasionally overwhelming odds
—
absolute unity and cohesion:
The interests of the working class and of its
struggle against capitalism demand complete soli-
darity and the closest unity of the workers of all
nations • . . . * 7
Working class solidarity could not be based, in
practice, solely upon any cooperative venture such as fed-
eralism, or upon an ideological conception such as the
workers' consciousness. Just as the proletariat required
the leadership of the Party to achieve their revolution,
the socialist countries needed to be amalgamated, or assimi-
lated, in order to achieve "socialist internationalism":
Just as mankind can realize the abolition of
classes only through the transit! aal period of the
dictatorship of the oppressed clas3, so mankind, can
realize the inevitable fusion of nations only
through the period of complete emancipation of all
the oppressed nations . . • .28
27





28Lenin, quoted in T. A. Taracouzio, The Soviet
Union and International Law (New York: The Kacmillan











Obviously, such fusion cannot be the product of the
exercise of the right to national self-determination. For
this reason, once the proletarian revolution has succeeded,
self-determination, or secession, becomes reactionary and a
threat to the existing socialist regime. If events are un-
folding in accordance with the precepts of Marxism-Leninism,
however, the initial success of the workers' revolution
should spur the movement forward; the proletariat of other
bourgeois states will revolt and exercise their "right to
union" and join the existing socialist system. This is the
theory of the "spark" that Lenin hoped would apply success-
fully to the Russian revolution and its effect on the pro-
29letariat of Western Europe. To insure that the "spark"
theory did not function in reverse, the "right to union"
could be exercised only once, whereas a seceding nationality
could later reverse its choice and opt to join the socialist
30
system —hardly a demonstration of confidence in the
theory of the "spark."
The spark theory was essentially a justification for
Lenin's combination of Marxist theory and his revolutionary
ambitions in Russia. Amalgamation, in a rather similar
29For a discussion of the theory of "the spark,"
see Meyer, Leninism , op . clt. , pp» 156-160 and 177-179.
30Low, op_. cit
. ,







fashion, is Justified on the basis of socialist inter-
nationalism. As one student of the nationality problem has
indicated, Lewies concept of assimilation is at variance
with Marxist internationalism:
Marx saw the root of national hate, of national
tensions, and of imperialism in economics and in
the class struggle, but not in nationality as such.31
Nationality had been uprooted from its legitimate,
critical role in Marxist theory to become a weapon in
Lenin's revolutionary organization. Socialist internation-
alism, the dialectical opposite of bourgeois nationalism,
envisioned the eradication of national culture through the
process of the fusion of nationalities. Amalgamation and
assimilation are terms not often employed by Soviet theo-
rists today. Instead, much is heard of the integration of
32
socialist economies, the international division of labor,
and the fraternal socialist commonwealth. Occasionally,
Soviet writers mention such factors as the desirability for
33
more extensive consolidation of the socialist countries,
but these are usually ideological exhortations directed
more towards cooperation than consolidation.




33A. Sobolev, "Some Forms of Transition from Capi-
talism to Socialism," International Life [Mezhdynarodnaya








The theory of socialist internationalism has been
subjected to several major modifications by Lenin's succes-
sors. It would not be entirely accurate to attribute these
"revisions" of doctrine entirely to the will of the Soviet
leadership. Many factors are involved, as usual, In 'he
making of policy and of the fitting of theory to policy
when such is required. Often the adjustment is mostly dic-
tated by circumstances; this writer's review in subsequent
chapters of the nature of "socialist internationalism" in
the Soviet bloc during the period 1956-1958 should demon-
strate this.
One of the better known ideological formulations in
Soviet doctrine since Lenin is Stalin's enunciation of the
concept of "socialism in one country," a theory that can
rightfully be attributed to the policies, if not the words,
of Lenin. Stalin's subjection of the functioning of inter-
national communism to the dictates of ->oviet policy and
security needs requires no amplification here. Soviet
policy, at the risk of over-simplification, and with some
interruptions and shifts , entered a conservative era in the
mid-1920 's that lasted for a quarter century. During the
Second World War, Stalin initiated an extensive campaign of
Russian national patriotism that almost completely neglected
the hoary concept of proletarian internationalism. After







"reactionary" stage, shifted to a violent campaign against
34
cosmopolitanism, once one of Lenin* s prized concepts.
The cultural, political, and economic isolation of the
Soviet Union from the West continued, despite the creation
of the socialist system in the years 1945-1948
•
It has been suggested that the campaign against cos-
mopolitanism since World War II has been closely connected
with the communist emphasis on protection of sovereignty.
Attacks on cosmopolitanism may have dwindled in recent
years, but the support for the values and ideas represented
by national sovereignty ever continues. Several parallels
between the relationships of internationalism-nationalism
and cosmopolitanism—isolationism can be traced. Of sig-
nificance to this study is the nature and scope of the
problems presented the socialist commonwealth by the ex-
tended emphasis on the notion of sovereignty and sovereign
equality.
The Soviet claim to the prerogatives of sovereignty
was a tactical requirement for political survival in the
34For an example of the Soviet campaign, in the latter
years of Stalin's rule, against cosmopolitanism, see Pravda
,
April 7, 1949. Cosmopolitanism, which was considered by the
Soviets, at this time, to be an "ideological cover" for the
policies of the bourgeoisie, is discussed in Merle Kling,
The Soviet Theory of Internationalism (St. Louis: Washington
University Studies, 1952), pp. 30-31. In addition, see
Tornudd, 0£. cit . , p. 54.




early years of the weak Soviet state. In the last decade,
as the Soviet Union has reached a position of considerable
influence in the affairs of the world, sovereignty has con-
tinued to be employed by the Soviet leaders to protect
their system from foreign influence but, even more important
perhaps , to attract former colonies and underdeveloped na-
tions to the socialist camp. The Soviets realize that any
policy leading toward assimilation or amalgamation of the
East European people's republics, no matter how strongly
ired by the Soviet leadership, would produce an extremely
strong reaction. The suppression of excessively national-
istic tendencies is one problem; the Imposition of policies
leading to amalgamation is yet much more complex and dan-
gerous. Even the heavy-handed policies of Stalin were
directed primarily to ensuring Soviet control of the East
European satellites, the direction of their policies;
Stalin, the autocrat, undertook few—if any—significant
measures to effect the consolidation and amalgamation of
the socialist bloc.
Despite the efforts of Stalin's successors, the na-
ture of relations among socialist states has altered sig-
nificantly in recent years. The years 1956-1958 are con-
sidered to be the critical period in this transformation.
The new tensions, structure of power relationships, and
conflicting interests that now operate more freely in and
-
54
among the socialist states have caused a significant shift
in the pattern of authority within the socialist group.
This shift (even excluding Sino-Soviet difficulties) has
produced a hierarchical structure more suitable for the
designation of "commonwealth" than "bloc."
Khrushchev was faced with essentially the same prob-
lem that Lenin wrestled jstith: the contradictory require-
ments of socialist consolidation and the devisive forces of
nationalism. A reading of Khrushchev's speeches and writ-
ings will reveal hardly a hint of these developments.
According to Khrushchev, the socialist camp remained united
as never before, presenting a picture of monolithic unity
and fraternal cooperation against the imperialistic hos-
tility of the West. In the Premier's opinion:
A i socialist type of international relations
arose with the formation of the commonwealth of
socialist states. These are relations of fully equal
rights, genuine friendship, fraternal cooperation in
the sphere of politics, economics and culture, and
mutual assistance in the construction of a new life. 3®
Three years later, Khrushchev was even more explicit
in his conception of the naturs of relations between the
socialist states. Despite the facts of Hungary and other
instances of fraternal socialist assistance, Khrushchev was
able to claim that:







The socialist camp is a voluntary union of equal
and sovereign states in which no one seeks or
strives for any special rights, privileges or advan-
tages for himself. It goes without saying that
each socialist country independently decides the
forms of its cooperation with the other socialist
countries. There is not and cannot be any coercion
in this matter, 37
Whatever the relations among socialist states as
interpreted by Khrushchev, there is no reason to doubt but
that these relations have changed considerably since Stalin,
Khrushchev did not possess what has been characterized as
the "moral authority" of Stalin, moral authority in this
context signifying an authority extending beyond physical
control. Stalin commanded from the Kremlin an immense
political machine, in which the Red Army, police systems,
and economic domination were employed to compel abject co-
operation by the satellites. The image of Stalin projected
beyond these manifestations of political power, however.
This image was the product of many factors, undoubtedly,
but among these factors was a devotion to Stalin as the
great vozhd who had successfully led the socialist movement
for so many stormy years. In addition, Stalin was, to a
limited extent, a theoretician who had been able to stretch
Marxism without exceeding the limit of elasticity. The
37
N. S. Khrushchev, 7tb Congress of Bulgarian Com-
munist Party; Bulgarian broadcast, June 4, 1958, quoted in
N. H. Mager and Jacques Katel, Conquest Without War (New
York: Simon and Schuster, 1961), p. 155.
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extent of this "moral authority" enjoyed by Stalin, espe-
cially in the years after World War II, has been indicated
by one observer as a form of foreknowledge of Stalin's
wishes, a condition of initiating action in the satellite
states
• • • not on the basis of direct orders from
Stalin but through the application of the principle
of "anticipated reaction"—by attempting to do what
Stalin might wish done ,38
It is highly unlikely that such a condition can
ever be recaptured. Stalin had been able to build up his
control over the Communist Parties in Europe and elsewhere
quite methodically, and, if necessary, painfully, during his
many years in power* The advent of Yugoslavia's independent
course, the rise of a powerful competitor in the form of
Communist China, and the revelations by Khrushchev of the
insidious "cult of the personality"; all of these started
in motion a force of fragmentation that will be difficult,
if not impossible, to contain.
This process of fragmentation cannot be recognized
officially by communist theorists, nor should it be over-
emphasized by non-communist observers. In discussing rela-
tions among socialist countries, contemporary Soviet
ideologists take basically the Leninist line that the
growth of the socialist system inevitably produces a
38Brzezinski, op . cit
• , p. 112.
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strengthening of socialist bonds. Having repeated and Jus-
tified the Leninist reservation that national forms will
remain for a "very long time," even after the complete
socialist victory, Soviet Marxists claim that the strength-
ening of the sovereignty of socialist states does not
contradict the objective of socialist internationalism. On
the contrary, it is only through this process of strength-
ened sovereignty that the socialist states can become
politically equal, and through political equality the
39
socialist countries draw closer together:
Only when the nations are really free and equal,
when no one nation encroaches on the independence of
another, only in that case do they deeply trust each
other, voluntarily enter into close relations dic-
tated by the interests of developing the economy,
defence, and foreign policy.40
As we shall see in a later chapter, the Soviets
visualize this "growing-togetherness" primarily in economic
terms, although the ideological aspects of socialist inter-
nationalism and fraternal cooperation should not be com-
41pletely discounted.
39
Fundamentals . op . cit., pp. 769-770.
40
Ibid ., p. 771. This reasoning is somewhat akin
to Stalin* s unusual theory that the state can wither away
only by growing stronger! One might question how "inde-
pendent" states must become before they can "deeply trust
each other."
The authors of Fundamentals , op . cit . , p. 709,
noted that "this law-governed tendency" (growing together-
ness) is ". • . based primarily on the requirements of the
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There are other features of the socialist system
that are propounded to support Khrushchev's claim for a
"new type" of international relations. These features,
stressed in recent communist literature, are the contribu-
tions by socialist countries to the creative development of
Marxist-Leninist theory (although to avoid "mistakes and
shortcomings," socialist countries should rely on the ex-
perience of other socialist societies), the "voluntary
42pooling of effort" within the socialist commonwealth, and
the coincidence of the interests of the socialist countries:
The national interests of the socialist coun-
tries are harmoniously combined with their common
interests and aims • • • • Patriotism of the
peoples of the socialist countries merges with
internationalism. Love for one's own socialist
country is organically combined with love for all
fraternal socialist nations.*-*
Finally, the world socialist system is not hier-
archically structured, an inevitable development in the
capitalist world where the more industrialized, imperialist
countries dominate the poorer countries which are forced to
remain suppliers of raw materials. Instead of a hierarchy,
development of the productive forces ... the interaction
of national economic systems • " This process of interna-
tional economic integration, the authors say, had commenced
under capitalism—for exploitative purposes, of course—but
will accelerate under socialism for the benefit of all.
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the socialist commonwealth is an association of free and
44
equal states.
These qualities are all cited by Soviet theorists
as the peculiar characteristics of the socialist system.
An additional advantage that has been repeatedly stressed
in recent years is the opportunity for economic growth and
protection of socialist gains offered to the new, under-
developed nations by membership in the socialist camp.
Neither the level of economic development nor the military
potential of the underdeveloped countries need prevent
these underdeveloped countries from associating with the
socialist camp. The building of socialism is possible in
the underdeveloped country "... irrespective of its level
of development at the moment of the revolution ... [and]
irrespective of the size of its territory and population
45
and military potential."
Once the saccharine coating of "growing-tgetherness"
and international love is disposed of, however, the Soviet
Marxists turn to their real problems: nationalism and the
leadership role of the Soviet Union.
Whereas love and all things good are the organic
elements of the socialist system, ". • • imperialist
44£bid., pp. 766-767.
45Ibld.« p. 767.
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reaction • • • [and] the most poisonous flowers of revision-
ism blossom in the nationalist morass." Nationalism,
"exclusiveness" and national communism are treated as
threats to the unity and solidarity of socialist countries.
During one of the "freezes" in Soviet-Yugoslav relations,
Soviet authors described this process in Yugoslavia, "...
where narrow nationalistic tendencies came to the surface
47in the policy of the country* s leaders." Because the
Soviets have not been able, or have not chosen, to activate
a Leninist policy of amalgamation, nationalistic tendencies
have flowered within the socialist commonwealth. In a some-
what fretful tone, the Soviets have admitted their failure,
and that there can be no dominant or leadership role for
the USSR. Soviet Ideologists insist that "all the socialist
countries are fully independent in solving their national
problems and each one has an equal voice in solving the com-
48
mon problems of the socialist camp." Not only are social-
ist countries equal, but "the CPSU [Communist Party of the
Soviet Union] does not in the least claim a special, leading
46Ibid., p. 774. 4 7Ibid .
48
Ibid ., p. 775. Objection to the role of the
Soviet Union, however, is prima facie evidence of reaction:
"Genuine internationalists should always remember that dis-
tortion of the role of the Soviet Union in the socialist
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role in the international Communist movement .... The
Soviet Union is just an example of the struggle for social-
ism . . . ."49
We have seen that the problems of nationality and
nationalism posed the same dilemma to Lenin as they have to
his successors. We have indicated that these problems are
derived from a basic Marxist fallacy, the notion that bour-
geois nationalism, class exploitation, and inequality stem
wholly from the nature of the economic system, or the
method of control of the productive forces. The tactical
advantages that have accrued to Lenin and Khrushchev from
their nationality and sovereignty policies have not compen-
sated for their damaging effects on socialist International
cohesion. Soviet leaders have demonstrated remarkable
political astuteness and tactical cleverness in pressing
the issue of nationalist rights abroad, and attempting to
suppress them at home. Yet, they cannot really seize the
problem and solve it, for its solution would involve either
rejecting the advantage of today's tactical maneuverability
or a denial of tomorrow's socialist-internationalist goals.
Either course might be fatal. The expedient solution is to
ignore the dilemma, continue to pay obeisance to the devel-
opment of world socialism, and concentrate on the problems
49 Ibid., p. 776.
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of sovereignty and nationalism as they occur* In the suc-
ceeding chapters, we shall examine some of the practical
measures that deny the existence of a "new world socialist
system, at least in the internationalist conception of




FORMATION OF THE SOCIALIST SYSTEM
No discussion of the post-war years and the course
of events in Eastern Europe is complete or meaningful with-
out establishing a working definition of "Stalinism" and
the relationship of Stalinism to these events. Much con-
fusion regarding Soviet policies in recent years could have
been avoided had there been less reference to Stalinism as
if it were a clearly-defined historical phenomenon. This
thought applies even more to the concept of anti-Stalinism
(and de-Stalinization) , which, in its simplicity, seems to
imply to its users a sort of liberal-democratic attitude.
Stalinism embodies the essence of totalitarian
politics; it is perhaps the "purest" example of total domi-
nation of a political system by one individual that has
existed. Stalin's personality and totalitarianism were by
nature complementary. There are many definitions of totali-
tarianism, of course, most of which try to describe it by
its surface characteristics. For example, Brzezinski
ascribes the following syndrome to Carl J. Friedrich:
... an official ideology, a single mass party,
a technologically conditioned near-complete monopoly
of all mr»*r.<5 of effective armed combat and of effec-
tive mass communication, and a system of terroristic
police control.*
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Although these elements are undoubtedly included
within totalitarianism, they may also be said to constitute
a "simple" dictatorship, Brzezinski adds several more
attributes that help in forming a concept of totalitarian-
ism, such as
• • • political power • • • wielded without re-
straint • « • for the purpose of effecting a total
social revolution • . • in an atmosphere of coerced
unanimity of the entire population,*
This comes somewhat closer to the mark of totali-
tarianism, especially in the last qualification concerning
"coerced unanimity of the entire population*" A simple
distinction, in this writer's opinion, between the concepts
of dictatorship and totalitarianism is that basically the
former is passive, the latter active, in the exercise of
control. In a dictatorship the essential elements of the
exercise of control are held firmly in the grasp of the
leaders ; the remainder of the society is "observed , " so to
speak, to insure that no alternative power centers develop
that could threaten control by the regime. No such "passive"
nature exists in a totalitarian system; control in this type
of society is active in that it seeks to identify with and
dominate all social groups, classes, and strata to insure
not only that no possible alternative power centers develop
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but that all societal activities are consciously and con-
stantly directed toward the purposes of the regime.
These remarks are especially applicable to Stalin's
character and to his regime. Stalin was obsessed with
total control, and he enjoyed for two decades the complete
subservience of those immediately around him, the govern-
mental structure, and Soviet society. When the Russian
armies occupied Eastern Europe at the end of World War II,
this attitude of total control was applied in the construc-
tion of the socialist system. It was as inevitable as any
political process could be that the countries of East Cen-
tral Europe would be mechanically and thoroughly transformed
into miniature Soviet states , called "people * s democracies ,
"
and that they would become little more than outlying prov-
3inces of the Soviet state.
In domestic politics, Stalinism could be described
as the process of seeking, by any means at hand, absolute
3For a graphic description of the process of assimi-
lation and sovietization of the satellites, see Hannah
Arendt, "Totalitarian Imperialism: Reflections on the
Hungarian Revolution," in Edward T. Hallowell (ed.), The
Soviet Satellite Nations (Gainesville, Florida: Kallman
Publishing Company , 1958 ) , pp. 5-6. Miss Arendt points out
that "all this and much more was predictable, not because
there were any social or historical forces pressing in one
direction, but because this was the automatic result of
Russian hegemony." Also highly recommended as a short
study of "economic Stalinism" is Alfred zauberman, Economic
Imperialism : The Lesson of Eastern Europe (London: Ampers-
and, Ltd., 195*577
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control. Such control is not attainable, but the combina-
tion of totalitarianism and a perverse mentality that seeks
for the unattainable produces the type of permanent crisis
that has characterized the Soviet Union, In speaking of
Stalinism, it may be stated that his domestic policies in-
cluded the affairs of the satellites, which were controlled
thoroughly from Moscow until 1953. They were hardly to be
considered sovereign entities, except for the advantages to
be gained in the relations of the socialist camp with the
5
remainder of the world.
Stalin's obsession with total power, his suspicion
of those serving him, and his fear of those not under his
control extended to relations with countries outside the
socialist camp. The product of his mentality and a totali-
tarian political system was a conservative foreign policy:
conservative not in its objectives but in its policies to
achieve these objectives. Stalin's urge to dominate caused
him not to press the "proletarian revolution" in areas
4Stalinism exerted its negative effect on the social-
democratic parties of Western Europe and elsewhere, one of
the reasons prompting Khrushchev's revelations at the Twen-
tieth Party Congress. "To the world socialist movement,
Stalinism is synonymous with perfidy, despotism and murder."




5See Alexander Dallin, The Soviet Union at the
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where he might not be able to exercise maximum authority
should the revolution be successful.
Stalinism, then, can be seen as a political tech-
7
nique, the methods involved in the exercise of power
rather than the objectives of the power. To attempt to
label any other communist party or government as Stalinist
can cause serious misconception. Even more misleading,
perhaps, is the use of anti-Stalinism as a political de-
scription. Tito has often been called anti-Stalinist, yet
he was one of Stalin's most loyal supporters and imitators
9prior to the 1948 Cominform expulsion of Yugoslavia. It
would be more accurate to label Tito as "anti-Stalin," in
Stalin's conservative policies have led some stu-
dents to conclude that Stalin was not only not interested in
revolution, but was actually anxious to prevent Communist
revolutions in other countries. See Erich Fromm, May Man
Prevail.' (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1961;
, pp.
12 , 14, and 34. This seems an untenable conclusion when
viewed against the activities of the Soviet Union (or its
satellites) in Greece, Western Europe, and parts of South-
east Asia, in 1947-1948.
7Carl J. Friedrich and Zbigniew 3rzezinski, Totali-




Kelvin Croan and Carl J. Friedrich, "The East
German Regime and Soviet Policy in Germany," in Hallowell,
op . cit
• , pp. 45-46.
9Alex N. Dragnich, "Recent Political Developments
in Yugoslavia," in Hallowell, op. cit . , p. 114, states that
prior to 1948 the Yugoslavs "utilizing well-known Stalinist
methods, they established a totalitarian regime, which in
the political, economic, and social realms was hardly dis-
tinguishable from the Soviet model."
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that he and the other Yugoslav leaders were not willing to
accept the extent of Soviet domination demanded by Stalin.
This was a clash of interests and objectives, not of method.
It is clear that the establishment of the socialist
system in Eastern Europe after the war was entirely depend-
ent upon the overwhelming superiority of the Red Army.
What is unusual, considering this military superiority and
apparent Western indifference, is the conservative approach
to the control of East Europe that was adopted by Stalin.
Stalin's tactics were not only totalitarian, but tradi-
tional. During the initial phases of construction of the
socialist system in Eastern Europe, from 1944 through 1947,
there were differences in the methods of acquiring and ex-
ercising power employed by the various communist parties
because of national, ethnical, and political differences.
Late 1947 marked an abrupt change in the pace of recon-
structing Eastern Europe. This change was signaled by
Zhdanov's uncompromising speech at the opening session of
the Corainform in September, 1947, and was closely followed
by strong communist pressure in Western Europe during that
winter and the Prague coup and Berlin blockade of the
following spring.
10The last years of Stalin, from 1948 through 1952,
included both the greatest intensity of the cold war and
the severest attempts to mold the East European satellites









From 1948 on, each state* s political, economic, and
military institutions were patterned directly upon those in
the Soviet Union, with almost no regard for the level of
industrial development, the political sophistication of the
peoples, or whether the occupied country had been an ally
or enemy state during the war* In each of the people's
democracies, the Communist or Workers' Party soon dominated
the political scene, a policy of economic autarky was insti-
tuted, and the essential means of domestic control, such as
the military, secret police, and economic organization, were
closely tied in with their corresponding Soviet institu-
tions .
One study of the internationalist aspects of com-
munist theory offers seven generalizations pertinent to the
12formation of a world socialist state* Among these seven
internationalism in this era was clearly defined by Stalin:
"In our time one can be a genuine revolutionary and inter-
nationalist only by unconditionally defending and supporting
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union
itself; only by basing one's activities on the teaching of
Marxism-Leninism and proceeding from the experience of the
Communist Party of the U.S.S*R*—the leading force of the
international communist movement*** Pravda , January 12,
1949.
An informative discussion of this period can be
found in Francois Fejto, "The Communists of East Europe
Between Fatherland and Internationalism," The Review
[Brussels], 3 » 19-23, 1961.
12Merle Kling, The Soviet Theory of International-
ism (St. Louis: Washington University Studies , 1952), pp.
35^50.
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concepts are economic amalgamation and political unifica-
tion with the Soviet Union as a prototype of the future
world (Soviet) state. It was within the power of Stalin to
revise significantly both the economic and political struc-
ture of the bloc countries during their formative years.
Such a policy might well have produced a level of economic
integration and productivity that is still vainly sought by
the bloc leaders, several years after the renewed emphasis
13
on their economic cooperation. If successful, such a re-
structuring would also have tended to destroy or mitigate
the erosive nationalistic forces within the bloc. National-
ism is one of the primary "natural" forces that persistently
disrupt socialist unity. The revision of traditional
political and economic ties in the direction of a new
international structure which visualized the realization of
the dismantling of artificial bourgeois national boundaries
would be in accord with Marxist-Leninist theory. It would
be difficult for even the most dogmatic of the national
communists to object—on a theoretical basis—to the trans-
formation of their nations on ideological bases.
Although speculation such as this may now be only
of academic interest, it is not irrelevant. The efforts of
Soviet leadership since 1955 to integrate the economies of
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the bloc members has been partly designed to provide an
intra-bloc institutional structure which would preclude
centrifugal, nationalist tendencies. But by the late
1950' s, when this program was implemented, the situation
had changed. Soviet troops were still dominant in Eastern
Europe, but they no longer claimed the freedom of movement
of earlier years, and their extensive employment against a
satellite would entail considerable risk. In addition, the
attributes of sovereignty within the socialist camp had
been emphasized repeatedly as a fundamental characteristic
of the socialist commonwealth. As the forces of national-
ism continue to shape the Soviet bloc as well as other
international relationships, Soviet leaders must often wish
that the bloc were structured on an economic-administrative
basis rather than on national units*
Why did Stalin not restructure the national divi-
sions of East Europe after the sweep of the Red Army west-
ward in 1944 and 1945? An immediate answer might be that
he would encounter an unknown degree of resistance, despite
the preponderance of Soviet power, from East European com-
munists as well as nationalist forces in that area. In the
consolidation of the bloc, Stalin and the communist leaders
were required temporarily to work with political forces
other than the communist parties. To have attempted, prior






boundaries would not only have alienated other political
elements but would have precipitated the utmost hostility
of the ethnic groups in East Europe, Such radical measures
would also cause the immediate enmity, even if not the
physical opposition, of the allies of the Second World War,
with whom the Soviet Union was still cooperating, albeit to
only a very limited extent.
More damaging to the future course of development
of the socialist system would have been the elimination of
the socialist countries as an attraction to the non-
communist countries who might otherwise sympathize with
their socialist endeavors and be tempted to establish
closer ties with the bloc at a later date. As we noted
earlier , Lenin understood the need to recognize the exist-
ence of nationalities and national units as the "facts of
international life." Khrushchev was at least as pragmatic
in his approach to the national question. Also, how else
could the dictatorship of the proletariat be established,
if not through communist parties which are organized on a
national basis? Nevertheless, it is highly unlikely that
the question of national boundaries and national sensitivi-
ties posed nearly the problem for Stalin as it has in
recent years for his successors.
Another factor that could mitigate against the re-






course would be that such a development might reduce the
overwhelming superiority enjoyed by the Soviet Union in its
bilateral dealings with each satellite, and might in the
long run produce a "bloc within the bloc" capable of devel-
oping an economic and political strength that could chal-
14lenge that of the Soviet Union. This consideration,
undoubtedly, has influenced Soviet leaders in recent years
as they ponder the most effective means to integrate the
economies of the East European states with the Soviet Union
without creating a power center potentially as strong as
the USSR.
There are also the theoretical considerations to be
dealt with in socialist construction after the war. It
was natural that the communists turned to the concept of
the dictatorship of the proletariat, or some suitable al-
ternative such as the "People's Democracy," in the recon-
struction of their national entities within the socialist
14Stalin most likely objected to the formation of a
Balkan federation because of the independence such a new
unit might develop in bloc affairs; although in order to
avoid a split with Yugoslavia in 1948, Stalin reportedly
considered a merger between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria which
hopefully might have increased Soviet leverage on Yugo-
slavia.
15 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York:













system. This would not only satisfy their Marxist-
Leninist preconceptions, but also provide a practical re-
sponse to the problems of the exercise of political power.
After all, there was a quarter century of Soviet experience
to build on; and although the satellite communist leaders
had not engineered their own revolutions, they faced similar
difficulties of reconstruction and uncooperative popula-
tions.
But most important in the consideration that Stalin
might have given to this problem is that such theoretical
determinations were not necessary for the imposition and
maintenance of Soviet control. Had Stalin thought along
these lines, he would soon have concluded that the standard
Bolshevik methods of political control through secret
16Some authors (Arendt, ojd. cit
. , pp, 5-6, for
example) have stressed the detailed imitation of Soviet
experience in the construction of the Peoples 1 Democracies,
indicating that, at this time, there was only one road , and
this determined by the Soviets, On the other hand, Brze-
zinski, The Soviet Bloc , op , cit , , pp. 27-29, discusses
several quotations of East European communist leaders in
the early, formative years of the bloc, which emphasize
that national conditions shape the path to socialism in
their countries, Brzezinski, The Soviet 31oc
,
op . cit,,
P - 64 » passim , claims that Stalinism as a political phe-
nomenon deveToped after 1947 when Stalin attempted to im-
pose a high degree of uniformity on all the satellites, and
that this repressive policy was further magnified by the
1948 break with Tito. See also Fejto, 0£. cit . , pp. 19-20:
",
. . from 1948 on, the Soviet model was applied in all
communist countries to the most insignificant detail, with
a complete disregard for the specific conditions of every
country . • , ."
u• i







police, terror, and fear of physical punishment would suf-
17fice. These techniques, that had stood successfully the
test of time, were buttressed by the domination of the Com-
munist and Workers' Parties of the satellites by the Commu-
nist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), as well as the
presence of the Soviet armies in Eastern and Central Europe.
The somewhat esoteric issues of proletarian international-
ism, sovereignty and equality, and other aspects of the
Soviet dualist policy simply provided a frame of reference
for the justification of Soviet hegemony. The gap between
theory and practice has never been wider than it was in the
years 1944-1948, when the East Europeans supposedly accom-
plished their "socialist revolution."
When Stalin wrote in 1922 that the Soviet Union was
"... the prototype of the future amalgamation of the
working people of all countries in a single world economic
18
system," he revealed the core of his policy that was to
be implemented at the end of the Second World War. Beyond
the obvious factors of the security of the Soviet state
through friendly border states, and a controlling Soviet
17For an exhaustive examination of the early phase
of Stalinism and Stalin's technique of political control,
see Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist
Party (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959)
•
18Joseph Stalin, Marxism and the National Question








voice in occupied Germany, Stalin was mostly concerned with
the economic reconstruction of the USSR. For this purpose,
the Soviets needed the utmost assistance from the recently
conquered territories. With the exception of East Germany
and Czechoslovakia, most of these countries were too poor
to provide extensive material aid to the Soviet Union, The
19key area for Soviet interests lay in East Germany. Com-
plete Soviet control of this satellite was mandatory for
rapid effective reconstruction of the crippled Soviet
20
economy. From the security point of view, the occupation
of East Germany by the Soviet Union placed Russia in the
heart of Europe with the claim for a voice in all European
matters, straddled the other satellites, and provided the
Soviets with a cogent argument for the presence of Russian
troops in Poland.
There was little need for Soviet pretense to its
control over East Germany, which was simply occupied terri-
tory conquered during war, and treated as such. In other
19Zauberman, op_. cit
. ,
p. 9. The degree to which
this Soviet interest has been borne out is the vital role
that Sast Germany now plays in the economic development of
the bloc. See J. Emlyn Williams, "U.S.S,R. to Absorb East
Germany.," The Christian Science Monitor , April 24, 1962, p.
1; and a more recent comment by Paul Wohl, "East Germany:
Soviet Kingpin," The Christian Science Monitor , June 28,
1963, p. 1.
20Arendt, op_. cit
. , p. 6, observes that East Germany
".
. . never became even a satellite country but remained





areas of Eastern Europe, however, the Soviet leaders felt
constrained to provide their military control of the vari-
ous countries with an aura of legitimacy through the admin-
istration of power by the local communist party.
For this reason, the seizure of complete political
control by the native parties was not immediately effected,
despite the presence of Soviet troops, Seton-Watson de-
scribes the process of the assimilation of power by the
local communist parties as consisting of three phases of
coalition government: (1) genuine coalition, (2) bogus
coalition, and (3) the transformation of the bogus coali-
21tion into a "monolithic bloc," During these three phases,
whatever methods were required by the circumstances were
employed by either the satellite communists or the occupy-
ing Soviet forces, or both. Obviously, the process was
made easier by the authority obtaining to the Soviets in
East Germany as an occupying power, with a prescription to
ban any activity they determine to be Nazi or fascist. On
the other hand, the seizure of power was somewhat more
difficult in Czechoslovakia where there was more of a demo-
cratic tradition with well-organized political parties, and
where there was closer observation and interest by the
Western governments.
21Hugh Seton-Watson, From Lenin to Khrushchev (New




Typical of the "three phase" process were the experi-
ences of Bulgaria and Hungary. The former, which had been
allied with Germany, severed relations with that country in
22
early September, 1944, and prepared to declare war. At
the same time, the Soviet Army, without advising its allies,
ignored a proferred armistice and invaded Bulgaria, even
though there were no German troops in the country. Imme-
diately after the "liberation," many thousands of patriotic,
anti-Nazi Bulgarians were arrested and sent to prison. The
first phase of the coalition government commenced with the
formation of a "Fatherland Front," which included the oppo-
sition party led by Nikola Petkov. The genuine coalition
phase soon degenerated into the bogus phase, as Petkov was
not allowed to present any effective opposition. The bogus
coalition phase ended abruptly in 194 7, shortly after the
United States ratified the peace treaty, when Petkov was
arrested, tried, and executed for conspiracy against the
state. The Communist Party in Bulgaria then had to endure
an additional stage, an internal power struggle between the
"natives" and those who had spent the war in Moscow, and
thus owed their allegiance to the Soviets. In the contest
22See L. A. D. Dellin, "Bulgaria, w in Stephen Kertesz
(ed.), Cast Central Europe and the World : Developments in
the Post-otalln Bra (Notre "Same, Indiana: University of







srii nan na^r.. b« rue
.2
79
for power, Chervenkov, a loyal disciple of Stalin and son-
in-law of the former Comintern leader, George Dimitrov,
successfully ousted the leader of the "natives," Kostov,
who was shortly tried and executed. In March, 1948, a
Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance was
signed by Bulgaria and the Soviet Union and, by 1950, Bul-
garia had slipped into a form of communist isolation from
the non-communist world, the most Stalinist of the satel-
lites in domestic politics.
23A rather similar process took place in Hungary as
well as other satellites. More time and effort was re-
quired during the "first phase" in Hungary, during which
the Communist Party fared poorly in two elections. After
the Fall, 1945, elections, in which the communists received
only 17 per cent of the votes (less than a third of the
vote accorded the major party, the Smallholders), the Com-
munists harassed their opposition and arrested the Secretary-
General of the Smallholders, Bela Kovacs, Prime Minister
Ferenc Nagy, also a Smallholder, was implicated by Kovacs*
confession and compelled to resign in May of 1947. The
communists pushed through a new electoral law and continued
to persecute those who did not comply with their demands,
23
e Stephen Kertesz, "Hungary," in Developments
,
op , clt






but they still managed to capture only 22 per cent of the
votes in the August, 1947, election. The immediate result
was a major effort by the communists to force all non-
communists out of the "coalition," which by now was in its
second phase, or that of "bogus coalition." President
Tildey, a Smallholder, was pressed into resigning in August,
1948, when his son-in-law was implicated in "espionage."
The third phase in the take-over of Hungary was completed
in late August, and in the spring of 1949, a single-list
election completed the formalities of constructing a
"people's democracy."
In like manner, the leader of the Polish Peasant
Party, 3tanislaw Kikolajczyk, was forced out of Poland in
December, 1947, and in the same month, King Michael of
Rumania was pressured into abdicating by the special Soviet
envoy, A. J. Vyshinski. Two months later, the communists
sent a special emissary, Valerian Zorin, to Prague, and
shortly thereafter a successful coup d'etat was effected
giving the communists, under the leadership of Klement
Gottwald, control, and resulting in the death of the For-
eign Minister, Jan Masaryk, and the resignation four months
later of President Edward Benes.
These events have been well described elsewhere, and
are mentioned here only to emphasize the nature of the






Undoubtedly, there were national and ethnic peculiarities
to be taken into consideration both during and after the
consolidation of power by the communists, but the similari-
ties of the seizure and maintenance of political control
far outweigh the minor differences. There was now a
socialist system in existence, but there was to be no re-
definition of the concept of socialist internationalism.
Since Stalin's earliest days, proletarian internationalism
had been interpreted in terras of the support required for
the policies of the Soviet Union, and Stalin saw no need to
re-examine this view. The ideological emphasis in Stalin's
last years were not "positive," in that they were directed
solely towards the unity of the bloc (this was insured by
Stalin's own methods of control), but rather "negative" and
aimed more at the exclusion of all possible Western influ-
ence in the satellites (as in the intense campaign against
"cosmopolitanism")
•
It is of interest to examine Stalin's method of con-
trol after 194 7-1948 to provide a later comparison with the
structure of the Soviet bloc, and its effective degree of
cohesion, in the critical years 1956-1958. The function of
For this reason, it seems only of academic inter-
est to record the many and twisted theoretical explanations
offered by the Soviets and other bloc communists concerning
the establishment of the "people's democracies," as in









the Soviet Array in Eastern Europe has been well documented,
and was graphically illustrated during the German uprising
of June, 1953, the Poznan riots of June, 1956, and the
Hungarian revolt of October-November, 1956. It is obvious
that the Soviet leaders feel impelled to use whatever force
is required to maintain their security and protect their
vital interests, and they obviously interpret their vital
interests to include preventing the disintegration of com-
munist control over the bloc. Other methods of control
25
employed by Stalin are not quite so easy to describe.
For example, there always has been a certain amount of co-
ercion maintained over most of the communist parties by the
26CPSU, but, in the long run, this is effective only to the
extent that the Russians have the capability—and the will
—
to exercise physical control through the police or army, or
their own clandestine organizations. Considering the
number of rigged" trials of high-ranking communists in the
25For background to this question, see Gunther
Nollau, International Communism and World Revolution (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 196TT7 pp. 209, 211-212; and
Wolfgang Leonhard, "International Communism: The Present
Phase," in David Footman (ed.), International Communism
(Carbondalc, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press,
1960), pp. 128-129.
Nollau, op. jcit
• , p. 209, says that one method em-
ployed to control the national parties was to send back to
work in their party organization various "functionaries" of
the Comintern staff who were presumably loyal to Moscow.




satellites from 1947-1952, the issue of Soviet dominance of
the other communist parties as an effective method of con-
trol is of extreme interest to the non-communist observer
of the bloc. One might reasonably speculate on the nature
of events in 1956-1958 had the Soviets disposed more effec-
tively of Gomulka and Imre Nagy in earlier days.
In addition to control of the parties, the political,
economic, and military organizations of the people's repub-
lics in the years immediately following their establishment
were staffed thoroughly with Soviet "advisers," who were
competent not only to proffer advice on the construction of
a socialist government but were also competent to warn both
the satellite leaders and Moscow when certain measures
being considered by a satellite government were not felt to
27be appropriate to the interests of socialism.
Wolfgang Leonhard suggests four politico-ideological
principles which provided the theoretical justification for
28
Stalin's control over other communist parties. Despite
the validity of these principles as ideological concepts,
and their acceptance by the more "internationally-minded"
27On occasion, the role of the Soviets extended far
beyond that of providing "advisors," as in the notorious
case of the Russian Marshal Konstantin Rokossovski, who
served as Poland's Minister of Defense for several years,
and was also a member of the Politburo.
28Leonhard, ojo. cit




, they are meaningful for purposes of control
only so long as the Soviet leadership is willing and able
to punish those parties or individuals who do not comply
with Soviet demands. As we have observed, in the develop-
ment of international communism since 1955, all of these
principles have been either abandoned or revised. The
result has been not only the elimination of a true "center"
of international communism, but also the practical realiza-
tion that the Soviet Union interprets the principles of
socialist internationalism in accordance with its own
national interests, and will administer discipline only
when it feels that its interests—not international commu-
nism—art tfel . atened. What is important to note in this
context is that the interests of the Soviet Union go beyond
the traditional interests of statehood to embrace the com-
munist movement.
From the maintenance of control and cohesion, there
have been essentially only two methods of coercion available
since the formation of the socialist system (unless intimi-
dation through the threat of personal physical violence is
included). These two methods consist of military and
economic sanctions. Depending upon circumstances, military
means of enforcing bloc unity are always available, but of
value onlj -xtreme cases. Much more subtle means of
developing and preserving a unified bloc are afforded by
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economic integration and control. These means have been
relied upon by Stalin and his successors, although with far
different emphasis and sophistication. But when the prob-
lems that faced Stalin are viewed in perspective, it can be
shown that there was no fundamental difference between his
technique and that of his successors.
Considering his long-range objectives and innate
suspicious character, Stalin most likely realized that the
war-time collaboration with his allies would not last long
in the post-war era. One of the primary concerns of the
Soviet Union after the war was the rapid reconstruction of
the Soviet economy. To this end, the economies of the
satellites w completely harnessed. During the process
of the socialist revolution of the peoples of East Europe,
i.e., while the coalition governments of the 1945-1948
period were being strangled, the satellite economies were
burdened with the costs of reparations, dismantling of
equipment and factories seized by the Soviets, and the sup-
29port of Soviet occupation troops.
29
The aggregate of these costs has been estimated as
one third of the total national income for Hungary at the
time, for example; see Zauberman, o£. cit
. ,
p. 14. Also
see Hugh Seton-Watson, The Eas t European Revolution (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1$51), pp. 234-23^; in his
preface to the second edition, Seton-Watson claims that Ma
good deal _ ace la this book is given to economic prob-
lems," but Soviet economic exploitation limited




During this period of reparations and dismantling,
the Soviets imposed various types of grossly unfair trade
and industrial arrangements* These commercial projects
differed depending upon the satellite and the branch of
industry involved, but the most important arrangements from
the consideration of the satellites were the Soviet-owned
companies of East Germany (and a few in Hungary), which
were M . . • in effect Soviet economic enclaves," and the
notorious joint companies located in Bulgaria, Hungary,
Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The Soviets enjoyed a form of
extraterritoriality in the operation of these companies.
Their structure clearly favored the Soviets in the determi-
31
nation of prices and control of management^ and their
operations not only covered many of the satellites ' extrac-
tive industries but also "... road, river and air trans-
portation, the processing of home raw materials, and some
Jan Wszelaki, Communist Economic Strategy : The Role of East
Central Europe ( Washington: National Planning Association,
1959), Chapter 8. Wszelaki estimates that the total amount
of assets removed from East Germany alone in the post-war
period as in excess of $15 billion, and the total transfer
of wealth from East Europe around $20 to $25 billion.
Wszelaki notes (p. 67) that the degree of exploitation
varied whether the satellite was a former foe or traditional
ally; also, see Charles P. Kindleberger , Foreign Trade and
the National Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press,
T552 5 , pp. 160-161.
Zauberman, o£. cit . , p. 16.
31Wszelaki, op. cit ., p. 67; Zauberman, op_. cit ., p.
18. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Nicolas
Spulber, The Economics of Communist East Europe (New York:













J It is not surprising
that the Soviet drive to integrate the bloc economies,
shortly after this period of extensive and costly exploita-
tion, did not meet with immediate favor or success.
During 1947-1943, Soviet policy towards the satel-
lites was modified substantially. There was no startling
reversal of the Soviet position, but rather a recognition
that conditions in both Eastern and Western Europe had
changed considerably since the war. Whatever hopes Stalin
may have had for the civil war in Greece or possible
seizure of power by the communist parties in Western Europe
were dashed by 1948. Also, the domestic economic problems
of the Soviet Union and the satellites called for greater
attention and more radical solutions. There was a gradual
"turning inward" of Soviet policy, despite the drama of the
Berlin blockade (which could be viewed as a defensive
measure to consolidate the Soviet grip on East Germany).
In the reappraisal of the strategy of the communist
movement in 1947, the emphasis was on the economic and
political strengthening of the Soviet bloc. A first step
was the establishment of a new organization to provide a
greater degree of institutional cohesion desired by the
Soviets. In the construction of socialism in the people's
32Zauberman, 0£. cit • , pp. 16-17.











democracies, many of the communist leaders, despite their
Comintern background and personal loyalty to Stalin, in
their preoccupation with their own national problems were
developing tendencies and attitudes which one author refers
33to as "domesticisra," or excessive concentration on
domestic affairs. Nevertheless, it appears that not even
the Soviet Union at this time wanted a strong, centralized
organization comparable to the Comintern, but urged in-
stead a more loosely-knit association designed primarily to
facilitate the exchange of information, opinions, and
35policy views. At the opening session of the new
33Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc , op . cit • , pp. 52-58.
"Domesticisra" is a "certain implicit perspective" inevitable
in the application of rather broad guidelines to specific
situations and demands. Brzezinski too easily distinguishes
between domesticism and national communism, as if the latter
were the purposeful placing of local-national units above
those of the international movement. The differentiation
is not that clear, as the Yugoslav Communists realized in
their struggle in the 1950 *s against "localism," a phenome-
non produced by their own decentralization measures.
34It has been reported that some members of the old
Comintern desired that organization to be less centrally
directed; B. M. Johann, "Nationalism and Internationalism,"
The Review , 3:29, 1961, claims that Palmiro Togliatti, a
member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern as well
as leader of the Italian communist party, first raised the
question of "polycentric cooperation" during the debate in
1943 over the last resolution of the Comintern.
35
Nollau o£. cit ., pp. 216-218. Seton-Watson , From
Lenin to Khrushchev , op . cit . , p. 328, states that the
Cominform oublication~""For a Lasting Peace, for a People's
Democracy," was designed to promulgate the official line









organization, the Communist Information Bureau, or Comin-
form, in September, 1947, however, Andrei Zhdanov delivered
a forceful, "hard" line policy speech, designed to rally
all the socialist countries around the Soviet Union in
order to present a unified front in the cold war. The
other members of the camp immediately reflected the Soviet
line in their foreign policy statements, but this stage in
international tension had been in preparation for some time
and was certainly not the product of the Cominform.
It is generally agreed that the Cominform performed
no major service for international communism, 36 An assess-
ment of its functions might show it to have been a failure,
in that the location of the Cominform in Belgrade did not
keep Yugoslavia within the bloc, and the Cominform operating
Soviets did not strive for a more centralized organization:
(1) Soviet control of the satellites would not thereby be
enhanced; (2) Stalin actually desired only a mechanism for
more effective coordination of the parties; and (3) Stalin
wanted an organization capable of exerting pressure against
a recalcitrant member, so that the Soviet Union would not
have to bear the entire disciplinary burden. This was the
case with the Yugoslav expulsion and subsequent Cominform
attack
.
36See Nollau, o£. cit
• , pp. 245-251, and Seton-Watson
,
From Lenin to Khrushchev , op . cit., pp. 328-330. Brzezin-
ski, 'the Soviet Bloc , op . cit . t p. 62, ascribes considerable
authority to Cominform and its "control over the Communist
power structures." Wolfgang Leonhard, in The Kremlin Since
Stalin (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1^62), p. 100,
notes that "the Cominform conflict and the existence of an







from Bucharest after the split with Yugoslavia in 1948 was
unable to force Yugoslavia to capitulate to Soviet de-
37
mands. Conditions had changed and, after about 1950, the
Cominforra served very little purpose and was paid even less
attention.
The clash between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia
was of much more significance to the interests and growth
of the international communist movement than the life and
death of the Cominform. There are, of course, differences
between Titoism, national communism, nationalism (localism,
domesticism, ad infinitum ), but essentially they all repre-
sent the same human tendency (or failing, from a Marxian
point of view): the inclination of a person—or group—to
place his interests first in priority, and to interpret the
interests of the larger group in terms of the requirements
of his more immediate environment. Brzezinskl has described
the "problems of diversity" within the bloc during its
formative stage, and how these problems tended to become
institutionalized and be resolved in ways that were not
38
always in accord with Soviet objectives. Usually local
37
"None of the reprisals taken against Yugoslavia by
the Soviet Union and the satellites were Cominform measures,"
according to Nollau, o£. cit
• , p. 244. A significant por-
tion of the propaganda campaign against Yugoslavia was
carried out through the Cominform, however.
38








communist leaders have interpreted their interests on a
national basis; within the bloc, each national party con-
stantly endeavors to obtain the best terms and conditions
for itself. Prior to 1945, there was only one communist
party exercising political power, that is, the CPSU. This
placed it in a significant leadership position for the en-
tire communist movement. During the formative stage of the
socialist system, it was recognized that the primary source
of communist power was still the Soviet Union. As the
socialist camp developed, however, the individual units
tended more and more to think and act in terms of their
more immediate objectives, rather than with regard to the
ultimate objectives of the movement as a whole. The Soviets
could keep this trend in check with their preponderance of
power in all the socialist states, except for Yugoslavia,
where the Yugoslav Partisans had been the principal factor
in the seizure of power in 1944-1945. The contest between
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union after Tito*s expulsion from
the Cominform in 1948 is usually viewed as a conflict of
interests, Soviet hegemony versus Yugoslav independence.
This is a correct interpretation but perhaps not sufficient.
Not enough attention is given to the "correctness" of the
position of the Soviet Union during this dispute: an effec-
tive international communist movement requires unity; unity










the Soviet Union, being not only the senior but the most
powerful socialist state, is the logical choice for the
role of directing the movement. For the communist movement
to remain a revolutionary force of significance, this was
the only possible course of development, in the eyes of the
Soviet leaders; the fact that this interpretation coincides
with Soviet interests is incidental. A strong, centralized
international organization, as the Comintern was intended
to be, was no longer considered necessary, Stalin realized
that there was always the possibility that such an organi-
zation could develop a voice of its own in formulating
policy and "creatively" developing theory. The unique his-
torical position of the USSR, Stalin felt, endowed it with
the capacity and authority to Interpret and act upon the
needs of the communist movement; there was no need to
burden the effectiveness of international communism with a
cumbersome institutional structure.
Yet, there remained a need for some sort of semi-
formal arrangement tying together the socialist states, so
that the more independent-minded members of the system
could be properly constrained. This is the reasoning
behind the modest role assigned to the Cominform, as well
as its very limited effectiveness in subduing Tito.
The quality of man that tends to project and iden-




nation) with the next larger societal unit is the centrifu-
gal force that has continually plagued the international
communist movement. There are inherent conflicts of inter-
est between groups, whether the groups consist of capital-
ists, socialists, workers, or intellectuals. These
conflicting interests must be resolved eventually by some
superior agency possessing the authority and capacity to do
so. When Stalin failed to bring Tito back into the fold in
the late 1940' s, he tacitly recognized the right to diver-
gent courses of development within the communist movement.
Stalin f s death, in 1953, was no more than the catalyst for
an inevitable process of the decentralization of authority
already in progress.
After Stalin, there were essentially only two
courses open to the Soviet leadership, either of which was
designed to tie together again the socialist bloc under
Soviet leadership. First, Malenkov and Khrushchev could
recognize officially the Yugoslav position, and assume that
a certain amount of national latitude in the building of
communism would not preclude, but actually enhance, the
strengthening of the movement. Or, secondly, they could
attempt to "go it alone" in the socialist camp without
Yugoslavia, castigate the renegade Tito as a fascist and
force him into the undesirable position of a cast-off, and
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similar to the latter course was advocated by Molotov and
the Anti-Party group, who apparently conceived of a viable
international movement only on the basis of a degree of
control comparable to that required by Stalin. Such a
course would not only be in accord with Soviet interest,
the Anti-Party group must have felt, but would be the only
way an effective revolutionary movement could be maintained,
To them there was no conflict between ideology and power,
because the power was to be devoted to the ideological ob-
jectives, and the ideological objectives could not be
achieved except through firm, centralized leadership of the
bloc*
Viewed in this manner, Khrushchev's secret speech of
1956 regarding the efficacy of separate roads, and his
earlier recognition of this theoretical development at Bel-
grade in May, 1955, represent the first of the two opposing
choices mentioned above, Khrushchev intended to make mem-
bership in the socialist camp more appealing, not only
through the negative aspect of eschewing Stalinism, but
positively by providing a more meaningful approach to
mutual security (through the Warsaw Pact, reflecting the
common fear in East Europe of West Germany in NATO), and by
providing the basis for a reinvigorated bloc economy that






a renewed industrialization drive and increased demand for
consumer goods.
Before Khrushchev could act to reconstitute the bloc
in a more progressive framework, he was forced to suffer
through the "growing pains" of the bloc from 1953-1956.




THE EVENTS OF 1956
The Soviet bloc and international communism have
never recovered from the "events" of 1956, and it is un-
likely that the communist movement will ever again possess
the unity (enforced or otherwise) of the early post-war
period. It is generally accepted that Khrushchev's famous
speech at the 20& Party Congress signaled, and even encour-
aged, the growing discontent that culminated in the Polish
October and the abortive Hungarian revolution. This is
partially true, in that the demi-god of Stalin was both
publicly and privately destroyed at the 20tb Party Congress,
encouraging both moderate and liberal communists throughout
the bloc to believe that all institutional vestiges of
Stalin should also be removed. It is true that the thesis
of separate roads to socialism was given renewed emphasis
at the 20th Party Congress. But it is also true that this
occurrence was more a form of recognition of processes al-
ready gathering momentum than the initiation of the proc-
esses themselves. De-Stalinization had been underway,
"Such an innocuous terra as "events" hardly describes
the revolutionary ferment at work in the communist movement
during 1956, especially the fall of that year, but it is a
more inclusive and general term than revolt, uprising,





although rather haltingly, since early 1953; and the sepa-
rate roads thesis was formally recognized by Khrushchev and
Bulganin on their first famous "junket, rt their trip to
2Belgrade in May, 1955, In fact, it is even more accurate
to push back the authorship of the separate roads theory,
3
as has Walter Laqueur, to Stalin and his failure in 1948-
1952 to "break Tito" and bring the Yugoslavs back into the
embrace of "socialist internationalism."
Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin *s crimes and
recognition of individual paths to socialism at the 20*
Party Congress was the culmination of a three-year growth
of dissatisfaction and unrest in the satellites, a search
by some of the satellite leaders for the degree of autonomy
they would be permitted by Moscow, and an attempt by some
segments of the native populations to determine the extent
of personal freedom they could achieve within their politi-
cal systems. Although the general accent was on increased
autonomy for each satellite, the popular participation in
political agitation and other features of this period
varied considerably among the satellites.
2This public admission of the "separate roads to
socialism" thesis, to the heretic Tito, could be considered
more significant than Khrushchev's treatment of the same
subject in his February, 1956, secret speech.
3Walter Z. Laqueur, "The End of the Monolith,"










Czechoslovakia and the GDR (East Germany) followed
somewhat similar patterns in that they experienced workers'
rebellions very shortly after the death of Stalin. These
revolts were forcibly restrained, the party leaders adopted
more responsive policies, and the split between party and
people did not again achieve the same proportions*
The first substantial physical outbreak against
Soviet hegemony and communist misrule occurred at Pilsen,
Czechoslovakia, on June 1, 1953* This was a spontaneous
workers' revolt, brought on primarily by economic hardships
(mostly because of a currency revaluation which destroyed
many family savings), but it led neither to further upris-
ings in Czechoslovakia or the promise of assistance from
the West. Control of the governmental institutions in
Pilsen was quickly regained by the central communist govern-
ment, and there was no need for extensive Soviet aid in
4quelling the revolt. An uprising in East Germany, less
than three weeks later, bore a remarkable similarity to the
Pilsen affair. Again, it was the workers who revolted
against communist oppression and, as in Pilsen, for eco-
nomic reasons: an increase in work norms was , in effect, a
4Duchachek, in Stephen Kertesz (ed.), East Central
Europe and the World : Developments in the Post-Stalin Sra
CNotre Dame, Indiana: University of~!Totre Dame Press, 1962)
,
p. 107; see also Taborsky in Edward T. Hallowell (ed.), The













5decrease in wages. There was a major difference, however,
between the Czechoslovak and German uprisings; the latter
was successful in temporarily gaining control of a signifi-
cant section of the agencies of public administration and
control, and large-scale Soviet intervention with tanks was
required to restore order and communist rule. The princi-
pal effect of these uprisings was the realization that the
Soviets would use military force to support the socialist
system, i.e.; the local communist leaders need not step
down in the face of the open hostility of their own people.
A secondary effect that must not have gone unnoticed was
that the Western powers would not accept the risks involved
in providing effective assistance to the rebellious workers,
It was significant in both Czechoslovakia and East Germany
that the uprisings were led by and composed of the workers;
there was not the active participation and literary stimu-
lus provided by the intellectuals, as in Poland and Hungary
in 1956. After 1953, the Communist Party leaders in Czecho-
slovakia and Cast Germany were able to maintain effective
control of both their parties and governments, without per-
mitting further threats to the unity of the Soviet bloc.
Rumania and Bulgaria were apparently both too back-
ward and too far removed from the influences of Western
Karl C. Thalheim, "East Germany," in Kertesz, op .
cit









liberalism for the workers or intellectuals to develop any
coherent opposition to communist rule. Purges and moderate
reforms after 1953 successfully precluded serious opposi-
tion. The slow process of de-Stalinization worked in
reverse in Albania, where a Communist Party had been put
into power in 1944 without the direct and primary assist-
7
ance of the Soviet Union but with the aid of the Yugoslavs,
The domination of Albanian politics by Tito resulted in the
welcoming by Albanian Communists of the expulsion of Yugo-
slavia from the Corainform in 1948. When the first rap-
prochement between Belgrade and Moscow took place in 1955,
the Albanians became quite apprehensive of renewed Yugoslav
interference in their politics. Premier Hoxha»s increased
strengthening of power and the grip of the Party produced
an aggravated form of Stalinism, rather than the de-
Stalinization process called for by the CPSU.
Hungary and Poland provide yet another response to
the death of Stalin and erratic de-Stalinizatlon. There
were no early abortive workers' revolts, and the growing
dissatisfaction of the workers that was dramatically mani-
fested in 1956 generally coincided with that of the
See Stephen Fischer-Galati, "Rumania," in Kertesz,
op , cit.
, pp. 157-159.
7Hugh Seton-Watson , From Lenin to Khrushchev (New







intellectuals. Most likely, the receptivity of a few of
the leading communists in these countries to a degree of
de-stalinization and moderate reforms, and the successful
example of national communism in Yugoslavia, was of sig-
nificance to the 1956 events in Poland and Hungary, Of
great importance, also, was the availability in time of
crisis of two communist leaders who seemed to be somewhat
in tune with the aspirations and demands of their people:
Imre Nagy and Wladislaw Gomulka. The differences between
these two communists were crucial to the course of develop-
ment of the "revisionist" forces and the course of the
revolutionary activity in their countries in the fall of
1956, Gomulka and the Polish United Workers (Communist)
Party symbolized revisionism expressing itself without
breaking the bonds of the international communist movement,
a rebellion by communists against the extent of the au-
thority and domination of Moscow. Imre Nagy in Hungary, on
the other hand, was not the guiding force of the spontane-
ous revolt of workers and students commencing October 22
with the 16-point resolution by Budapest students. Nagy
was a symbol of the earlier "new course" in Hungary from
1953-1955 that had meant a reduction in Stalinist-type
government. He had neither the political strength to keep







that his later withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact
would not be tolerated by the Russians,
The 20& Party Congress, then, was not the entire
story of de-Stalinization, nor was it the beginning. It
was more like opening the floodgates which had previously
passed only a trickle of revisionist water. Khrushchev
must have had mixed motives in condemning Stalin at such
length and with such vehemence and forcefulnass, and in
emphasizing other creative developments in Marxism as the
theory of separate roads to socialism, the notion that war
was no longer an inevitable occurrence, and the possibility
of parliamentary transition to socialism. De-Stalinization
may have been focused primarily on domestic policies, but
Khrushchev, undoubtedly, realized that his revelations
would have serious repercussions in the satellites and
other communist parties. Leonhard offers three reasons
which explain Khrushchev's deliberate dilution at the 20t&
p
Party Congress of Moscow's authority in the socialist camp:
1. Political and ideological rapprochement with
Yugoslavia;
2. Realistic interpretation of the course of
political development in the bloc, and an
p
Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Stalin (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger , 1962), p. 125. See also
Nathaniel Weyl, The Anatomy of Terror (Washington: Public











attempt to nip in the bud any further back-
sliding towards national communism: and
3. Hope of renewed ideological ties with the
Social-Democratic forces in Western Europe,
and an ideological appeal by the bloc to
nationalistic forces in Asia and Africa,
In retrospect, we see that none of these hopes
materialized fully. Yet, surely, Khrushchev would not have
accepted such grave risks to socialist unity in early 1956
without anticipating commensurate rewards. It seems likely
that the Soviet leaders were following their own Marxist
preconception, that the natural affinity of the working
classes of all the bloc members would weld the bloc to-
gether under effective leadership. This leadership would
be provided, of course, by the most experienced and power-
ful member of the bloc. Stalinism had suffocated the
economic and political growth of the bloc; the elimination
of Stalinism, Khrushchev must have felt, would produce a
new and much more viable socialist camp. Khrushchev
probably did not anticipate the extent to which Stalinism
had stifled initiative, national feeling, and other cen-
trifugal forces which would disrupt socialist unity once
9the lid of Stalinism had been removed.
9Gunther Nollau, International Communism and World
Revolution (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 3T??61)
, pp.
259-260, comments on the minor role played by proletarian
internationalism, as a concept , at the 20tfc Party Congress.





We have already briefly discussed the nature of
Stalinism and its relationship to the formation of the
bloc, Khrushchev directed the contents of his secret
speech, of course, to the assembled members of the CPSU,
but it should have been obvious that the contents of the
speech would become known to the non-Soviet communist par-
ties. For this reason, the significance of the effect of
the speech on relations among socialist countries could not
be avoided. Stalinism had not been simply a Russian domes-
tic phenomenon, but had permeated the entire bloc. It was
not possible to destroy Stalin's image in the USSR without
doing the same in the satellites.
Of great interest in assessing Khrushchev's speech
forms of transition to socialism and the problem of the
cult of personality, according to Nollau "the Presidium of
the Central Committee of the CPSU seems to have been slow
to appreciate the effect these factors would have on the
relations between the Communist parties • • • . M The So-
viets not only did not visualize the damage that might be
incurred, it considered that the results of the 20to Party
Congress would be a greatly strengthened bloc; Nollau
quotes Prayda , July 16, 1956, on these Soviet expectations:
"The decisions taken at the 20& Party Congress have opened
up majestic prospects for the unifying of all the forces
supporting peace and socialism."
See Chapter III.
Delivered February 24-25, 1956; released by the
United States Department of State on June 4, 1956; found in
the Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1956), hereafter cited as
The Anti-Stalin Campaign . For additional analysis of





is his fundamental purpose in attacking Stalinism: to de-
tail the crimes Stalin committed against the CPSU . The
fact that these crimes more than occasionally affected many
millions of Russian people was not the most important
reason for their revelation. Khrushchev mentions, on occa-
sion, the injustices to the Soviet people and their great
accomplishments under Stalin in building socialism, but his
central thesis rests upon the damage Stalin did to the
Party. This was implicit not only in the detailing of
12Stalin's crimes but also in Stalin's positive contribu-
tions to the CPSU, such as his very important and necessary
struggle against "the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc and of
13the Bukharinites, " whose victory—Khrushchev claimed
—
over the CPSU would have returned capitalism to Russia.
Stalin ruled—or attempted to rule—the bloc as he
did the Soviet Union. The purges of former members of
coalitions in the satellites during the late 1940' s, as
his secret speech, see J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tac-
tics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University
Press, 1§62), pp. 305-307. Also see Wolfgang Leonhard,
"International Communism: The Present Phase," in David
Footman (ed.), International Communism (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1960), p. 132.
12 Such as the repression of "many honest Communists"
and the party cadres who had borne the heavy Civil War load,
The Anti-Stalin Campaign , op . cit . , pp. 12-13; also see pp.
21-24, passim , for further listing of crimes against the
CPSU.






well as the trials of suspected ritoists (Rajk, Slansky, et
al. ) in the early 1950 »s, indicates the extent to which
Stalin controlled the bloc, with the obvious exception of
Yugoslavia* As revealed by Khrushchev, Stalin had grossly
misjudged the extent of his control when he told Khrushchev
that "I will shake my little finger—and there will be no
more Tito. He will fall." 1 This could have been Stalin's
most crucial error; had he forced the Yugoslavs to submit
to the dictates of the Cominform, there may have been no
need for Khrushchev five or six years later to explain the
validity of separate roads or to destroy Stalinism.
Of additional significance to the communist movement
is the relationship of Stalinism, a technique, to communism,
which is both a technique and a form of government. It was
vital that Khrushchev lay to rest any doubts or fears on
the part of other communist parties that Stalinism was a
reflection of the socialist system, a conclusion of the
Western "bourgeois" press and political observers. It was
inevitable that the communists had to treat Stalinism as a
perversion that could not possibly reflect a degeneration
of the Soviet system; this ideological "shoring up" by the
CPSU did not take place until mid-1956, however, when some
West European communists attacked the features of socialism




which could permit the growth of a phenomenon such as
Stalinism. This is another indication that perhaps the
Soviet leaders did not expect nearly as strong a reaction
to de-Stalinization as was displayed in the subsequent
months
•
Although no mention of the future dissolution of the
Cominform was made during the 20tb Party Congress, this pos-
sibility was most likely on Khrushchev's mind at that time.
By early 1956, it was obvious that the Cominform had out-
lived its usefulness as a constructive force in the building
of socialist unity. This was especially true now that
Khrushchev was attempting to bring Yugoslavia, which had
been the object of violent Cominform propaganda attacks and
Soviet threats in the past, back into the international
socialist fold. The official resolution announcing the dis-
solution of the Cominform recognized that "there have
been changes in recent years in the international situa-
tion," but the changes offered as the reasons for the dis-
solution of the Cominform hardly correspond to reality,
Leonhard, International Communism
, o£. cit . , p.
130, says that Khrushchev had mentioned, as late as Decem-
ber, 1955, the need of retaining the Cominform.
^Announcement of the Dissolution of the Information
Bureau of the Communist and Workers 1 Parties," Pravda,
April 18, 1956, p. 3; translated in CDSP, VIII , 16, pp. 6-
7. The resolution is also found in Carl E . Zinner (ed.),
National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe





except as noted that there were "particularly urgent tasks
• • . of overcoming the division within the working class
movement • . • • M Other forms, the resolution continued,
should be found to promote socialist unity, "each party or
group of parties will . . . find new and useful forms of
establishing links and contacts among themselves . . . .
"
No reasons for the dissolution of the Cominform were of-
fered beyond the "changing international situation;" it was
not noted why the Cominform, which was supposedly just a
means for exchanging information, could not serve in the
new situation.
An article in Fravda accompanying the announcement
of the dissolution of the Cominform sheds some light on the
purposes of this move:
For the first time in world history there has
arisen the possibility of preventing new wars and
imperialist aggression through the united efforts
of peace-loving states and peoples • • • • [Italics
adTded • J
The article continues with a reiteration of the "new
prospects . • • for the transition of various countries to
socialism," including parliamentary accession to power, and
concludes with a call for "unity of action" among the vari-
ous socialist parties. This announcement could be consid-
ered to pre-date the more intensive campaign begun in June






The pace of events in the socialist camp gradually
quickened until June, 1956, when the full revelation of the
extent of Stalin's crimes and perversions was made com-
pletely public by the release by the State Department of a
copy of Khrushchev 1 s secret speech of four months previous.
It became mandatory for non-Soviet communist leaders to
explain to their party members why they had supported
Stalin so slavishly for so many years. It is obvious that
all "good communists" had to adopt the line that Stalinism
and its abuses could not possibly be inherent in the so-
cialist system, but were merely a personal aberration.
Beyond this basic assumption, however, there was
considerable variation in the nature of the comment and ex-
planation offered by Communist leaders. An editorial in
17
The Daily Worker (CPUSA) X noted first that there were
great changes taking place in the Soviet Union, and that
rather than being inherent in socialism, "the evils of the
Stalin era . . • created a peril for socialism . . . ."
Khrushchev's revelations demonstrated the strength of the
system, rather than any possible weakness, and indicated "a
new era for communism and humanity."
In his now famous interview published in Nuovi
18
Argomenti , June 16, 1956, Palmiro Togliatti of the Italian
17
The Anti-Stalin Campaign , op . cit . , p. 93; The
Daily Worker (CPUSA), June 6, 1956.
18






Communist Party came closest to blaming the socialist sys-
tem for Stalin's excesses when he criticized the tendency
towards its bureaucratic degeneration under Stalin's
leadership. In a subsequent report to the Central Commit-
tee of the Italian Communist Party, Togliatti described the
19basis of his proposed polycentric system:
... full autonomy of the individual Communist
parties and of bilateral relations between them to
establish complete, mutual understanding and com-
plete, mutual trust, conditions necessary for col-
laboration and to give unity to the Communist move-
ment itself • • . •
These principles had all been discussed before, but
their relationship to events and Togliatti' s call for bi-
lateral relations among the communist parties (rather than
each individual party tied to the CPSU) signaled a new form
of socialist collaboration.
Togliatti also hailed the agreement reached that
month between the CPSU and the LYC (League of Yugoslav Com-
20
munists) during Tito's journey to Moscow. This agreement
was close to being a restatement of polycentrism:
Believing that the path of socialist development
differs in various countries and conditions, that
the multiplicity of forms of socialist development
tends to strengthen socialism, and proceeding from
the fact that any tendency of imposing one's opinion
on the ways and forms of socialist development is
alien to both—the two parties have agreed that their
cooperation shall be based on complete voluntariness









and equality, friendly criticism, and comradely
exchange of opinions on controversial questions.
By late June, 1956, it appeared that the CPSU was
having second thoughts about the advisability of continuing
further a propaganda campaign that was only serving to
21break up the bloc. Although most of the damage had been
incurred by this time, the Soviets reacted by attempting to
minimize the significance of the separate roads thesis, to
emphasize the values and advantages of socialist unity, and
to answer the critics both within and without the communist
movement, who had wondered out loud how Stalin had thrived
in a socialist system and why Stalinism had not been un-
masked earlier by the other Soviet communists.
Accordingly, the CPSU responded with an important
22
resolution that mentioned first the recent positive
2i
. . . Johann, "Nationalism and Internationalism,"
The Review [Brussels], 3:30-31, and Leonhard, International
Communism
, op . cit • , p. 128, observe that the Soviet cam-
paign to counteract the disintegrative and polycentric
forces began in June, 1956. This writer recognizes the im-
portance of the June 30 document, but suggests that the re-
marks of the CPSU following the dissolution of the Cominform
presage this event. The Soviet campaign to arrest the dis-
integration of the bloc was highlighted by an article in
Frayda, July 24, 1956, pp. 3-4, translated in CDSP , VIII,
30, p. 25, which emphasized the ". • • world system of
socialism as an inseparable association of different coun-
tries and peoples ... advancing toward a single goal,
toward building a socialist society • • . . " The article
stressed that "different paths toward socialism are by no
means paths which diverge."
22







achievements in the creative development of Marxism-
Leninism, the "power and strength of our Party and the
Soviet socialist system . • . " reflected in the "coura-
geous and relentless self-criticism in the matter of the
personality cult." The resolution then explained the
causes of Stalinism, all of which, of course, were alien to
and outside of the socialist system,
23Starting with two gross distortions, the CPSU
resolution then, at great length, explained the unique
position of the Soviet Union as the first socialist power,
one that offered great experience for other Communist and
Workers' Parties because it had fought alone for socialism
for more than a quarter century, like a "besieged fortress
encircled by capitalism," The Soviet Union claimed the
resolution had struggled against the intervention of hos-
tile foreign powers, spies and provacateurs, and alone the
Soviet Union faced the onslaught of fascism and the Anti-
Comintern Pact, The failure of the Western capitalist
powers to respond, in the late 1930' s, to Soviet overtures
Communist Party of the Soviet Union, June 30, 1956, Pravda ,
July 2, 1956; also found in The Anti-Stalin Campaign , op .
clt
. , p. 275,
23That they, the CPSU, had "told the whole truth, no
matter how bitter," and that "the line of the Central Com-
mittee of the CPSU has met with the complete approval and









for collective action against fascism also posed a grave
threat to the existence of the USSR.
During these times, there were massive economic
problems pressing upon the Soviet Union as well as an em-
bittered internal struggle ("who will get the upper hand . *'
said the resolution) after Lenin's death. The tremendous
achievements of building socialism under these conditions
required the iron discipline characteristic of Stalin (no
matter what the cost to the Russian people), but the power
and adulation of his eminent position "went to his head,"
noted the resolution. The marvelous accomplishments of the
Soviet people under the leadership of the CPSU were not
lost despite the "criminal band led by the agent of inter-
national imperialism, Beria." Crude and unfortunate viola-
tions of socialist legality took place, and "many honest
Communists and Soviet non-Party people were slandered and
suffered innocently."
The resolution then explained that failure by other
Communist leaders to attack Stalin during this period did
not signify any "lack of personal courage" (an answer to
several attacks on Khrushchev); any action at this time
against Stalin "would not have received support from the
people" because of the depths to which they have been




The altercation with Yugoslavia in 1948 was then
blamed, in the resolution, on Stalin (although at Belgrade
in 1955, Khrushchev had laid the blame on 3eria and Abak-
homov )
•
Despite this open admission that the worst forms of
Stalinism could flourish for thirty years, the Soviet
leaders could then claim that "Soviet society is strong
through the awareness of the masses," although they had
just admitted that any action against Stalin "would not
have been understood by the people."
The finale of the resolution consisted of the usual
exhortations to all Communist and Workers' Parties to
"retain and strengthen their ideological unity and inter-
national fraternal solidarity ..." against war and for
peace, against the machinations of NATO and SEATO and the
Baghdad Pact (CENTO'S predecessor) and against United
States subversion.
It is difficult to imagine one document containing
more falsification, distortion, and nonsense, yet this
24
resolution has served as the basis of Soviet relations
24Broadened in its scope by the Soviet declaration
on the status of their troops in Eastern Europe, Pravda,
October 31, 1956, p. 1, translated in CDSP, VIII , 40, pp.
10-11; and modified by the Declaration of the Ruling Com-
munist Parties, Moscow, November, 1957. This writer con-
siders it a basic document because it is a response not to







with its fraternal socialist neighbors since that time.
Perhaps its efficacy is measured by the quality of social-
ist internationalism that has prevailed in the Soviet bloc
since 1956. Viewed in this light, the attack that really
commenced in April, 1956, on the "errors" of fellow commu-
nists has in no sense been a complete failure. Yet neither
has it been more than a temporary success. One reason the
June 30, 1956, resolution has not contributed more to
socialist unity is its basic contradiction: the notion
that Stalin could deceive, manipulate, corrupt and decimate
the CPSU for nearly thirty years without the awareness of
the people or the active resistance of the Party. Although
these features of Stalinism existed and thrived with the
knowledge of the Party, the Party consciously was incapable
of corrective measures. Yet, Stalinism was supposedly not
a degeneration of Soviet socialism. This is perhaps too
much for the most devoted Russophile in the satellites to
accept.
The importance of the June 30, 1956, resolution was
25
stressed in a lengthy editorial in Pravda , July 16, 1956,
which declared in part that: "It is impossible to move
separately or haphazardly toward such a great goal [as Com-
munism]. The working people of all socialist countries are
25Zinner, ojd. cit





marching toward this aim in unison . . . . " The absence of
comment on the various forms of transition to socialism was
an especially noteworthy feature of this article.
However, events in some of the East European social-
ist countries were not moving in the direction called for
by the CPSU. In March of 1956, a Secretary of the Polish
United Workers' Party attempted to confine the effects of
the "separate roads" thesis:
The Gomulka group propounded the theory of a "Polish
road to socialism ... [which meant] holding up the
process of revolutionary transformation .... In
its essence this was not a variation of the Soviet
road but its contradiction, and objectively it signi-
fied an outright negation of the road to socialism. 26
During this same month, the Stalinist Bierut died
and was replaced as First Secretary of the Polish United
Workers (Communist) Party by Edward Ochab. In less than a
month, Gomulka was released from prison and rehabilitated,
and two months later there occurred the Poznan riots which
touched off the momentous events of 1956.
Jerzy Morawski, "The Lessons of the 20tb Congress
of the CPSU," Trybuna Ludu , March 27, 1956; translated in
Zinner, ojp_. cit . , p. 5§~. This editorial also cited criti-
cism of Gomulka by Ochab, who considered Gomulka a national-
ist and opportunist. See report by Edward Ochab on Results
of 20tb Soviet Party Congress, Pravda , April 8, 1956, . 5,
translated in CDSP, VIII
, 14, p. 35. Morawski displayed
political astuteness by proposing to eliminate excessive cen-
tralization in the economy and restore intra-party democracy;
he also proposed a 25 per cent wage increase, showing an
awareness of worker dissatisfaction. Finally, he emphasized
the need for "the unity and cohesion of the entire socialist




The details of the actual uprisings in Poland and
Hungary in the latter half of 1956 do not call for repeti-
tion here, dramatic as they may be. Needless to say, the
revolts were, and still are, blamed by the Soviet Union on
"imperialist forces" and "hostile agents." This was not
the line adopted by the Polish government and party. It
was admitted that this was an internal matter and not the
27
work of "foreign provocateurs." The Joznan riots actu-
ally reflected not only economic dissatisfaction but enmity
towards continued Soviet control of the country.
The key to the reaction to these events by the
Soviet party is found in a statement by Premier Bulganin a
month after the Poznan uprising, when he and Marshal Zhukov
were visting Poland in an attempt to minimize the extent of
the damage. This statement reminded the Poles of the
nature of their western frontiers, which among the major
powers guaranteed these frontiers, and that the retention
27At a meeting of the Central Committee of the
Polish United Workers' Party, Ochab placed the blame for the
Poznan riots upon lingering economic difficulties and ''. . .
the difficulties connected with the tense international
situation and with the necessity for rapid industrialization
• • • » " Pravda , July 20, 1956, p. 4; translated in CDSP ,
VIII, 29, p. 16. Ochab admitted party responsibility for
failure to eliminate bureaucratic distortions and callous-
ness toward the people. Gomulka later observed that "...
the clumsy attempt to present the painful Poznan tragedy as
the work of imperialist agents and provocateurs was very
naive politically." For the Soviet conclusion that the
Poznan revolt was caused by imperialist agents and a reac-
tionary underground, see Pravda , June 30, 1956, and July 5,








1 X OIUD -•
118
of this border depended upon "the friendship of the peoples
of our socialist camp, the friendship of the Polish and
23Soviet peoples." Polish security forces, however, had
been able to restore order without relying, in this in-
stance, on the "friendship" of the Soviet people. There
were no immediate and sweeping changes in the Polish politi-
cal and economic situation as a result of Poznan but, un-
doubtedly, the riots were of great importance in the later
developments that brought Gomulka back into the party and
in power. A Yugoslav comment on the outcome of the Poznan
riots was that "it is of particular importance that Poland
29
remains loyal to democratization." But not even the
Yugoslavs fully appreciated the trend of the affairs then
at work in East Central Europe; Poland was to remain a
"people's republic," but with a much different emphasis
30from that of early 1956.
28Oscar Halecki, "Poland," in Kertesz, ££. cit . , p.
50. Also, see Zinner, op_. cit., pp. 143-145.





30As has been noted, the transformation of Poland
during the latter half of 1956 was not a shift to "national
communism.'' Gomulka remained steadfast in his adherence to
Polish-Soviet ties as a prerequisite to the existence of
the Polish state. A resolution (see Zinner, o£. cit., p.
239) adopted by the Central Committee of the PUWP at its
Eighth Plenary Session, October 19-21, 1956, and based on a
speech by Gomulka Just previous, declared that (p. 256) it
would take all steps necessary against reactionaries at
.
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Whether their reasoning was based on pragmatism or
ideology, the Polish political leaders repeatedly reaf-
firmed during the "Polish October" their loyalty to the
socialist camp and their abiding friendship with the Soviet
Union. To the dismay of the Soviets, however, many revi-
sionist and downright un-Marxist views slipped into print
in Polish publications during this period. The Soviets
31
attacked the liberal-intellectuals who proposed innova-
tions that, as the Soviets claimed (justly, perhaps), would
"shake the very foundations" of the socialist system. Re-
forms in Polish political life did not include permitting
attacks on the socialist system or the "necessary" ties
with the Soviet Union.
Undoubtedly, Gomulka has hewn a "new path" for
Polish socialism, but surface differences should not be
home and abroad who attempt to weaken the Soviet-Polish
alliance or cause anti-Soviet feelings. An even more
graphic description of the need for strong PUWP-CPSU ties
was offered by Premier Cyrankiewicz: "It is impossible to
build socialism in Poland without the U.S.S.R. or, as some
idiot might think, against the U.S.S.R.," Pravda , October
25, 1956, p. 3, translated in CDSP, VIII , 41, 5.
Pravda, October 20, 1956, p. 3, translated in CDSP ,
VIII , 40, 12-l3. A certain 2. Florczak "suggested that the
slogan 'Workers of the World, Unite,* be abandoned, and
that the ultimate goal be shifted from Marxism to the 'final
enrichment of man.'" Another writer by the name of Jerzy
Putrament prepared an article which, the Soviets rather
plaintively noted, did not even mention socialism, and was






mistaken for substantive reformation of the Polish system
or her relations with Moscow. On the contrary, Gomulka »s
first public speech after his return to power contained
remarkable similarities in both content and cone to the
official Soviet explanations of the importance of the 20tb
32Party Congress. Gomulka first admitted that a "great
deal of evil, injustice, and many painful disappointments
have accumulated in the life of Poland during the past
years." The First Secretary of the Polish United Workers'
Party declined to dwell on this subject. Just as the
Soviets denied that Stalinism was, or could possibly have
been, a product of their system, and could not happen again,
Gomulka dismissed the miseries of previous years with the
terse comment that "these years belong to the irrevocable
past." Gomulka then claimed, as did the Soviets after the
20tb Party Congress, that the Party leadership had told "the
whole truth, the unvarnished truth, leaving nothing unsaid
about our economic and political situation . . . ." As if
not quite sure that this message had been absorbed, in the
midst of discussing economic problems, Gomulka again claimed
that "the Party is telling the unvarnished truth to the
working class."
32Zinner, 0£. cit . , pp. 271ff; the speech was de-








The new First Secretary then warned that no one
would be permitted "to take advantage of the cause of re-
generation and of the peoples' freedom for purposes alien
to socialism," a firm reminder similar to many found in
33Pravda in the weeks after February, 1956. Gomulka 's most
significant remarks were directed towards the relations
between Poland and the USSR. Having recognized the obvious
that the Soviet Union is the "oldest" and "most powerful"
socialist state, Gomulka continued with a statement that
could have been studied with satisfaction in both Washing-
ton and Moscow: "We see our place in the world camp of
socialism, and we understand our fraternal, friendly rela-
tion^ with the Soviet Union in this light [this is Soviet
i 34power J." In the days that followed, while the Hungarians
were enjoying a brief respite between invasions of Soviet
33Later in the speech Gomulka forcefully dispelled
any possible revisionist illusions: "The state authority
will not tolerate for a moment any action directed against
the Polish state interests and against our state system."
Brzezinski correctly notes that "... from the very begin-
ning, the National Communism of Poland, as it was often
called by observers, was restricted by Gomulka to domestic
affairs . . . without translating it into an external ide-
ological challenge or a fundamental revision of Poland's
place in the world .... Gomulka was neither a Nagy nor a
Tito." Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 261.
34Gomulka 's position has been consistent; compare,
for example, the above quotation with his statement after
the 40u> Anniversary celebration in Moscow in November, 1957,
Gomulka has steadfastly opposed any but the most mild form
of organizational structure for the bloc.

armor, the Polish people were being congratulated by edi-
35torials in Trybuna Ludu ** for their combination of "roman-
tic outbursts" tempered by "political realism."
Confirmation of Poland *s right to determine its own
road to socialism was contained—among other terms—in a
communique issued after talks between party and government
delegations of the Polish People* s Republic and the Soviet
Union in Moscow, November 18, 1956. Gomulka headed a
rather large delegation to Moscow to take part in important
discussions concerning relations among socialist states in
view of the recent developments in Poland and Hungary. The
visit was also a fruitful one for Poland, at least tempo-
36
rarily. The matters agreed upon included the settlement
of outstanding debts on coal deliveries of nearly a decade
previous, the promise of large amounts of Soviet grain in
1957 on credit, additional Soviet credits to the extent of
700 million rubles, the clarification of the status of
Soviet armed forces personnel in Poland, and the repatria-
tion of Poles still in Russia.
The economic arrangements contained in this agree-
ment were important not only as a means of placating Polish
feelings and revitalizing her economy but also as an
35Trybuna Ludu , November 1 and 2, 1956; also found
in Zinner, ojd. cit
. , pp. 277 and 281.
36
Zinner, op_. cit . , pp. 306ff.
.
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expression of the new debtor-creditor relationship between
the satellites and the USSR that was forming at this time. 37
From a Stalinist era of exploitation, the Soviet Union, as
the leading economic as well as political power of the bloc,
was now in the position of aiding the satellites in their
economic development. The extent and nature of this aid
over the next few years was variable, and the motives of
socialist mutual help often seemed questionable. It is
also true that East Germany and Czechoslovakia continued to
supply the Soviet Union with many needed products, espe-
cially machinery and chemical goods.
Considering the fraternal nature of relations be-
tween socialist countries, the content and amount of detail
of the agreement on the status of Soviet forces in Poland
seems unusual. The Poles recognized that the presence of
Soviet troops was a necessity caused by the international
situation; the Soviets agreed, on the other hand, that
their military forces were not to interfere in Polish in-
ternal affairs, that the disposition of these forces must
be agreed to by both the governments involved, that Soviet
military personnel and their dependents were to respect
Polish law, and that "the movement of Soviet military units
outside their stations requires the agreement of the
37
^or this shift in economic relations in the bloc,





Government of the Polish People's Republic or other compe-
tent Polish authorities." 38
At the end of 1956, the reputation of international
socialism appeared to be severely damaged in the Soviet
bloc, among the Communist Parties of Western Europe, and in
the so-called uncommitted and neutral states throughout the
world. Yet, the Soviet Union had effectively, even if
somewhat reluctantly, established by positive action a new
content and significance to the phrase socialist inter-
nationalism, as it applied to the USSR and the peoples'
democracies of East Europ . The acceptable parameters of
political maneuvering permitted the satellites had been
fixed at the close of 1956, Once the satellites had been
advised forcefully of the full meaning of the concept
"separate paths to socialism," it then remained for the
Soviet Union in the following two years to exert the utmost
efforts in restoring both the attractiveness and effective-
ness of socialist unity within the bloc. That the Soviets
were not completely successful was not unusual. Rather,
the extent to which Khrushchev was able to re-weave a meas-
ure of bloc cohesion attests to his perserverance and in-
genuity in this period.
in
Zinner, oj£. clt . , p. 312 [italics added]. "Compe-
tent authorities" other than governmental representatives
are not defined; presumably this refers to Party officials.
•oq
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The communist leaders of Hungary were not so success-
ful in their attempts to confine the rising discontent of
the people. After the Twentieth Party Congress, the con-
flict between the intellectuals and the party leadership,
especially Rakosi, deepened. The conflict was aggravated
rather than eased by the rehabilitation of Laszlo Rajk, who
had been condemned to death as a "Tito deviationist" in
1949. The Petofi Circle, society of intellectuals formed
within the communist youth organization in Hungary, focused
the frustration of the writers and served as a vehicle for
publicizing their anti-party views. The Hungarian Workers
(Communist) Party strongly attacked the writers and the
Petofi Circle, warning that anti-party attacks would not be
tolerated: ". • • in the language of socialism a new revo-
39lution of this kind is called a counter-revolution."
After the Poznan revolt in Poland, increased pressure
was brought against Rakosi, and he was replaced by a similar
party functionary, Zrno Gero, on July 18, 1956. Although
Gero implemented some minor liberalization measures, the
discontent that continued to mount was focused against
Stalinism by speakers at the reburial of Rajk on October 6,
attended by a huge crowd. Imre Nagy, who had been Premier
briefly in 1953 and still retained his popularity, was
Szabad hep , July 3, 1956. Official organ of the






readmitted to the Communist Party in the middle of October,
and a week later the now famous sixteen-point resolution
was adopted by the Budapest students. The succeeding
events are well known: Gero's intemperate remarks to the
students followed by rioting and police firing into the
crowds. The students were quickly joined by the workers as
the riot developed into a major revolution that was even-
tually controlled only by full-scale intervention by the
Soviet Army. On November 4, Kadar replaced Nagy, who fled
to the Yugoslav embassy, but was arrested and later ex
cuted upon leaving the embassy, having heen granted safe
passage by Kadar.
Janos Kadar quickly came to terms with the Soviets,
and on a trip to Moscow in March, 195 7, agreed that Soviet
troops could remain in Hungary "as long as necessary," in
return for economic assistance from the Soviet Union.
Kadar moved swiftly against the two bases of opposi-
tion to the communist regime in Hungary: the intellectuals
(including the students) and the workers. The Writer's
Union was banned in January, 1957, but action against the
Workers 1 Councils proceeded somewhat more cautiously, and
they were not finally dissolved until November, 1957.
The repression of the Workers* Councils forms one of
the more interesting and significant subchapters within the






of 1956, The workers, of course, 3hould have been the
most receptive to communist indoctrination, and it must
have been difficult for communist leaders throughout the
bloc to explain why the workers were in the vanguard of the
41Hungarian revolution. It is important to note that the
workers did not call for an end to the communist government
in Hungary, although to the party leaders it must have
seemed so. On the contrary, the members of the Workers*
Councils felt themselves to be genuine socialists, true
Marxists. They believed that the workers should control
their own destinies, should run their own factories (as
they supposedly did in Yugoslavia); in their enthusiasm,
they believed that workers had a special affection for each
other that spanned national boundaries (the true socialist
Perhaps the best treatment of the role of the
Workers 1 Councils during this period in Poland and Hungary
is found in Karl Reyman and Herman Singer, "The Origins and
Significance of Cast European Revisionism," in Leopold
Labedz (ed.), Revisionism (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
1962), pp. 219-221.
41Speaking in Budapest many months after the event,
Khrushchev admitted that: "Naturally, we cannot close our
eyes to the fact that a certain segment of the working
people, particularly from among the intelligentsia, were
taken in by the fascist slogans . . . ," Pravda , April 4,
1958, pp. 2-3, translated in CDSP , X, 14, pp. 12-14. At
the same time, however, Khrushchev claimed that "as is
known, our aid to the Hungarian people in the suppression
of the counterrevolution was unanimously approved by the
working people of the socialist camp."
.
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internationalism). In eliminating the Workers 1 Councils,
the Soviet Union was crushing the only true workers' organi-
zation, the closest in form to the revolutionary Soviets of
42forty years earlier.
An additional development arising out of the events
of 1956 in Poland and Hungary was the important Soviet
Declaration on Troops in Eastern Europe of October 30,
431956. This declaration restated the nature of relations
among socialist countries, in light of the revolts that had
occurred in Poland and Hungary:
United by the common ideals of building a socialist
society and by the principles of proletarian inter-
nationalism, the countries of the great commonwealth
of socialist nations can build their mutual relations
only on the principles of complete equality, of
respect for territorial integrity, state independence
and sovereignty, and of noninterference in one
another's internal affairs.
These principles of relations among socialist coun-
tries had been stated in various forms before. What was
new at the end of October, 1956, was that the Soviet Union
found itself forced by another socialist country to empha-
size these conditions of socialist relations. The Soviet
Union admitted that there had been many difficulties and
mistakes in relations among the socialist countries during
42See Arendt in Hallowell, o£. cit
• , p. 28.
43
Prayda, October 31, 1956, p. 1; translated in
CDSP, /III, 40, pp. 10-11.
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the formative year3 of the new system. At the same time,
however, the declaration claimed that such mistakes had
been condemned by the 20U» Party Congress, implying that
these were Stalin* s mistakes.
The declaration then singled out the economic and
military spheres as areas in which further attention "has
become necessary." The Soviet Union offered (1) to develop
and strengthen economic ties, without any violation of
sovereignty; (2) to discuss the question of Soviet advisers
"requested" by the East European governments; and (3) to
review the stationing of troops in the satellites on the
basis of :rsaw Treaty.
The entire tone of the declaration was defensive;
and although the Soviets did not commit themselves to an
ideological or political retreat, they were now in a dif-
ficult position in their relations with the East European
socialist states. They would have to bargain with t









Only if the proletariat and the poorest peasantry
can muster enough consciousness, idealism, selfless-
ness, persistence—only then will the victory of the
socialist revolution be guaranteed. By creating the
new soviet type of state, by thus opening the possi-
bility for the working and oppressed masses to take
an active part in independent construction of the
new society, we have solved only a small part of the
difficult task. The main difficulty lies in the
economic sphere: socializing strictest accounting
and control over the production and distribution of
products everywhere, raising the productivity of
labor, socializing production in fact .-*-
Lenin was indeed a first-class prophet when he said
that "the main difficulty lies in the economic sphere
• • . "; for despite the success of the Soviet Union in
developing its own economy at a prodigious rate, the
attempt to create a dynamic world socialist economic system
has met with much more limited success. Lenin also may
have correctly analyzed the reasons that have precluded
this success by making it dependent upon the "consciousness,
idealism, selflessness, persistence" of the peasants and
workers in their efforts to create a "new soviet type
state."
The relations of the East European people* s democra-
cies and the Soviet Union are affected not only by the
V. I. Lenin, Sochinenlia (Second edition; Moscow:
Cn.n.], 1926-1932), Vol. XXII, pp. 440-441.
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traditional ties between a great power and its protector-
ates but also the singular Soviet ideology that has grown
out of Marxist theory and what has been called the "Soviet
experience." From the point of view of the Soviet leader-
ship, there is no divergence between what the Soviets
choose to call "socialist internationalism," and the in-
terests of the Soviet Union, This is not new, but was ini-
tiated by Lenin nearly a half century ago. What is new, we
have determined, is the concrete formation of the socialist
commonwealth after the Second World War. Now the interests
of socialist internationalism are no longer determined
solely by the political leadership of one socialist state,
although this was effectively the situation prior to
Stalin's death. Now a group of somewhat disparate nations
comprise the "socialist camp," each one concerned with its
2
own national interests.
Contrary to the expectations of most Marxists, bour-
geois nationalist tendencies did not disappear with the
first socialist victory, or even upon the establishment of
the socialist system. Despite the claims to "new forms of
international relations" with the advent of the socialist
system, there are now several different views and attitudes
2Kennan rather humorously noted that the Soviet
government now has "friends" to complicate its policy.
George F. Kennan, Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin







seeking to determine, or help to determine, those policies
felt to be in the interests of international socialism. We
have seen in a brief review of events in the socialist com-
monwealth (Chapters III and IV) that Khrushchev's attempt
to mold what he has called a "fraternal association of
socialist countries," based upon the ideals of socialist
internationalism, has not been an unqualified success. His
weakening of the "moral authority" of Stalin, at the his-
toric 20tb Party Congress, earned not only fraternal gratitude
but increased the desire for some forms of independence for
the Communist Parties of the East European socialist states.
The impact and reverberations of Khrushchev's speech
are now well known. What Khrushchev's intentions were at
this time cannot be firmly established. What the Soviet
leadership did in the two or three year period after the
hectic months of late 1956 to recapture both the "socialist"
cohesion of the bloc, and a firm Soviet position of au-
thority within the bloc, can be reasonably restructured.
Our goal in this chapter is to examine the historical devel-
opment, the institutional arrangements, and the most sig-
nificant features of the economic integration of the Soviet
3bloc, with emphasis directed to the years 1956-1958.
3Foreign trade outside the bloc and foreign aid will
not be discussed in this paper except as they pertain to




In Chapter II, we discussed some of the theoretical
aspects of relations among the members of the socialist
camp. It is appropriate at this point to mention some of
the theoretical bases of the so-called "world socialist
economy," a concept that is also supposed to be a radical
development in the historical process. Close examination
of both theories, relations among socialist countries and
the development of a world socialist economy, illustrates
that even the claims of contemporary Marxists are not
•specially radical, except as they are compared to the
existing situation in the socialist camp.
Some of the "new" characteristics attributed to the
world socialist economy have also been applied by socialist
authors to the description of relations among socialist
states In il« This includes the process of the "draw-
ing together" of socialist states as they develop, an
4intricate process ", • • requiring much time and effort,"
In the economic sphere, this implies, of course, that the
economies of the socialist countries will be very closely
coordinated and integrated.
An important aspect of this close coordination of
the socialist countries in their economic activities is
The -'undamentals of Marxism-Leninism (Moscow: For-








another "new" characteristic of the socialist system, the
international socialist division of labor. The inter-
national division of labor, Marxist theorists tell us, is
5
not new; but the international socialist division of labor
is a radical departure because it is based upon fraternal
socialist principles. It is not possible, within the world
socialist economy, to undertake a "fierce competitive
struggle," because all trade is conducted by official agen-
cies of the socialist government, which is inherently
incapable of exploitative practices or wasteful competition
for profit.
In addition, because of the nature of the planned
economies of socialist countries, the development of the
world socialist economy is not hindered by economic fluc-
tuations, artificial trade barriers, or exclusive regional
7groupings. Such activities, which are inherent in a
capitalist economic system, are contrary to the socialist
principle of "growing togetherness."
The concept of the international division of labor
is implicit in the carrying on of foreign trade. As one
author has explained it, foreign trade is " • • • the neces-
sary consequence of an international division of labour."
Roy F. Harrod, International Economics (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 9.
Fundamentals




The cooperative efforts of the socialist system in-
clude the free exchange of scientific and technical data, 8
one of the means by which the less-developed socialist
countries can advance to the same level of economic develop-
ment as the more experienced, industrialized socialist
countries, so that all countries in the socialist system
can commence to build communism at approximately the same
time. This characteristic of fraternal socialist aid is of
great importance, communist theorists claim, in the attrac-
tion of the less-developed countries and former colonies to
the socialist system,
Ti; /iet authors also stress the fact—of great
importance to the "emancipated peoples"—that the economic
competition with non-socialist countries is strictly with
the well-developed countries of the West, "As for states
which are taking their first steps in industrial develop-
ment, the socialist countries do not treat them as competi-
9tors."*
Q
Ibid . t p. 784. One observer of the Soviet bloc
economy has commented that the bloc has a "large-scale free
exchange of patents and technical information" and conducts
extensive exchange of personnel in support of the program
of mutual aid and coordination. In the exchange of person-
nel "... they may have gone further than the West. East
Germany and the Soviet Union alone have exchanged more than
17,000 specialists in the past 10 years." Paul Wohl,
"Soviets Loosen Trade Ties," The Christian Science Monitor t
January 16, 1962, p. 7.
9Fundamentals , op . cit • , pp. 785-786.
•.<, : I a&O ?' - •..'•.-.-.-..
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Socialist planners also emphasize certain laws which
are applicable only to the world socialist economy. Among
these is the socialist principle of the maximum development
of new branches of the economy, so that each socialist
country will become fully developed. Not only domestic
socialist economies, but the world socialist economy as
well requires extensive planning and coordination; such
planning, vjhich is conducted with the economic needs of all
the fraternal socialist countries equally in mind, is pos-




Within the world socialist economy the Soviet Union
plays a special role: at the time of the formation of the
socialist system in the late 1940 , s, the U.S.S.R. had al-
ready formed ". • .a powerful and integrated economic sys-
tem [which] was well adapted to becoming the core of the
12
world socialist economy." While the Soviet Union carried
the burden of the struggle for socialism, it was forced to
develop all facets of its economy to the maximum extent;
Soviet theorists note that the new socialist countries








1 3Ibld ., p. 778.
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The Soviet authors explain in some detail the appli-
cation of the principle of the international socialist
division of labor to the world socialist economy, the bene-
fits of the cooperation and coordination of the socialist
economies and their specialization of production, and the
fact that these principles do not apply to the Soviet Union
because of its diversity and great breadth of industries
14
already developed.
Again, the degree of planning, coordination, and
specialization is a new feature in economic relations "pos-
sible only in the socialist system"; it is emphasized that
the agency set up to conduct this planning and coordination
(the CEMA ) is not a ". • . directing body, or supra-state
agency with authority to intervene in the affairs of sov-
ereign states." This is one of the "dual policies" of




15 CEMA will be the abbreviation generally employed
in this r for the Council for Economic Mutual Assistance,
Many studies in English refer also to GMEA or to COMECON.





, op . cit
• ,
p. 780. Compare this atti-
tude toward national sensitivities with that of Lenin, op .
cit
.
, XVII, pp. 143-144: "The proletariat supports every-
thing which contributes to the elimination of national dif-
ferences, to tearing down the barriers between nations,
everything which makes the relations of the nationalities to
each other increasingly more Intimate, everything which
leads to the amalgamation of nations • • • • Economics will




Soviets, and to other communist leaders: the need and
desire to achieve maximum economic efficiency (and Soviet
control, incidentally) is continually blunted by the policy
of theoretical respect for the sovereign integrity of the
individual units within the system. We can now turn to the
development of the process of economic integration of the
socialist camp.
Since the dissolution of the Cominform in early 1956
shortly after the 20tfc Party Congress, there have been no
formal institutional arrangements reflecting (or providing
for) the political cohesion of the bloc. Nearly coincident
with the demise of the Cominform, the bloc under Soviet
leadership was strengthening the economic aspects of social-
ist unity and cooperation, institutionally expressed by the
CEKA. Bloc unity was at least temporarily refurbished
after the long winter of 1956-1957, or, at least, the dis-
integrating forces of 1S56 were temporarily arrested. The
absence of centralized political control—once provided by
the Comintern, and to a lesser extent the Cominform—has
been partially compensated for by the more frequent gather-
ings of party congresses, mutual visits, and other political
meetings. .Socialist cohesion and the position of the
Soviet Union within the bloc have been enhanced by widely-
expanded economic ties between the socialist countries of
East Europe and the Soviet Union, Steps that provide
i
139
economic coordination are conducive to political control.
Political and economic power are, of course, extremely dif-
ficult to distinguish. It is possible that Khrushchev may
have forged greater bloc unity through economic coordina-
tion because it appeared to be an excellent vehicle for
containing the disintegrating forces of 1956. It is more
likely that he realized—well before mid-1956—the signifi-
cance in political terms of a closely-knit, rapidly-
expanding bloc economy.
As we have seen in previous chapters, the economic
development of the East European satellites in the years
immediately following World War II was closely modeled
after that of the Soviet Union: the industrial sector of
the economy was nationalized, central economic planning
with strict direction of all sectors of the economy v/as
introduced, and each socialist country set out in its ov/n
autarkic manner to construct the basis of socialism, i.e.,
heavy industry. During these early years, as the gulf be-
tween East and West widened , and as economic conditions in
the bloc failed to demonstrate a marked recovery, some
sort of attempted "rational" planning or further coordina-
tion of the socialist states seemed almost inevitable.
The Council for Economic Mutual Assistance was es-
tablished in January, 1949, supposedly as an answer to the
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17Marshall Plan for Western Europe, which was seen through
Marxist eyes as another example of capitalist enslavement
of the workers and continued United States domination of
the area. The Council had two meetings in 1949. An April
gathering in Moscow decided to form a permanent Secretariat,
and in August the Council meeting in Sofia exchanged tech-
nical and scientific information.
Following a November, 1950, meeting of the Council
(occasionally referred to as the Plenum) at which general
problems of foreign trade were discussed, there was an
organizational lull until 1954. No formal rules had been
published, and it was not until a decade later that a
19Charter for the CEMA was released. During its early
years, the CEMA's activities were most likely devoted
17
:bigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), p. 12~Tl ATso see Jan Wszelaki,
Communist economic Strategy : The Role of East-Central
Europe (Washington: National Planning Association, 1959),
p. SO. The original CEMA members were the U.S.S.R., Poland,
Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Albania
Joined (February, 1949) shortly after the founding of the
CEMA and Cast Germany was accepted in September, 1950.
18
<3ric L. Pryor, "Forms of Economic Cooperation
in the European Communist Bloc: A Survey," Soviet Studies
,
11:174, October, 1959. The studies by Pryor and Wszelaki
provide an excellent historical and operational brief of the
A. For additional detailed treatment, see Alec Novo and
Desmond Donnelly, Trade with Communist Countries (London:
Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1960), pp. 25ff.
19
'
'Texts and Documents: The COMECON Charter," East
Europe , 9:42-45, August, 1960.
•
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primarily to the economic strengthening of the Soviet
Union, which then completely dominated the organization.
Because it was the only institution linking the U.S.S.R.
and the East European satellites in these years, the CEMA
undoubtedly served effectively as a channel of communica-
tions among these countries and as a means for the Soviet
Union to consolidate its position in Eastern Europe.
The period 1949-1954 could be characterized as an
era of limited intra-bloc planning , with trade concentrated
20in bilateral channels and based upon economic necessities
•
Each satellite continued to follow Stalin's formula for
"building socialism in one country, despite the extreme
disparities among the bloc members in raw materials, power,
21transportation, and labor force capabilities."
From the close of World War II to the end of this
period, the Soviet Union continued to exact reparations
from its zone of occupation in Germany. These reparations
20An indication of the extent to which the bloc also
"turned inward" in this period is that "in 1938, the com-
parable share of the West in the fort ign trade of the bloc
areas was between 80 and 90 percent, 17 whereas in 1948 and
1953 it had declined to 59 and 20 per cent, respectively.
Samuel Pisar, A New Look at Trade Policy Toward the Commu-
nist Bloc , United States Congress, Joint Economic Committee
(Washington : Government Printing Office, 1961), p. 72.
21





have been estimated to be as high as "25 per cent of pro-
duction in any given year • . • as severe as could be
22designed and tolerated." As a result, the East German
economy in effect did not recover from the damages of the
war until the late 1950* s.
After the formative period which terminated in early
1954, there came a renewed emphasis within the bloc not
simply on increaed economic expansion in all areas but
greatly enlarged activity for the CEMA as the agency
through which socialist trade and technical cooperation
would be channeled. In addition to scientific-technical
mutual assistance, the period 1954-1959 marked the first
steps in two related areas of economic planning : more ex-
tensive coordination of the national plans of each member
country, and attempts to reduce the autarkic practices of
23
members by means of increased specialization of production.
Another significant development during these years was t:
formation of permanent, functional committees, located in
22Wolgang F. Stolper, The Structure of the East
German Economy (Cambridge: Harvard UniversTEy Press, 1960),
p. 5. For additional information on the extraction of war
booty and reparations from Eastern Europe by the Sovi;
Union, and the reorientation of trade patterns in this area
after the war, see Penelope H. Thunberg, "The Soviet Union
in the World Economy," in Dimensions
, pp. 41-416, 424-425.
23Specialization of production within the bloc, on
the basis of the principle of division of labor, has been
labeled the CEMA's "main task" since 1955. See Jan Wszelaki,









the various CEHA capitals. These committees (more correctly
referred to as commissions) have been very important in the
growth of the CEMA activities in recent years. Coordination
of national plans, specialization of production, and the
permanent commissions will be amplified later.
An examination of some of the comments in the mid-
1950' s by both politicians and economists in the Soviet
bloc indicates an enthusiasm that goes beyond the usual
artificial, stereotype exclamations of social zeal. One
reason for this undoubtedly was the relaxed (relatively
speaking) political atmosphere in bloc relations following
Stalin's death, which permeated economic planning and co-
operation. Also, there is reason to believe that each
socialist member felt that it could materially benefit from
more cooperative efforts. There was increased realization
that self-sufficiency was not only economically impossible
but its pursuit was mutually destructive. A basis for bar-
gaining to achieve increased cooperation—a realistic price
structure in each member—did not exist, however, as will
be discussed later in this chapter. The new, invigorated
policy, at least after 1956, reflects the much more radical
24
and energetic international policies of N. S. Khrushchev.
24Brzezinski refers to the renewed emphasis on the
CEMA as "... a compliment to Khrushchev's perceptiveness. -1
Brzezinski, 0£. cit., p. 284. Evidence of Khrushchev's mox
flexible approach la his apparent confidence in economists:





Enthusiasm by itself, however, seldom surmounts bar-
riers or fulfills plans, and the bloc members soon encoun-
tered enormous problems as they attempted to extend the
scope and depth of their trade integration. Artificial
prices in planned economies is one of the problems the
25
socialist planners faced—or ignored as best they could.
The extensive efforts of the past few years to solve these
problems have produced some diversified and sophisticated
theorizing within bloc economic circles. Some of the
issues of this "inner debate " will be touched on briefly in
this chapter, after an outline of the institutional struc-
ture of the CEMA. This activity has been located mostly
within the Secretariat, although the Permanent Commissions
have been given some attention as a reflection of socialist
cooperation. Certain organizational features of the CEMA
are rather revealing. An analysis of the Charter, in addi-
tion to what else is known of the functioning of the several
CEMA organs , and combined with a study of the typical func-
tioning of communist organizations (to determine which
listens to them and understands the basic principles of
capital investment and foreign trade." This comparison is
from "The Work of CGIIE CON," o£. cit .
, p. 3.
25
It appears that the satellite economies were more
severely restricted and damaged not only by unworkable
plans but also unrealistic prices and exchange rates. As a
result, agitation for thorough restudy of the socialist
pricing structure as well as other financial arrangements
in the CEMA financial arrangements in the CEMA originated
in some of the satellites prior to their official notice by






organs make decisions and which merely approve, disregard-
ing such designations as the "supreme organ," etc.)—all
this might indicate the effective centers of power.
The stated purposes of the CBMA are to further "the
welfare of the member-peoples of CEMA . . . through the
unification and coordination of the efforts of the member
countries ... Tby means of] planned development of
26
national economics." To date, there has heen ample co-
ordination but little unification of the individual national
economies , except in their Marxist-oriented approach to
economic problems. Effective unification tending to sup-
plant present national boundaries may be an unexpressed
goal in keeping with Marxist-Leninist theory of the "world
socialist economy"; present reference to such a goal,
should it .^xist, would probably produce sharp dissent among
the East European members of the bloc.
Other methods of "furthering the welfare" of the
socialist peoples have included the exchange of scientific-
27technical information, bilateral cooperation in the
26
"COMECON Charter," East Europe , 9:42, August, 1960.
27See supra
, p. 135. For a recent Soviet descrip-
tion, sec '.'. Skrypnik , "Scientific and Technical Cooperation
between the USSR and other Socialist Countries," Vneshnaya
^ovlya , No. 2, 1960; translated in Problems of Economics ,
3:4 7-48, August, 1960. Skrypnik says that ". . . no less
than 132 Soviet institutes in the People's Democracies
(presumably including China) are now jointly working on
about 2,000 different problems," p. 50.





construction of large-scale industrial enterprises, the
granting of loans and credits, and the specialization of
production of the member countries (referred to in socialist
terms as the "international socialist division of labor").
The Charter of the CEMA, as well as nearly all
Soviet references to the work of this organization, stress
the "... principle of complete equality of all its mem-
bers, mutual respect of sovereignty and independence [and]
28fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance." Inherent
in the notion of complete equality is the arrangement in
the CEMA providing one vote for each member, in "marked con-
trast to capitalist practice." In addition to equal votes,
the CEMA members are protected by Article IV of the Charter
which specifies that recommendations and decisions of the
Council are "... adopted only with the consent of the
member-countries concerned." Soviet commentators in this
field also emphasize, disregarding recent trends in the
CEMA and the ultimate objective of a "world socialist
economy," that the CEMA is not a supra-national organiza-
tion. 29
28Nikolai Faddeyev, "New Features in Socialist
Economic Cooperation," New limes [Beirut], January 24,
1962, p. 4.
29
Xbld . | Wszelaki, loc . cit . , claims that ". . • the
CMEA has evolved into a powerful regulatory organism, which








Membership requirements are stated in the Charter,
allowing in theory for other states to join, and for pres-
ent members to withdraw. The charter also specifies (not
insignificantly) that "the seat of the Secretariat of the
Council is in Moscow" (Article IX/4), and that "the lan-
guage used in the Council is Russian" (Article XIV/2).
The Charter provides for four primary organs, or
types of organs, within the CEMA. The first of these is
•an
the "Session of the Council," " referred to in the Charter
as the "supreme organ" (Article VI/1). The Session of the
Council is composed of the national delegations, usually
headed by the Minister for Foreign Trade or the Planning
Chairman of the respective delegation's government.
Sessions are scheduled twice a year; and since the CEMA»s
30This is occasionally referred to as the Plenum;
Pryor, o£. cit
. , p. 179.
31
Ibid. Also, see United States Congress, Senate,
Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery
in the Soviet Union , Report by the Subcommittee on National
Policy Machinery, £?6tb Congress, 2d Session, January 20,
1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 49;
hereafter cited as Soviet Policy Machinery . See also Wohl,
op. cit
. , p. 7, who described the December, 1961, meeting
of the Council as being composed of the chairmen of the
national planning committees. It is reported that at the
16tb Session of the Council, held in Moscow in June, 1962,
an Executive Committee was established, to be composed of
the chairmen of the State Planning Committees of the CEMA
members; see Theodore Shabad, "New Soviet Body to Guide






evolution from 1954, this obligation has been fulfilled
with few exceptions. However, in a manner similar to the
"supreme" status of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., the
Council meets for short periods in rather large groups, and
is probably more an approval body than a decision-making
organ. As the highest organ, it is charged by the Charter
to study proposals from member countries, the Conference of
the Representatives Permanent Commissions, and the
Secretariat, as well as define the course of action of the
other organs (Article VI/5 , a, b).
Similar in function to the Central Committee of most
communist parties is the Conference of the Representatives
with one representative from each member country and a
deputy in the Secretariat. In theory, the Conference is
32designed to operate during the absence of the Council.
Specifically, its functions include studying proposals on
the implementation of decisions of the Session, coordinating
the programs of the Permanent Commissions, and approving
salaries and budgets and controlling the Secretariat (Arti-
cle VII/2, a, c, d).
On the surface, the functions of the Secretariat
(Article IX) appear rather perfunctory, and this organ is
32Other studies indicate that the Conference meets
"at least twice per month, by statute," (Pryor, 0£. cit
.
,
p. 180); or is in continuous session and is composed of
"permanent country delegates resident in Moscow" ( Soviet





seldom mentioned in Soviet or other socialist publications
•
Nevertheless, it is a permanent, major organ (some or most
of the Permanent Commissions have their own small secre-
tariats); it is located in Moscow; and it is headed by the
33Secretary of the Council, usually a Soviet representative.
In view of the typical importance of the secretariat in
other communist organizations, it is logical to suggest a
34
similar function for the Secretariat of the CEMA.
If the S iat is the locus of political power
in the CEMA (this can be only a tentative conclusion), the
center of technical competence lies in the Permanent Com-
35
missions. The Permanent Commissions, which have come
into existence in the last seven years, have expanded
rapidly in number and size. Considering the mission of the
CEMA to be the coordination of the national economies of
the member countries ". • .on the basis of an international
socialist division of labor," this mission of
3 Soviet Policy Machinery , op . clt . , p. 49.
34Wohl, o£. cit.
,
p. 7, suggests a contrary inter-
pretation of the importance of the Secretariat: "In con-
trast to Western Europe's international economic agencies,
CMEA headquarters in Moscow employs no experts, can take no
initiatives or conduct research, and publishes neither sta-
tistics nor a bulletin."
This appears to be the accepted title, although
there are references to "permanent committees , " "standing
committees , " etc., in Western and Soviet materials.
36A. Alexandrov, "In the Permanent Commissions of
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specialization of production is fulfilled by the several
Permanent Commissions. The extent of the increased impor-
tance of the Commissions within the CEMA in recent years is
indicated by their responsibilities, which include
... proposals for further development of eco-
nomic ties • • • and for organizing comprehensive
economic and scientific-technical cooperation in
individual branches of these countries economies.
The Commissions [may] set up their own auxiliary
bodies. 37
These auxiliary organs could be secretariats and temporary
and permanent working groups.
There are approximately fifteen functional Permanent
38Commissions seated in different capitals of the CEHA. mem-
bers. Usually they are located in a capital which is appro-
priate for the function involved; i.e., the Oil and Gas
Commissions sits in Bucharest, the Chemicals Commission in
East Berlin, etc. Twelve of the Commissions were created
the Council on Mutual Economic Aid," Vneshnyaya Torgovlya
,
VII, July, 1961; translated in the Current Digest of the "
Soviet Press ( CDSP ) , XIII, November 8, 1961.
37
* Ibid .
38Alexandrov, 0£. cit • , lists fourteen; Pryor, op .
cit., pp. 180-182, describes fifteen; various other sources
have mentioned fifteen. Knud Erik Svendsen, "The Economic
Relations between the East European Countries , " Ostakonomi
[Oslo], Special Issue, 1961, p. 38, says that there are
eighteen permanent commissions, but does not give their
titles. The confusion probably results from the several
different titles applied to the Commissions , and the dif-




at the Seventh Session of the Council in East Berlin in
39May, 1956; the remaining Commissions are of more recent
origin.
In addition to the Permanent Commissions, the
Seventh Session of the Council approved ambitious economic
objectives for the bloc to accomplish during the years
1956-1961. The coordination of the national economies and
the other arrangements agreed upon to achieve these plans
were shattered by the events in Poland and Hungary in the
40fall of 1956, and as a result had to be reduced in scope.
At the same time, the Permanent Commissions increased in
size and extent of activities, indicating not only accept-
ance by the satellites, but perhaps even a degree of popu-
larity. Some of the Commissions, located in the "field" as
it were, might serve as a vehicle for effective regional
"mutual assistance" beyond the detailed supervision of
Moscow. In this sense, the decentralization character of
the Commissions perhaps compensates for some of the measures
of integration that may not be popular in the satellites.
The Permanent Commissions bear comparison in many














The state committees play an important role in
determining production and research programs, but
do not directly administer enterprises and have no
formal right to issue orders
. • . .
4^
Similarly, the Permanent Commissions do not directly
control economic units. But, an examination of the "advi-
sory" functions of a typical commission is revealing. The
Oil and Gas Commission, for example, has coordinated the
national plans of member countries through 1980; the Com-
mission reports to the Council on consumption and shipments
of petroleum; it studies problems of specialization of pro-
duction and the automation of pumping and control of oil
42pipelines, as well as communications along pipelines. In
addition, the petroleum import requirements of East Germany,
Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary (the latter only par-
tially) are being supplied by a pipeline from the Soviet
Union, under a degree of supervision of the Oil and Gas
A 3Commission.
Another Soviet author, discussing the activities of
the Permanent Commissions, states that they have
... analyzed the status of the corresponding
branches of the national economy in all the member
Alec Nove, The Soviet Economy (New York: Frederick
A. Praeger, 1961), p. 74.
42Alexandrov, loc . cit .
43See "The Work of COMECON," East Europe , 9:5, April,
1960; Mario Mura, "Eastrope Project: An Answer to Russia's
Oil Threat," Petroleum Management , 34:222, April, 1962.
.ht
153
states of CEMA and have drawn up recommendations on
the volume of production and mutual deliveries of
the most important goods . . • .44
An additional parallel may be drawn in the compari-
son of the CEMA structure with that of the Soviet Union in
the realm of long-term planning. This function in the
Soviet Union is performed by the Economic-Science Council,
which is responsible for several tasks originally assigned
45
to Gosplan, including research. Within the CEMA, similar
responsibilities are discharged by a Permanent Committee on
Economic Problems. This Committee, during its Moscow ses-
sion in November, 1959,
... discussed and approved the order, the ti
and the program for drawing up the main principles
and indices of the international socialist division
of labor. °
At its meeting in December of the following year,
the Permanent Economic Committee continued its discussion
of long-range coordination of national plans, approved sug-
gestions regarding the basic principles of the inter-
national socialist division of labor, and "approved the
work done by the countries' specialists in drafting a
0. Bogomolov, "The International Socialist Divi-
sion of Labor," Voprosy gkonomlki , No. 1, 1960, translated










method of comparing economic effectiveness of capital in-
47
vestments in Council countries,
"
In the words of another observer of the economics of
the Soviet bloc, the purpose and scope of the Permanent
Economic Commission is to devise
... methods of comparing the efficiency of
factors in similar sectors of production in differ-
ent member countries, and inquiring into questions
such as the amount of capital required per unit of
output, output per man-hour, and over-all cost per
output unit. 48
Data obtained and the methods resulting from such
studies presumably would serve as the basis for decisions
regarding the specialization of production of each member
country, on the principle of the international socialist
division of labor.
This brief analysis of the structure of the CEKA
essentially confirms the insistence of Soviet authorities
that COMECON is primarily a coordinating agency that has no
supra-national attributes. There is no clear demarcation,
however, between a "loose confederation" and a supra-
national entity in international organisations. It is
clear that the satellites have delegated considerable plan-
ning authority to the several CEMA organs, especially the
47Alexandrov, loc . cit .
48Alfred Zauberman, "The CMEA: A Progress Report,"
Problems of Communism
, 9:58, July-August, 1960.
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Permanent Commissions and perhaps the Secretariat* Beyond
planning, the features of supra-nationality are difficult
to detect. Sovereignty in the CEMA is supposedly protected
by the veto in the decision-making process. The principle
of unanimity and respect for the sovereignty of individual
members is highly publicized by the Soviets. Despite the
tedious discussions of integration and international social-
ist division of labor that are intended to weld the bloc
into a unified whole, a world socialist economy, the pri-
49
raary emphasis on bilateral negotiations remains. The
Soviet Union undoubtedly can exert its maximum influence
within the CEMA through the bilateral process, in which its
massive power is matched with that of a single satellite
during negotiations. The zealous protection of the sover-
eign rights of all members of the CEMA could work to Soviet
advantage.
Integration, on the other hand, could possibly lead
to the formation of a bloc—or blocs—within the CEMA, in
the East European countries which theoretically could pose
50
an economic challenge to the Soviet Union. From this
4°
After nearly eight years of "increased emphasis,"
the CEMA is still affected by ". . . inability to take
binding decisions or even to propose a draft convention
• . . [which] brings out the looseness of the Sov' loc's
international economic setup." Won!, o£. cit . , p. 7.
Shabad, op. cit., p. 8, in discussing the 16Uj Ses-








point of view, the lowering of artificial national barriers
could be contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union,
even though it might be closer in accord with Marxist-
Leninist theory than the present conservative, sovereign-
rights approach.
The scope of this paper does not permit a discussion
of the division of labor within the CEMA area on the basis
of economic principles. Instead, some of the stated pur-
poses and objectives of bloc specialization of production
will be mentioned, along with their apparent significance.
Specialization of production is a logical result of
the efforts of several countries (or simply two countries)
involved in a joint enterprise to increase their overall
51
efficiency. It is not in itself necessarily a measure of
the economic domination of one country by another but
the Soviet Union has been pressing for greater economic in-
tegration of the bloc as a counter to the Common Market;
the formation of the Executive Committee at this session
was to have been, according to Shabad, a "compromise 1
tween the previous loose economic alliance and the supra-
national body sought by the Soviet Union, but resisted by
Poland and Czechoslovakia."
51Bogomolov, 0£. cit . , p. 44, states that iter-
national socialist dTvision of labor accomplishes "...
the specialization of individual countries within the frame-
work of the world economy, in the production of te
kinds of goods and presumes that they complement each
other's economy." In this paper, the term international
socialist division of labor and specialization of production
are considered to be essentially the same; certain uses by
socialist economists imply several shades of meaning.
.01
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instead a recognition of the advantages in rational expen-
diture of available resources. Between partners of rela-
tively equal economic stature, division of labor should be
beneficial to each, without unfair advantage accruing to
either partner. If the participants are disparate in eco-
nomic power and growth, it is likely that the smaller or
less-developed partner will become an appendage of t
stronger. The supplier of unfinished products will, theo-
retically, remain a source of raw materials, tied to the
productive system of the more-developed partner. Communist
propagandists have used this theory to attack Western
colonialism and imperialism with a degree of accuracy and
effectiveness, but thereby admitting that the concept of an
international division of labor grew from the world capi-
talist system as a practice of colonialism:
International division of labor developed spon-
taneously in the conditions of capitalism. Born of
the nesd to develop productive forces, it turned
into a brake on their further progress, maintaining
and furthering the economic backwardness of most
countries of the world. 52
Such a development under the international socialist
division of labor would be impossible, we are told, because




and Socialism), No. 4, 1961.





exploitation of man by man and instead strengthen the
"• • . rational and harmonious development of the economy."
In view of the autarkic practices of the satellites
in the past, it is logical to assume that there has been
extensive opposition among the East European countries to
rigid lines of specialization in their national economic
development that prevent the overall growth of their eco-
nomy. There have been examples of criticism of the prac-
54tices prevalent in the system since the principle of the
55division of labor was brought forth in 1956. The number
of statements in Soviet journals justifying a division of
labor for the CEMA area indicates, perhaps, the extent of
satellite recalcitrance on this subject. It is difficult
to overcom. not only the habits of several years but also
it is difficult to surmount the most perplexing and explo-
sive issue of all in East Europe, nationalism. The inher-
ent logic in economics of the division of labor finds a
53
addeyev, o£. cit . , p. 5.
C A
The December, 1961, issue of Nowe Drog i [Warsaw],
commented to the effect that the more developed members of
the CEMA have followed practices designed to enhance their
economic superiority at the expense of the less-developed
members of the bloc.
55
It has been demonstrated that this principle was
implied at the formation of the CEMA in 1949; s ork
of CGK^CON," ££• cit. , pp. 3-4. r'addeyev, o£. cit . , p. 4,
says that the coordination of the several economic plans








formidable opponent in the local communist leader who de-
sires an overall development of his economy rather than one
tied to the policies of other governments.
The bitter pill of specialization is not made easier
to swallow by the double standard devised by the Soviet
Union. In regard to the East European members of the
CEMA, the Soviets say that it is not wise for each socialist
country to try to develop all types of industry, and that
57
such a policy would be impossible to fulfill, Th
Soviets justify specialization for the satellites as re-
quired by sources of raw material, geography, labor devel-
58
opment, and "historically evolved traditions." The
principle of the division of labor does not apply to the
Soviet Union, Soviet specialists claim, because the same
conditions do not apply within the Soviet Union. This is
explained as follows:
eg
One Soviet writer, after justifying the continued
autarkic growth of the Soviet economy and condemning the
same for the satellites, then claimed the participation of
all members of the bloc in deciding upon this course of
action; N. Siluyanov, "A New State in the Development of
International Socialist Division of Labor," Voprosy Ckono-
miki, January, 1959; translated in Problems of Economics
,
1 : 10 , May, 1959. Siluyanov says that this decision was
taken at t: nference of Representatives of Communist and
Worker's Parties of the Countries Participating in the CEMA,
which took place in May, 1958.
i 57
Faddeyev, op_. cit
• , p. 5.








The different countries do not participate in the
international division of labor to the same extent.
Big countries with vast territory and a large popu-
lation, plus a more or less full supply of natural
wealth, develop primarily on the basis of an inte-
gral economic complex • • • • Countries with a com-
paratively small territory and insignificant natural
resources depend greatly on the external market and
the international division of labor. 59
Despite the obvious advantages for the Soviet Union,
Soviet writers in this field continue to stress that t
principle of the division of labor does not preclude the
overall development of the national economies, that t:
CEMA is not a supra-national authority, and that thi 1-
ciples of socialism preclude the possibility of unev
economic growth or international exploitation among social-
ist countries. Also, it is emphasized that there is not a
single economic plan for the regulation of the economic
organization of the socialist world, but that this regula-
tion is based upon "... the voluntary coordination of the
60
national economic plans of the socialist states."
Ibid
. , pp. 44-45. Also, see K. Vinogradov, "Col-
laboration of Socialist Countries in the Development of
Machine 3uilding," Voprosy Ekonomiki , No. 2, 1960; trans-
lated in Problems of Economics , 3:52-53, June, 1960.
60
Bogomolov, op. cit., p. 45. MiroshnichenJ;
another Soviet writer on this subject, has added that the
Communist ideology predetermines ,r . . .a singl
economic policy and the character of economic dev
for all socialist countries." B. Miroshnichenko,
nation of the National Economic Plans of the Socialist
Countries,^ Voprosy Ekonomiki , No. 3, 1960; translated in




The extent of specialization and coordination of
production has increased considerably in the last six years*
Considered concurrently with the growth of the Permanent
Commissions, this represents one of the most significant
developments in the CEMA system in recent years . We can
now turn to some of the details of the integration of the
socialist countries, and then examine the problems that have
inhibited a rr.uch more rapid development of the world social-
ist economy.
We have observed how Lenin visualized the achieve-
ment of the future socialist system, through "the amalgama-
tion of all nationalities in a higher unity"; this process
would be effected by economic amalgamation. It seems
logical to assume that, in the fifteen years a socialist
system has existed in Eastern Europe, the Soviets and their
associated states would have undertaken radical , comprehen-
sive measures to create a new, unif socialist economy
which would serve as the basis for the future stateless
society. The artificial barriers to the free flow of goods
and people are the inevitable fruits of a bourgeois society,
the communists claim. Now that these impediments to the
growth of a socialist economic system in East Europe have
been removed, one might expect to see artificial barriers





dismantled, and economic integration advanced without re-
gard for the traditional forms of the national state.
To develop the broad principles of the international
socialist division of labor poses no major problem for the
Marxist theorist, but to implement these principles in the
form of integrative policies does present formidable prob-
lems for the communist politicians. As in other spheres of
human activity, there develops a hiatus between theory and
practice. Inevitably, the pragmatic requirements of poli-
tics receive precedence over the theoretical goals and pre-
cepts of Marxism.
The concepts of division of labor and economic inte-
gration are closely related and are often employed inter-
changeably. But there is a difference: the concept of the
division of labor is primarily a theoretical principle;
economic integration is the practical application of this
principle that has been devised piecemeal as demanded dur-
ing the evolution of the socialist system. There is inher-
ent conflict between division of labor and the requirements
of economic integration. Writing in 1959, the Soviet
economist Siluyanov noted that the policy of autarky
—
except for the Soviet Union—contravenes the needs of so-
cialism and the socialist system. Socialist internation-
alism, he claimed, is a feature of the completely new






structure of relations among socialist countries • Attempt-
ing to interject new (supra-national) values into the con-
cept of socialist internationalism, Siluyanov added that
the new socialist system should be developed not only on
the basis of the location of raw materials and the require-
ments of the national economy, but ". . . for the satisfac-
tion of the needs of other countries in the socialist camp,"
The attempt to place the interests of the bloc above
those of any single member is not a recent innovation.
After the crude Soviet exploitative practices in the imme-
diate postwar years , the CEMA members agreed in the early
1950 , s that there should be a form of economic integration
in order to utilize most efficiently the available bloc
resources. Such a program required "... the formation of
an integrated bloc economy in which production would be
ft "\
organized strictly on the basis of comparative advantage."
Until 1956, the integration of the planning of all
members was mentioned only occasionally in various bloc
publications, and most of the trade was conducted on a bi-
64lateral basis. In the later 1950' s, the foreign trade of
6 ^
Alfred ^auberman, "Economic Integration: Problems
and Prospects," Problems of Communism , 8:23, July-August,
1959.
64Nove and Donnelly, op_. cit . , p. 26. Also
Robert S. Jaster, "CEMA's Influence on Soviet Policies in








bloc members with each other increased rapidly, reflecting
the steps taken to implement the principle of division of
labor as well as the increased efficiency resulting from
the efforts of the Permanent Commissions. Some of the
results of the planned integration of the economies of the
CEMA members should be briefly mentioned, although this
dissertation does not attempt a detailed study of trade
patterns and other related economic matters.
As the second industrial power of the world, the
Soviet Union might be expected to import primarily raw
materials and export finished products. This is not the
case, however j the economy of the USSR is still being devel-
oped as rapidly as possible in an attempt to overtake th
United States in total production during the course of the
next fifteen or twenty years. For this reason, development
of heavy industry continues as the highest priority.
Soviet imports from the area [of East Europe]
consist mostly of machinery and finished industrial
goods
. while Soviet exports are mainly primary goods
such as fuels, minerals, foodstuffs and other raw
materials. 66
c ^
The pioneer major work in the field of East
European economies was that of Nicolas Spulber, The Eco-
nomics of Communist East Europe (New York: John Wiley and
The Technology Press, 1957) . A more contemporary study,
although not as detailed, is Nove and Donnelly, op_. cit
.
;
both works discuss the work of the CEMA only in general
fashion.









This trade pattern reflects a trend in the Soviet
Union not only of continued emphasis on industrial develop-
ment per se t but also a more diversified economy which may
devote more attention to the production of complex indus-
trial and electrical equipment, including electronics and
related "space age" products, requiring a lower input of
. , 67raw materials.
In its effort to become the world's leading indus-
trial power in all vital sectors, the Soviet Union is con-
centrating on the development of industries, such as those
just mentioned, which are best promoted by means of the
most modern and automated machinery • At her present pace,
the Soviet Union is unable to provide all of this equipment
herself. The imbalance of industrial goods, an important
target in the specialization of production, is supplied
mostly by the two most highly-developed industrialized mem-





p. 439, explains the Soviet
emphasis on this type of development as an effort ". • • to
concentrate its investments and manpower upon the develop-
ment of such branches of its national economy which it
regards as most essential for the winning of its economic
and power race against the West."
6°
"The most important items of Soviet imports are
machinery and equipment . The Soviet Union is still one of
the most important importers of machinery and equipment in
the world • • • • The German Democratic Republic ships









In order to facilitate the growth of the machine
tool industry in the satellites, the building of machines
has been numerically restricted to a certain number of
models; and the production of these models is allocated
among the satellite countries possessing special compe-
tence,
A more recent application of the principle of "spe-
cialization of production," an outgrowth of developments
during the 1956-1958 period, is found in the integration of
the shipbuilding industry of the East European members of
the CEMA. The Shipbuilding Commission of the CEMA, at a
meeting in Warsaw in December, 1961, decided on the stan-
dardization of sea-going ships for the bloc. Production of
these ships is concentrated in the Baltic yards of East
Germany and Poland, although other CEMA members will take
part in the program, "In future the shipyards of each
country will build in large numbers for all CMEA countries
70the types of vessels required by them."
large quantities of various machines and equipment to the
Soviet Union .... From Czechoslovakia we import equipment
for the power, chemical, and food industries . • • . " G.
Rubinshtein, "The Development of Soviet Imports," Vneshnyaya
Torgovlya , No. 5, I960; translated in Problems of Economics ,
3:4-5, August, I960. For an earlier discussion and criti-
cism of the insufficient integration of the machine building
industry, see Siluyanov, o£. cit . , pp. 11-12.
69
Rubinshtein, op_. cit., p. 4.
70
Eric Bourne, "Soviet Bloc Knits Industries," The
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The specialization of production of segments of in-
dustries in the satellites does not restrict the industrial
development of the USSR in general, or in the specific in-
dustries involved, 71 On the contrary, it frees the Soviet
Union for more profitable endeavors in other fields.
In similar fashion, the industrialization of the
East European socialist states 72 has increased their depend-
ence on the Soviet Union for sources of raw materials.
Table I demonstrates that the increase of raw materials
imported by the East European countries from the USSR
within an eight-year period was certainly not insignificant.
The significance of this shift in trade patterns be-
comes even more apparent when the figures in Table I are
compared with the trade of the East European countries,
prior to World War II, with the countries of Western Europe
and the USSR.
Christian Science Monitor , February 10, 1962, p. 2; Wszelaki
Economic Developments , " o£. cit
• , p. 442, states that one
Polish shipyard has been committed during the period 1959-
1965 to supply the Soviet Union with a million tons of ship-
ping.
71See Skrzypek, o£. cit . t p. 20, for table entitled
"Share of the Dependent Countries in Soviet Trade." This
table graphically illustrates the dominating role played by
the USSR in the exports of each of the satellites, and how
relatively small a share of the Soviet Union* s exports are
taken by the satellites.
72Faddeyev, o£. cit * , p. 6, presents a table describ-
ing the increased snare of the industrial sectors of the
total economies of the East European countries.
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Soviet trade with the East European socialist states
represents the major portion of their foreign trade, and
the satellites are becoming increasingly dependent upon the
Soviet Union in their trade patterns. The extent of the
intra-bloc foreign trade that is regulated by the CEMA has
not been specifically determined. Most Western students
discuss "east European trade" in general terms relative to
the CEMA. Wszelaki mentions two methods of Soviet "tighten-
ing economic controls" in 1959-1960 (through the CEMA and
through the process of trade control) as if some or most of
the foreign trade of this area is not CEMA-regulated. On
the other hand, Stolte, discussing the increased coordina-
tion of the national economies of the CEMA members, quotes
a 1961 Ulbricht statement to the effect that 90 per cent of
the bloc industrial production was controlled through the
CEMA. The control of intra-bloc trade should be at least
comparable in degree to the control of industrial produc-
tion. In addition, it should be remembered that the cur-
rent Soviet Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) anticipates an
increase of "more than fifty per cent" in the trade of the
75Soviet Union with the other countries of the bloc.
74Wszelaki, "Economic Developments," 0£. cit . , p.
424.
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Through the operation of the principle of socialist
division of labor which, as we have seen, applies to the
satellites and not to the Soviet Union, the USSR is able to
increase the specialization of the production of each East
European member of the bloc and direct this specialization
to the advantage of the growth of its own economy. Whether
coincidental or carefully planned, the development of the
pattern of trade of the Cast European socialist countries
with the USSR in recent years has subjected these countries
76
to increasing dependence upon Soviet Russia.
There have been various reports of increasing con-
solidation of Soviet control in some satellite countri
Some of the control measures, it is implied, are so all-
inclusive that they are outside the institutional arrange-
ments of the CEMA. There is little to substantiate such a
77possible trend, however.
The extent to which the deliberate integration of
national economies conflicts with the national interests of
the participating states, be they socialist or otherwise,
has been suggested. Economic integration implies the
76
This process has been described by Wszelaki,
"Economic Developments," o£. cit . , pp. 432ff.
77 See J. Emlyn Williams, "U.S.S.R. to Absorb East












rational process of selective judgment: priorities in the
sectors of production and exchange must be determined.
This, in turn, involves the question of "comparative advan-
tage." No matter what the method of selection, whether
"Marxist-scientific" or capitalist, it is assumed that the
decisions relating to the selection of production and ex-
change matters are considered on the basis of comparative
78
advantage. The notion of comparative advantage involves
many things beyond the scope of this research, but one of
its most important features is the question of price and
value, and their relationship to production and exchange
criteria. The Marxist-ideological content of these factors
has relevance to the economic construction of the socialist
commonwealth as it presently exists, and particularly the
period 1956-1958.
78Nicolas Spulber and Franz Gehrels, "The Operation
of Trade within the Soviet Bloc, ; ' The Review of Economics
and Statistics
, 40:148, February, 1958~ state that ". I T
it appears that the authorities have so far shown only
slight interest in planning economic development in con-
sonance with comparative advantage This clair, s not
seem entirely accurate. Soviet economists, in this writer's
opinion, are continually striving (since the early 1950' s)
for a method of determining comparative advantage, without
using the term, of course, within a Marxist framework . Lack
of success, in accordance with Western standards, should
not imply lack of interest. See also K. Ostrovityanov,
"Commodity Production and the Law of Value under Socialism,"
Kommunist
,
13:100-101, September, 1957, translated in J J si
,
IX: 44, pp. 3-8.
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Without attempting a datailed analysis of Marxian
economics, it is relevant to mention some of the thoughts
of Marx that pertain to price and value. It is necessary
first of all to recall that Marx was not interested simply
in the philosophy of economics, history, or politics in
themselves, but offered an integrated system of thought
that would both explain the nature of the existing human
society, i.e., a critique of capitalism, and provide the
rationale for the proletarian revolution. This is the so-
called "unity of theory and practice," although forty-five
years of Soviet experience have so altered the content that
it could now be labeled the "disunity" of theory and prac-
tice.
Since Marxism is supposed to be an integrated whole,
as a revolutionary philosophy, Marx's economic theory is of
validity insofar as it explains the contradictions of capi-
talism and supports Marx's materialist conception of his-
tory. In other words, Marxian economics is a political
economics. Marx's economic theories serve a clearly estab-
lished political purpose * and are not offered as mere
erudite scholasticism.
79Lichtheim lucidly demonstrates the relationship of
79George Lichtheim, Marxism i An Historical and
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80Marxian economics—especially Marx's interpretation of
the "law of value"—to his philosophy as a whole, and the
use to which his economic theory is to be applied. Consid-
ering the apparent contradiction between Volumes I and III
of Capital , as Marx developed his theory of value and the
principle of commodity exchange, Lichtheim suggests that
one's interpretation ". • . must ultimately depend on what
one expects a theory of value to do. n If the student's
purpose is directed toward an understanding of the socio-
logical explanation of the processes of capitalism, "...
there is no particular reason why one should not employ the
Marxian apparatus . . . ." On the other hand, if the stu-
dent is primarily concerned with the theory of value and
its relationship to prices, ". • . it is hard to see what
useful purpose is served by trying to salvage a theoretical
model which makes such an operation impossibly difficult*"
The conclusion is obvious, it seems, that Marxian economics
are not (or should not) be considered per se as the theo-
retical basis of a viable political economy, but rather
should be treated as the methodological approach to an
analysis of sociological phenomena and process.
80To this writer, "Marxian" implies the body of
thought offered by Karl Marx; the term "Marxist" refers to
the theories and concepts originated by Marx but revised,










The reader might consider that this conflict is of
only academic interest in the study of the economic struc-
ture of the bloc, but this is not entirely correct. Despite
81the extent of the revision of the content of Marxian
economics, Soviet-socialist economists have not abandoned
their ideological view of the totally-planned economy, and
the totally-planned economy cannot allow for the independent
play of the market but is inextricably bound up with an
artificially determined price structure. Many observers of
the bloc economic organization consider the price structure
to be the principal stumbling bloc to effective economic
integration and more rapid development of the bloc economy.
From this point of view, it is necessary to consider (with-
out defining) both the Marxian and Marxist concepts of
price and value and their present relation to the strength
and cohesion of the bloc.
82According to Lichtheim, ' Marx*s followers and
critics have needlessly expended their efforts attempting
to develop or explain an economic science based upon Marx's
theoretical concept of commodity value, as being defined in
81
For a brief discussion of the evolution of Marxist
economics, see Alfred Zauberraan, "The Revisionism in Soviet
Economics," in Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 268-280; Nove, op. cit.,
Chapters VIII and XI, also discusses this problem, although
not only from the point of view of revisionism.
82
Lichtheim, 0£. cit., pp. 180-181.
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terms of labor content. This attention, misdirected to a
"pseudo-problem," ignores the main purpose of Marx»s eco-
nomic analysis as a "sociological explanation of the genesis
and operation of capitalism, " rather than as the theoretical
basis for a socialist economy. Because Marx*s main purpose
was politico-sociological analysis, he could accept the
methodological limitations of his analysis to obtain his-
torical perspective. Nevertheless, Marx's disciples
accepted his theory of the "law of value" as scientifically
operative. This "law" became "the basis of the ideological
platform of the Marxist movement." Because the law of
value has been ideologically wedded to the concept of sur-
plus value and capitalist exploitation of labor, it has
served a3 "the theoretical justification of the call for a
85
revolutionary overthrow ..." of capitalist society.
83Ibid.
, pp. 182-183.
84Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics,"
op . cit
. ,
p. 270. On this subject, Nove, 0£. cit
. ,
p. 221,
has said the following: "Marxian theory was concerned with
identifying the elements which determined value and price
in a capitalist market economy, and accounting for such
phenomena as exploitation and surplus value. Whether Marx
was, in fact, successful in doing these things is a ques-
tion we need not pursue here. The problem before Soviet
economists in a search for an objective basis for prices is
to find a means of using the theory in a situation in which
a free market does not exist." [Italics added.]
85Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics,"
op . cit ., pp. 270-271.
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It has become untouchable doctrine in Marxist theory be-
cause of its ideological content and significance.
If these interpretations of the misapplication of
Marxian theory by latter-day Marxists have any validity,
they serve to illustrate the dilemma posed in the integra-
tion of the Soviet bloc. Just as the Soviet economists
have not fully resolved the dilemma of sophisticated mathe-
matical price-cost determination versus Marx*s theory of
value, the bloc economists collectively have not really
faced up to the dilemmas presented by artificial pricing
structures and their relation to comparative advantage.
Mendershausen considers this dilemma of pricing
86
structure and bloc trade at three levels
:
1. Are bloc trading arrangements to be determined
by market equals or through a supra-national
organization ?
2. In the conduct of trade, are goods to be ex-
changed by means of the operation of a market,
or the simple naccounting-type u transfer of
goods
.
3. If the bloc members do not employ their own in-
ternal price structures for intra-bloc trading,
but adapt "world prices" to their own system,
what are the criteria selected?
The first problem is not accepted as such by Soviet
theorists, first, the sovereign equality of all bloc members
86
Horst Mendershausen, "The Terras of Soviet-Satellite
Trade: A Broadened Analysis, : he Review of Economics and




applies, of course, and there can be no "market interplay"
as is known xn the West. Supra-nationality is also dis-
counted, but not rejected in practice as it has been in
Soviet theory. The fact that the "fraternal cooperation" of
the socialist commonwealth does not provide a sufficient
yardstick for the solution of this problem is tacitly admit-
ted by the lengthy theoretical discussions on pricing and
trade in bloc journals since 1955. Although Mendershausen's
second suggested problem area is related to the first, there
is an additional factor introduced by the apparent abandoning
87
of the theory of simple accounting-method transfer of goods.
Stalin was one of the last to approach such a concept in his
work The Economic Problems of Socialism
,
published in 1952.
Since the mid-1950 's, it has been admitted that the law of
value is fully operative even without the completely social-
ist (state) sector of the economy.
Soviet economists have supplied little information
on the third problem area suggested above. They still ad-
mit that the price system for bloc trading is based upon
go
world prices. Although they claim that socialist pric
87
The account-transfer method is held valid for cer-
tain segments of the ioviet economy.
88
I. Dudinskii, "Some Features of the Development of
the World Socialist Market," Voprosy akonomiki , No. 2 (1961),
translated in Problems of economics .' 4 :58-59, September,
1961. In 1958, two non-Soviet analysts noted that: "All
trade agreements published before 1951 specified that world




are not subject to the cyclic nature as in the capitalist
world, they do not offer the criteria employed in providing
price stability in the socialist camp. One Soviet writer
typically observes that: "Prices [in the Soviet bloc] are
established for a long period, and they remain stable. '
On this basis, it seems that the bloc would be able to shift
to its own price structure, but this author continued that
"•
. .we believe that the socialist camp will gradually go
over to its own price basis in its trade Yet, he admits
that this is no simple matter : "The formation of the
socialist market's price basis confronts the economists of
the socialist countries with major problems." These prob-
lems require the accumulation and study of data from
socialist trade, but it is not acknowledged that this
process supposedly has been underway for decades.
There is general agreement among Soviet economists
that (1) the law of value operates in a socialist economy
90
where commodity production exists, and (2) that prices
have a definite relationship to value, but there seems to
from 1951 onward ... no specific statements can be found
concerning the pricing basis of these particular contracts."
Spulber and G ^hrels , op_. cit .
, p« 14
89Dudinskii, op. cit . , pp. 59-60.
90
M. Sakov, "Some Questions on the Theory and Practic
of Price Formation in the USSR," Voprosy Ekonomiki , trails.
in Problems of Economics , 1:49, June, 1958; also, L. Gatovsky,
"On "Utilizing the Law of Value in a Socialist Economy," Kom-






be no clear consensus on the role of price and value as the
socialist society approaches communism. The orthodox Marx-
ists argue for the political determination of prices:
"Deviation of price from value does not contradict the law
of value, but follows from its operation and nature."
Other more revisionist-minded Soviet economists stress the
continued role of money and price structure well into the
achievement of communism. Nemchinov advises that prices do
not correspond directly to value because of the effect of
supply and demand.
The claim that price formation is based solely on
the states* price policy rather than on the objective
process of the formation of socially necessary outlays of
labor is just another ". . • incorrect notion."
Although the more sophisticated attempts to bring
Marxian economics "up to date" have been undertaken pri-
91
marily in recent years by the socialist mathematicians,
an early justification for this process of revision was
provided by Ostrovityanov in 1957, whose model was Leninist,
vice Marxist, economics. Ostrovityanov provides a key to
the un-Marxian future:
As is known, the fundamental differences in the
nature of social labor will disappear in the highest
stage, communism, but the incidental differences
91
See Zauberman, "The Revisionism in Soviet Economics,"
op . cit











between mental and physical labor will remain. If
one is to deduce from the differences in the nature
of social labor under socialism that commodity pro-
duction is necessary, it must be admitted that cer-
tain incidental commodity production and an
incidental law of value will also remain at the
highest stage, communism.
What has been taking place has been called a "grow-
ing rapprochement between Soviet and post-Karx non-Marxist
92
economics." An appreciation by socialists of the prob-
lems involved in contemporary socialist economic practice,
and an understanding of some of the methods of non-Marxist
economics and their application to socialist practice, how-
ever, does not signify the evolution in the near future of
a market-operative economic system in the Soviet Union or
the bloc. It is much more likely that the political direc-
tion of a totally-planned economy will remain and that the
obstacles ;nted—whether recognised or not—will be
accepted ac an inevitable part of the dialectical process,
if there were the most honest efforts by all
the CCKA members to develop a highly-integrated, cooperative
economy, the bloc would still be plagued by the problem
posed by artificial prices in the individual national eco-
nomies. Integration of the CEMA economies, as has been
noted, was suggested as an objective at the formation of
the CEMA; by the mid-fifties, integration had become the
92








major objective, to be attained on the basis of the inter-
national socialist division of labor.
So far there has been little real progress toward
effective integration of the plans of the national eco-
93
nomies, although bilateral—and, in some cases, multi-
lateral—trade and industrial projects have been greatly
increased. One difficulty encountered by the planners of
integration was the method adoptee', the ". . • primary
reliance upon the intra-bloc trade network as the integrat-
ing mechanism . . . clearly the wrong instrument in an
94
environment of planned economies •'* Intra-bloc trade may
have been the wrong vehicle for economic integration, but
it is suggested that perhaps there have been no other
reasonable alternatives, unless the CEMA were to be empow-
ered with supra-national authority to allocate materials.
Paradoxically, it is the nature of the completely-
plannec economy, extolled for so long and faithfully by
socialist economists, that presents the severest problems
in international economic integration. Some of these prob-
lems include artificial pricing structure, lack of conver-
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Currency exchange is closely connected with the
problem of artificial prices in a planned economy. The
official currency of the CEMA is the ruble. Early attempts
to increase the multilaterality of the CEMA resulted in the
decision reached at the Eighth Council Session, June, 1957,
to establish a currency clearing union through the Gosbank
in Moscow. Despite the efforts involved, however, it was
reported in early 1961 that:
The Soviet bloc is no closer to convertibility
and multilateralism than before. Communist experts
are well aware that some objective price basis which
reflects a real relationship between the value of
goods produced in the various countries must be
established within the bloc before much headway can
be made toward integrating their economies. 95
This lack of success in the establishment of multi-
lateral trade and clearing systems is confirmed by Soviet
and other bloc sources. Dudinskii noted, as late as Septem-
ber, 1961, that "bilateral clearing covers the bulk of goods
in trade, largely because most of the trade on the world
96
socialist market is handled under bilateral agreements."
95
"Eastern Europe and the New Ruble," East Europe
,
ir>:i9, April, 1961. See also Raymond F. Mikesell and Jack
N. Behrman, financing Free World Trade with the Sino-Soviet
Bloc (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press,
1958)
,
p. 59, who suggest that the claims of "multilater-
ality" arising from the June, 1957 meeting of the CEMA
Council must be treated with skepticism.
96Dudinskii, o£. cit
. ,
p. 60. In discussing the co-
ordination of trade through the CEMA for the period 1959-







He recognizes that multilateral clearing, although it is
employed in the bloc economy, "offers additional possibili-
ties . . . [and] will gradually rise in importance •
"
Despite the obvious disadvantages and obstacles,
most of which are belatedly receiving increased recognition
in socialist journals, there have been notable achievements
in the economic sector of the Soviet bloc. For a balanced
judgment, the purposes and successes of the socialist eco-
nomies, as well as their deficiencies, must be kept in mind,
97
and not compared only with an idealized Western economy.
It should be recognized that there has been a sig-
nificant shift in the political and economic orientation of
the Soviet bloc in the last decade. Although the famous
"secret speech" by Khrushchev before the 20» Party Congress
of the CPSU, in February, 1956, is generally credited as
the moving force behind the new socialist structure, per-
haps even of greater significance has been the Belgrade
Declaration delivered by Premier Khrushchev in early May,
1955, to President Tito. It was recognition by the Soviet
Union of the "different roads" thesis that has led to the
establishment of a "commonwealth" of socialist countries.
times) would be realized ". • .on the basis of bilaterally-
conducted trade negotiations," p. 58.
97Taken in part from the methodology offered by Nove,
op . cit









This principle was publicized at Belgrade and reaffirmed at
the 20Qs Party Congress.
But in case Khrushchev missed the significance of
his own words in early 1956, there were the "events" in
Poland and Hungary in the fall of 1956 to remind him.
Force, or the threat of force, on the part of the se
lites, caused the Soviets to issue their momentous (in con-
tent, as well as title) Declaration of October 30, 1956,
"On the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening
of Friendship and Cooperation between the Soviet Union and
Other Socialist States."98
The importance of the period 1956-1958 in the devel-
opment of bloc relations lies not only in the increased
latitude, however limited this may be, of the satellites
vis-d-vis Russia, but in the institutionalization of this
revised situation and its clear recognition by both the
USSR and the East European socialist states.
If the Soviet Declaration of October 30, 1956, marks
the official recognition of the new relationship among the
socialist states, the May, 1958, summit conference in
Moscow attended by the leaders of the Soviet bloc, with
98
Pravda, October 31, 1956, p. 1. For a frank treat-
ment of the importance of this Declaration, see P. Nikitln,
"Economic Cooperation of Countries in the Socialist Camp,"
Pravda, July 14, 1957, pp. 4-5, translated in CDSP, IX, 28,
pp. 10-11. See also the discussion of this Declaration in
Chapter IV, supra .
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representative* from Asian socialist states, signifies a
new era in socialist cooperation. Or at least, that was
its intent. The conference dealt primarily with the eco-
nomic integration of the restructured socialist camp. An
examination of events in the socialist bloc since 1958
should support some conclusions concerning the effective-
ness of the CEMA as a cohesive force within the Soviet bloc.
First, there has been substantial improvement in the
development of the industrial sector of the Soviet bloc
since 1956-1958; despite its limitations, the CEMA has un-
doubtedly been instrumental in this development. It has
become increasingly active as the organizational means for
developing and coordinating the trade of East Europe and
the Soviet Union.
The scope of CEMA activities has broadened sharply
from a modest beginning with a primitive economic organiza-
tion embodying not only increased trade patterns, but also
extensive coordination of the national economic plans of
its member countries, specialization of production, limited
currency convertibility, fairly extensive mutual scientific-
technical assistance and exchange, and rather impressive
achievements in the integration of electric power networks,
and the machine building, oil transport, and shipbuilding
industries. Successes in these areas, however, are par-
tially offset by rather limited bloc integration in other
e*w isrtt ,3**91 i* ad
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industrial sectors, the lack of a multilateral clearing
system, and the handicap of artificial price structures
which inhibit effective cost comparison and extensive,
99
meaningful economic negotiation.
Although the Soviet Union recognized, in the years
1956-1958, a more equitable position for the satellites
within the bloc, there is evidence that the Soviet Union
still maintains ample economic leverage vis-a'-vis the satel-
lites. Without considering at this point the purely politi-
cal and military measures of control of the bloc available
to the Soviet Union, a study of the present economic struc-
ture discloses somewhat more subtle methods of economic
domination and control.
Most obvious, of course, is the economic strength of
the Soviet Union relative to each one of the satellites.
99For a recent, thorough analysis of the course of
developments in the CEMA, see Iichael Gamarnikow, "The
Future of COMECON, " East Europe, 11:4-6, June, 1962. This
is an excellent treatment of the work of COMECON from 1958-
1962. Gamarnikow concludes (p. 9) that "the internal con-
tradictions which have become apparent since 1958 suggest
that the prospects of COMECON are not very bright." The
heart of the problem, according to Gamarnikow, is the
artificial price structures within the bloc, or the lack of
mn effective method to gauge comparative costs of produc-
tion. Less important, but still vital, problems are the
lack of progress in the implementation of bloc integration,
failure of the bloc's "richer" members to provide adequate
financial assistance to the "poorer" ones, and the tendency
for each member of the bloc to concentrate on the production
of those goods in short supply, i.e., to place their own














Bilateral negotiations and agreements may be clumsy alter-
natives to multilateral arrangements, but in a meeting of
units of such disparate economic power as the Soviet Union
and the satellites, individually, the definite advantage is
with the major power. Through bilateral arrangements, the
Soviet Union is able to maintain its predominant position,
but this position of strength is buttressed by several
other factors:
1. Financial arrangements, such as price setting100
and the use of a bloc currency, x appear to
be dominated by the Soviet Union,
2. Control of the direction and character of trade,
by reserving to the Soviet Union the right to
The exploitation of the satellites by the Soviet
Union through "rigged prices" is beyond the scope of this
study. For a review of this question, the following analy-
ses are suggested: (1) Mendershausen, op. cit . , pp. 15 3-
155, who attempts to show an overcharge in Soviet trade
with the satellites, without claiming deliberate intent;
(2) FranJclyn D. Holzman, "Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing and
the Question of Discrimination," The riew of Economics
and Statistics , 44:134-147, May, 1962, who refutes Mender-
shausen 1 s theoretical approach rather than his figures,
claiming that an analysis of bloc trade and pricing as a
sort of "customs union" would demonstrate the irrelevancy
of Mendershausen' s conclusions; (3) Jan Wszelaxi, "Soviet
Price Discrimination in Export to East-Central Europe ,
"
Assembly of Captive European Nations , ACEN Document 207,
June 7, l5£0.
One of the best descriptions of the methods of
exchange and prices within the Soviet bloc is presented by
Penelope Harland Thunberg in "The Soviet Union in the
World Economy," o£. cit . » pp. 418-424.
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the principle of autarky, but denying this
principle to the satellites. The specializa-
tion of production of the East European bloc
members of the CEMA makes these countries
dependent upon the Soviet Union in their trade
patterns,
3. Integration of the power industries, through the
tying together of electric power grids and a
network of pipelines originating in the Soviet
Union
•
4. Institutional control through the various organs
of the CEMA, several of which are permanently
located in Moscow, and which are dominated by
Soviet personnel.
On the other hand, there is evidence that shows that
the Soviet leadership of the bloc is not completely unchal-
lenged. There have been frequent instances of the expres-
sion of displeasure by the satellites over the pricing
structure, the lack of more extensive financial assistance
within the bloc, and failure to integrate those industries
which some satellites consider to their advantage.
The bloc countries have achieved some notable suc-
cesses in economic progress, but the efforts to forge an
irresistible economic system—the basis of the world social-
ist system—do not reflect any radical, new principles of
socialist international relations.
m§ |









THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST REVISIONISM
Having read some of the literature of the "marxist"
school, Karl Marx is reported to have exclaimed t "All I
know is that I am not a Marxist." Were he able to study
the various remnants of Marxism still persisting as politi-
cal movements both in and out of power in most regions of
the world today, Marx's comments would probably verge on
exasperation. Marx lived long enough to experience the
perils of revionism and reformism, the Scylla and Charybdis
Revisionism can be simply defined as the alteration
of a substantive or essential portion of Marxism-Leninism,
so that its interpretive, critical, or revolutionary con-
tent is dissipated. A more specific definition has been
provided by a Soviet source, Izvestia , December 28, 1957,
pp. 3-4; translated in Communist Digest of the Soviet Press
thereafter cited as CDSP J, IX , 52, pp. 2T7 35: "Revisionism
is a trend hostile to Marxism within the workers movement
which, under the pretext of developing Marxism, reviews and
revises Marxism's basic and tested principles and tries to
substitute antiscientific bourgeois-reformist views in
their stead."
Reformism is the alteration of the revolutionary
aspects of Marxist ideology so that the revolutionary move-
ment accepts its position within bourgeois society. Re-
formism negates the revolution. Defined by Jerzy Morawski,
Secretary of the Polish United Workers 1 Party, Trybuna Ludu ,
March 27, 1956 [cited in Carl E. Zinner (ed.), National
Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe i A Selec-
tion of Documents on^Svents
^
in Poland and HungaryT February-
November, 1956 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957;,
p. 60]: "Reformism is a policy of concessions and reforms
effected within the framework of the bourgeois system,
intended to 'correct ' or 'mend' capitalism instead of radi-
cally liquidating the sources of class exploitation and
oppression."
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of every revolutionary movement. Revisionism has always
been considered a major threat to the viability of the
international communist movement. As just suggested, it is
not a phenomenon new to Marxism, but the extent to which
revisionist tendencies since the death of Stalin have split
the communist movement in several directions has caused
considerable interest of late not only in the modern mani-
festations of revisionism but in its historical context as
well. 2
Revisionism is an inevitable sociological develop-
ment in that circumstances change and ideas must be altered
to keep pace with the passage of time. This is a particu-
larly un-Marxist view, because in Marxist theory the his-
torical process is subject to certain scientific interpre-
tations that require not alteration, but simply "creative
application" of the theory. The theory is infallible; it
must be creatively applied to historical conditions. Only
those who understand and believe in Marxism-Leninism are
competent to apply the theory creatively, of course.
A fascinating survey of the revisionist phenomenon,
both old and new, ideological and institutional, is provided
in Leopold Labedz (ed.), Revisionism (New York; Frederick
A. Fraeger, 1962). Especially recommended for an analysis
of contemporary revisionism is William E. Griffith, "The
Decline and Pall of Revisionism in Eastern Europe," in
Labedz, ©£. clt . t Chapter XVI; and Alfred Sherman, "Tito—
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Another wholly un-Marxist thought is that revision-
ism is an inevitable process because individuals and groups
consider their own interests as primary, and interpret the
interests of the larger societal unit in terms of their own
needs and desires. The orthodox Marxist would claim that
there can be no conflict between the interests of a social-
ist state and those of socialist internationalism, but he
is hard pressed to explain the progress of Yugoslavia since
1948, Communist China since 1959, Albania since 1960, and
so forth.
It is a basic thought of this research study that
revisionism, that is the process of diversification under-
way in the socialist camp since the mid-1950' s, is simply
the reaction—an almost inevitable reaction—to Stalinism.
Stalin possessed the power to prevent revisionism to assume
dangerous proportions. To recognize that Stalinism in it-
self is a variant of revisionism is neither profound nor
profitable; Leninism, also, is a revision of Marxism, et
cetera . What might be profitable in terms of understanding
relations between the USSR and the East European states in
the years 1956-1958 is an analysis of the nature of Yugo-
slav revisionism, its effect on the cohesion of the bloc,
and, finally, the campaign against revisionism that com-











A determination of the nature of revisionism in
terms of Marxist doctrine involves a value judgment, based
not only upon the published works of Marxist theorists but
also upon the subjective qualities of the person or persons
arriving at this determination. There is no unified doc-
trine, or selection of formulae, which can simply be
labeled "Marxism." A study or criticism of Marxism is a
subjective effort or interpretation; as Alfred Meyer aptly
suggested, "... every work on Marx should really be en-
titled What Marx Means to Me." 3
Hence, there is the need, when discussing a subject
such as revisionism, to establish a reference point within
the historical development of what has become known as
Marxism. Some basis, a school of thought within this de-
velopment, must be selected as representing orthodox
Marxism; otherwise, any discussion of revisionism and rela-
tive terms becomes meaningless. There are limitations
inherent in any selection, even if only the works of Marx
and Cngels are considered, but the selection will, never-
theless, provide a necessary function. For the purpose of
this discussion, "orthodox Marxism" will be considered
3Alfred G. Meyer, Marxism (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1954), p. xvii • This is true not only be-
cause of the inherent characteristics of Marxist "philosophy,"
but also because of the severe controversy and resultant
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embodied in the writings of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Lenin
is included not only because of his embellishments on Marx-
ist theory but also because Lenin was a successful practi-
tioner whose ideological concepts and motivations were not
excessively warped by the requirements of the exercise of
power. In addition, Lenin for several years was engaged
within the international socialist movement in an almost
"personal" conflict with strong forces which he considered
revisionist.
The error of revisionism can be committed by either
a positive or negative act. When Stalin dominated the com-
munist bloc, revisionism (although Stalin did not often use
the term) consisted of failure to display complete subser-
vience to the interests of the USSR as the determinant of
communist ideology and revolutionary strength. Khrushchev
has applied very much the same test in recent years, only
without the authority possessed by Stalin. Thus, in this
negative sense, revisionism has amounted to failure to
recognize the dominant position of the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the USSR in the international
communist hierarchy.
These and other versions of revisionism have diluted
the more traditional, authentic concept that revisionism
is the positive act of altering a basic tenet of Marx or
Engels. The charge of revisionism includes de facto












Judgment by the individual or group making the charge j Marx
is not alive to applaud or condemn j and there is no proce-
dure for a neutral, third party determination of orthodoxy.
Usually, the person or group with the most influence within
the communist organization is able to pursue his argument
to ultimate victory. The opposition—the revisionist—then
either submits to self-criticism or is forced out of the
party organization. Not even Marxist theory is immune to
the dialectic process it has formulated for societal devel-
opment •
Revisionism, in its theoretical application, centers
around three closely-related Marxist tenets: the class
struggle, nature of the capitalist system, and character
-
4istics of the proletarian revolution* As the communist-
socialist movement has progressed since the middle of the
nineteenth century, the bitter factional disputes over
revisionism have mostly been concerned with these subjects.
Whether the labels of revisionism were simply a cover for a
more basic power struggle is not our concern here. A dis-
cussion of motives, intentions, and sincerity could prove
barren
•
4Lenin adds a fourth principle to these: the neglect
of the final goal for temporary gain, or a form of oppor-
tunism. See V. I. Lenin, "Marxism and Revisionism,"























The theory of the class struggle is basic not only
to the problem of revisionism but Marxism in general. Marx
evolved the historical development of the class struggle,
from the multi-class system of ancient Rome and the feudal
era through the period of commercial and colonial expansion
during which there gradually evolved the two basic classes
of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, or the exploiters
and the exploited. To this process of the evolution of the
class system, Marx added the dialectic of the fundamental
antagonism between these two hostile classes. The present
class struggle will not end until the proletariat achieves
its inevitable victory and capitalism is destroyed. Once
the proletariat has begun, there will be no more class
structure in society and the class struggle will have
ceased
•
Until the proletariat dictatorship has been estab-
lished, however, classes will exist and dominate human
society. State governments are an expression of this class
structure. As Marx and Engels wrote in the Communist
Manifesto : "Political power ... is merely the organized
5power of one class for oppressing another. M Engels made
5
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Manifesto of the
Communist Party (New York: International Publishers);
also see Emile Burns (ed.), A Handbook of Marxism (New
York: International Publishers^ In.d. J}
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it clear that this was valid in a so-called democratic
republic just as much as in a monarchy. The representative
democracies were an illusion for the workers, who had very
little political influence, according to Marxist thought.
The power of the proletariat in a bourgeois democracy con-
sisted of being able to go to the polls every few years to
select various members of the ruling capitalist class to
"represent" them in parliament.
It is inherent in capitalist society, according to
Marxist doctrine, that the cleavage between the bourgeoisie
and the proletariat will widen, and that this gap cannot be
overcome through the exercise of democratic processes by
the proletariat. On the contrary, the capitalist system
will succumb only to force, despite the inevitability of
its collapse. In one of his better known observations,
Marx wrote that: "Force is the mid-wife of every old
society pregnant with a new one." It was a basic tenet of
the orthodox school of Marxism that it is necessary to
smash the bourgeois state machinery and start anew.
It is the failure of the revisionists to understand
and appreciate the nature of the class struggle that causes
them to adopt their revisionist views, say the orthodox
Marxists. Because the revisionist neglects not only the
final goal of the class struggle, the communist society,
but also the role of the class struggle in achieving this
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goal, he falls to view bourgeois democracy as a class democ-
racy, the exercise of political authority by the ruling
class. Thus, instead of directing his attention to the
revolutionary struggle of the proletariat against the ex-
ploiting capitalist class, the revisionist shifts to a
liberal view of democracy, accepting the evolutionary proc-
ess of proletarian struggle.
Lenin, always a caustic, sharp-tongued revolutionary,
reserved some of his most vitriolic comments for the re-
visionists and their supporters. Two of his favorite
targets were Bernstein and Kautsky. Both, in Lenin's posi-
tion, were guilty of the revisionist sin of advocating
evolutionary socialism, but Bernstein was also considered
an opportunist for sacrificing the communist goal in favor
of the immediate tactical gain. Kautsky, whom Lenin de-
scribed as an old "windbag , " was merely "chewing rags in
his sleep" when he succumbed to the liberal illusion of the
future of the proletariat in a bourgeois democracy.
In addition to the political aspect of the class
struggle (in a bourgeois democracy as well as a totali-
tarian state), the orthodox Marxists have strong views
relative to the economic characteristics of the capitalist
system and how it has evolved. The foundation for these
views is the concept of the inherent contradictions of the
capitalist system which provide the "seeds of its own








destruction." The capitalist owners of the means of produc-
tion increase their exploitation of the proletarian class
through the theory of surplus value. The workers are paid
minimum wages
,
so that they are unable to purchase the prod-
ucts of the economy; meanwhile, as the capitalists increase
their surplus value accumulation, they are able to produce
greater amounts of goods , which the workers cannot afford to
buy. As a result, the goods accumulate, unemployment in-
creases, and a crisis results. The orthodox Marxists, in
their view of capitalist society, claim that the crisis cy-
cle accelerates, increasing both the wealth of the capital-
ists and the impoverishment of the masses. This dooms
capitalism to eventual collapse because of its inherent con-
tradictions. This collapse, although inevitable, must be
hastened by the revolutionary activity of the proletariat.
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, a school of
thought within the Marxist movement re-evaluated the condi-
tions of capitalist society and concluded that the crisis
cycle v/as not necessarily accelerating and that the prole-
tariat were not being further impoverished and exploited.
This group, whose foremost exponent v/as Eduard Bernstein,
consisted for the most part of German socialists who accepted
wholeheartedly the idealism of Marx. But, in their analysis
of the development of capitalist society, they did not see
an intensifying crisis cycle and further impoverishment of







stabilized, in a relative sense. The crises were not appear-
ing more frequently and severely, as Marxist theory had pre-
dicted. The workers* position, both politically and economi-
cally, had improved. The revisionists felt that the working
class had a 'stake" in its present society; that they were a
part o_f society rather than apart from society. To the
orthodox, the revisionists had accepted bourgeois status.
The third of three primary revisionist tenets concerns
the nature of the proletarian revolution, or the use of revo-
lutionary violence by the proletariat to gain power and
establish their dictatorship. Again, views on the use of
violence by the proletariat are closely linked to the accepted
theory of the class struggle and the process of capitalist
development. This is essentially a problem of revolution
versus evolution, one of the theoretical issues fundamental
to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute under consideration.
Bernstein, and the other revisionist-socialists,
felt that "socialism could be attained without a revolution
by purely economic pressure." Their program, which has
been referred to as the "Marxian minimum program," contem-
plated peaceful, democratic tactics of economic pressure to
gain social reforms, within the existing governmental in-
stitutions. Jven though their tactics may not have specifi-
cally included the use of violence, the Social Democrats of
yer, op_. cit










this period were not, of course, as conservative as the
socialists of the raid-twentieth century. Nevertheless, the
relative success of their trade union movement and the
general growth of economic prosperity and nationalism in
Western Europe stunted their revolutionary ardor, without
erasing their idealistic objectives. The dilemma facing
most intellectual Marxists, at the present time, as well as
at the start of the century, is that:
Marxism is divided into a set of purposes which
are unscientific [the socialist ideal] on the one
hand, and a scientific method [economic determinism],
which is quite independent of purpose and ideals,
on the other. Either one or the other has, by vari-
ous people, been named as the essence of Marxism.
'
The intellectual movement in Eastern Europe in 1956-
1957, although the product of different immediate causes,
reflects the conflict between idealism and pragmatism in-
herent in the communist system. This conflict is magnified
by the problems involved in the exercise of governmental
authority. What better explanatory context is there for
the divergent policies of two such "devout" Marxists as
Imre Nagy and Nikita Khrushchev? Nagy lost his life not
only because his revisionist program threatened the entire
structure of international communism but also because other
Titoists-revisionists needed to be impressed with the










As could be expected, the most significant changes
and additions to Marxist theory result from the efforts of
those who have been faced with the practical necessity of
governing on the basis of Marxist theory. Marx was much
more concerned with the conditions that surrounded the
workers* struggle of his time than he was with the blissful
future he predicted under communism. Consequently, Marxist
theory is vague of the question of the dictatorship of the
proletariat, transition to socialism, withering away of the
state, and other such vital subjects that necessarily con-
cern those communists in positions of governmental respon-
sibility.
In this context, Lenin, Stalin, and Khrushchev can
all be considered guilty of revisionism for their depar-
tures from orthodox Marxism while applying it in the USSR.
Such programs as Lenin's "New Economic Policy," Stalin^
"Socialism in One Country," and Khrushchev "On the Inevita-
bility of War," conflict with or are not to be found in
Marx-Engels doctrine. To carry this thought further, those
communists in either the Soviet Union or foreign parties
who have disagreed with the pronouncements of Stalin and
Khrushchev can—and often have been—considered revisionists.
In other words, revisionism plus a_ preponderance of power
equals orthodoxy . This approach to the question of revi-














of certain cases such as that of Yugoslavia must be sought
in a political as well as ideological analysis.
A basis for understanding the ideological battle in
1958 between the Soviet camp and Yugoslavia must be ap-
proached through the historical perspective of Yugoslav
socialist progress in the preceding decade. The charge of
revisionism in its Marxist context is a serious charge.
The Yugoslavs were alleged on several counts to have
attempted to revise Marxism-Leninism in the ten years since
the Conimform resolution* The attack on Yugoslavia on the
basis of revisionist policies reached its peak in 1958 with
the publication of the Draft Program for the Seventh
Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, known
as the "Ljubljana Program." Before examining several of
the principal features of this program that resulted in the
campaign against Yugoslav revisionism, the primary charac-
teristics of Yugoslav socialism as it has developed since
1949 should be briefly mentioned.
The events leading up to the expulsion of Yugoslavia
from the Cominform in 1948, and the reasons for this expul-
sion, are well known. Yugoslavia was not only motivated by
the desire for independence, but as the only satellite that
had played a major role in its own liberation in World War
II, Yugoslavia was in a position after the war to assert
its freedom. Stalin felt that his influence within the
test
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Yugoslav Communist Party (renamed the League of Communists
in 1952) would be sufficient to topple Tito in a test of
g
strength, but he not only miscalculated his own prestige,
he also underestimated Tito and Yugoslav determination.
Yugoslav separatism was proved to be a most costly failure
9for the Soviet bloc.
It soon became apparent after the break with the
Cominform that Yugoslavia would have to undertake extreme
The Cominform resolution expressed no doubt on this
matter. "If the present leaders of the Yugoslav Communist
Party prove unequal to this task, then these sound forces
must replace them by others and produce a new international
leadership for the Party. The Information Bureau has no
doubt that the Yugoslav Communist Party will be able to ful-
fill this honorable task." Gunther Nollau, International
Communism and World Revolution (New York: Frederick A.
Praeger, 1961)
, pp. 236-237. Khrushchev referred to this
section of the Cominform resolution in a speech on July 11,
1958: "Our criticism [in the resolution], which we have
never renounced, was not incorrect; it was the appeal for a
change in the leadership of the Yugoslav Communist Party
. . . that was incorrect," Pravda , July 12, 1958, trans-
lated in CDSP, X, 28, pp. 5-8. Also found in Vaclav L.
3enes, et al. (eds.), The Second Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute
( Bloomington : Indiana University Publications, Ln.d. J)
,
p.
203. Khrushchev had voiced similar criticism of the Yugo-
slavs in a speech to the Bulgarian Party Congress, June 3,
1958, Pravda , June 4, 1958, pp. 1-3, translated in CDSP, X,
22, pp. 8-13.
q
It has been reported that Khrushchev was warned by
Molotov against "sanctioning" Yugoslavia's independent
course in 1955; see Francois Fejto, "The Communists of East
Europe between Fatherland and Internationalism," The Review
[Brussels], 3:19, 1961. Molotov was probably more "realis-
tic" than Khrushchev in assessing the requirements of
socialist unity; Khrushchev was probab.ly wore •'realistic"
than Molotov in appreciating the costs of Stalinist bloc
unity, Fejto also observed that even since 1956, Khrushchev
has been doing his best to "neutralize" the explosive ef-

















measures, not only to maintain continued independence from
the communist bloc but also to protect the position of the
Tito regime in Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav government was
deprived of extensive economic aid by the rupture with the
Corainform. The economy was in a very unfavorable condition
in 1948-1949, and the termination of bloc support further
aggravated the situation. Strong repressive measures in
Yugoslavia shortly after World War II, when Tito was a
model of Stalinism, had seriously reduced the government's
popular support enjoyed at the end of the war. In 1949-
1950, it was necessary for the Tito regime to attempt to
rectify the shortcomings of both foreign and domestic poli-
cies simultaneously.
In a review of their position after the break with
the Cominform, the Titoists realized that the Stalinization
of the Yugoslav government had stifled the economy. Tl
rapid growth of bureaucracy and central authority had
wreaked havoc with the entire system. The logical step was
to decentralize, but the process of decentralization re-
quired a fundamental basis in ideology. The Titoist
approach to this problem was centered upon the Marxist con-
cept of the ownership of the means of production. Nation-
alization had been accomplished in Yugoslavia at the end of
the war in a fashion similar to that of the young Soviet




however, nationalization and the growth of state functions
and authority had resulted in what the Yugoslavs called
"State Capitalism," with the people now exploited by the
state instead of the bourgeoisie, as in the capitalist coun-
tries. Tito's theorists based their decentralization efforts
upon the Marxist tenet that the state should commence to
"wither away" once the proletariat has gained power (accord-
ing to the Yugoslavs), and that this process should not be
delayed simply because of capitalist encirclement, t
reasoning often used by Stalin. This Yugoslav concept of
timing of the withering process is a source of extensive
ideological conflict with the USSR, as will be discussed.
In other words , nationalization was considered to be
only a first step and was to be superseded by common or
social ownership, the fundamental ideological basis for
Tito's "Socialist Democracy." The basic law providing the
realization of the social ownership theory was the Workers'
Council Law of 1950, to use its abbreviated title. This
law serves as the source of Tito's claim to having developed
a higher stage of socialism than the other states within
the socialist bloc. The theory of workers' councils is
employed by the Titoists also to strengthen their influence
with the intellectual Marxists and socialists of the
Western nations , on the basis of having democratized as






The operation of the workers* councils soon produced
several results, anticipated and otherwise. As was desired,
individual incentive and initiative increased, spurred on
by some freedom of action in the market place . Unfavorable
results also became evident. There was gross inefficiency
in workers* management in the early years, until new tech-
nical skills could be learned, and there were cases of
unsound competition between some similar enterprises, in
the bourgeois search for profits. But the primary fault of
the early system was what the Titoists referred to as
"localism," or "localistic anarchism," which was exempli-
fied by the tendency of individuals or local groups to
devote their effort toward improving their own situation
rather than those activities that would best serve the
needs of the area or state as a whole. To combat this
drift toward localism, the government somewhat strengthened
central authority in 1954 and 1955 by several steps. Some
of these steps included measures to simplify and strengthen
the vertical lines of communication and authority from the
central government to the local enterprises.
The process of decentralization that had taken place
in 1950-1953 had proceeded in similar fashion in other
areas of government, in the party, and to a lesser extent
in agriculture, but the formulation of workers' councils
: l "3 t
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has received the most attention in ideological debates in
the subsequent years.
Within the framework of his ideological dispute with
Stalin and Khrushchev, Tito often refers to Stalinism as
having strayed too far from Marxism-Leninism by fostering
state capitalism and the growth of bureaucracy, and the
process of strengthening the party at the expense of the
masses. Tito has taken what he claims are positive steps
not only to avoid these excesses in Yugoslavia, but also to
develop a higher form of socialist order. Tito*s framework
for these efforts has been the principle of the withering
away of the state, designed to support his claim of ideo-
logical purity. Tito's detractors could mention that in
effect the Yugoslav state and the Communist Party of Yugo-
slavia (League of Communists) are not withering away to any
significant degree, and that decentralization has been
simply a necessary counter to the stifling inefficiency
posed by excessive centralization in the early years of the
regime.
The philosophical foundation of "socialist democracy"
and decentralization was defined by Edvard Kardelj in late
1954 as recognition of the inherent limitations of central
authority and the vital importance of material incentive
upon individual initiative and effort. Perhaps the most
appropriate comment on this so-called philosophical









foundation is that it is based upon liberal concepts that
have been considered self-evident in Western political
thought for m«ny years. 10
There is no need in this dissertation to discuss in
detail the nature of Yugoslavia^ decentralization program
in the early 1950»s, or the strengthening of central
authority in 1953-1954. The Yugoslav leaders have boasted
often of their implementation of the theory of withering
away of the state and party, and the fact that these meas-
ures support their claim to having the correct interpreta-
tion of Marxist theory. Of more significance is the
development of new attitudes by the Titoists toward inter-
national relations, the nature of capitalism, and the
transition to socialism.
Just as Tito was forced to justify his break with
the Cominform in the shape of a decentralized, somewhat
liberalized governmental structure, he also found it neces-
sary to revise the ideological content of Yugoslav foreign
policy. Basic economic realities, problems magnified by
the 1950 drought as well as the inefficiency of his regime,
Charles P. McVicker, Titoism : Pattern for Inter-
national Communism (New York: St. Martin's Press, 195?)
,
p. 63. For a thorough treatment of Yugoslav policies, both
domestic and foreign, see Charles P. McVicker and Fred
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forced Tito to accept aid from the West. At the same time,
the Titoists began the process of modification of some of
their basic Marxist views on the nature of capitalism,
socialist revolution, etc. Distasteful as some of the
Yugoslav domestic policies may have been to the orthodox
Marxists from Moscow, these programs most likely would have
been overlooked by the Soviet leaders during the negotia-
tions for a rapprochement in the mid-1950* s, except for
Yugoslavian new views on foreign policy. Khrushchev and
the others could not afford to ignore the Yugoslav posi-
tions in such foreign policy matters as the nature of rela-
tions between socialist states. These 'non-Marxist"
concepts were explicitly enunciated in the Draft Program of
the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Before examining
The Draft Program (Program of the League of Com-
munists of Yugoslavia) was published in The Review of
International Affairs [Belgrade], June 1, 1958, and can
also be found in Benes, ©£. cit . , Section II, pp. 29-91.
The Program is a most revealing exposition of Yugoslav
attitudes toward Marxism-Leninism; Benes noted (p. 27) that
the Draft Program "... had become a formal declaration of
political and ideological independence." The Draft Program
was strongly criticized in an article in Kommunist, April
15, 1958, translated in CDSP, X, 18, pp. 3-11, and in
Pravda, May 9, 1958, translated in CDSP , X, 19, pp. 6-11.
For the Program as it was finally adopted by the Seventh
Congress, see Yugoslavia's Way (New York: All Nations
Press, 1958). A brief analysis of the Program can be found
in Ernst Halperin, "Revision and Yugoslavia," in Walter
Laqueur and Leopold Labedz (eds.), Polycentrism (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 53-54.









some of the features of this Program, and the revisionist
charges advanced by the Soviet theorists, Soviet-Yugoslav
relations during the period 1955-1957 should be reviewed.
It had become increasingly obvious during the last
years of Stalin's reign that his Yugoslav policy had been a
dismal failure, and that the entire international communist
structure required a re-alignment in order to prevent in-
creased growth of such forces as revisionism and national
communism. Attempts to redefine relations between commu-
nist states fell upon the willing shoulders of Nikita
Khrushchev. There have been few goals more important for
the socialist camp, or pursued with more vigor than Khrush-
chev's goal of imparting increased revolutionary impetus to
the bloc nations, while at the same time strengthening
socialist solidarity. These two vital factors were—and
are—often contradictory in their requirements and effect;
proper balance between dynamism and unity within the bloc
poses perhaps the greatest challenge to Khrushchev.
One of Khrushchev's first moves in 1954 was to move
in the direction of a new accord with Yugoslavia. It was
imperative that Yugoslavia be brought back into the social-
ist camp, or effectively destroyed as a symbol of success-
ful socialist independence. It is probable that both Tito
and Khrushchev fully appreciated the objectives and nego-











probable is that both of these veteran politicians deceived
themselves regarding their power to influence the other to
modify his position so that an accord could be reached,
Tito felt that he could accept from Khrushchev nothing less
than unequivocal agreement to Tito*s principle of poly-
centric communism, with Belgrade as a third locus of ideo-
logical growth along with Moscow and Peking. Khrushchev,
on the other hand, could not be expected to sit by as
observer to the disintegration of the empire he was just
beginning to bring under his own control. He could recog-
nize in principle the theoretical basis of the "different
roads to socialism" thesis, but Khrushchev considered it
mandatory that the CPSU be recognized as the fountainhead
of ideological wisdom, and the Soviet Union the leading
power of the socialist camp. When Yugoslav nationalism
conflicted with Soviet internationalism, it was clear in
Khrushchev* s view that the latter must predominate,
Khrushchev, often considered a hard-headed realist,
probably overestimated the strength of the forces moving
Tito toward renewed active participation with the bloc. It
is also typical of communist leaders to have a dichotomous
view of the world political situation, except when talking
to or with non-aligned or "neutral" powers. For the commu-
nist, class loyalty must be either bourgeois or proletarian,






are either ju3t or unjust. Khrushchev most likely had dif-
ficulty visualizing Tito and Yugoslavia in a neutral role,
a position referred to by the Titoists as "active co-
existence. " To Khrushchev, Yugoslavia has either been a
member of the peace-loving socialist camp, or a lackey of
imperialism.
Most students of this subject accept as Khrushchev 1 s
goal during this period the return of Yugoslavia to the
12
socialist camp* It has been suggested that Khrushchev *s
13target year for this accomplishment was 1957. Yet, it
appears less than realistic on the part of Khrushchev to
have expected Tito*s return, on what would have been mostly
Soviet conditions. Perhaps, it is more plausible to con-
sider that Khrushchev did not really expect this of Tito,
but fully intended instead to be working—or appear to be
working—in this direction in order to lure Tito away from
his policy of limited cooperation with the Western powers,
draw him into a degree of cooperation with the bloc, and
then attempt to isolate Yugoslavia and discredit Titoism
within the bloc.
12Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc (New York:














There is some support for this thesis. First of all,
Khrushchev was undoubtedly a realist, and it seems unlikely
that he would expect Tito to accept more than a loose con-
federation with the bloc nations. Secondly, an "independ-
ent" communist state might serve a very useful purpose in
Soviet relations with the uncommitted states. Discreet
references to the independent policies being followed by
Tito might create a favorable impression with the idealis-
tic Marxists and socialists in these areas. Thirdly, suc-
cessful "neutralization" of Titoism by the Soviet leaders
would give Khrushchev a potent weapon in maintaining revo-
lutionary solidarity in the remainder of the East European
states.
For these reasons, it is suggested that the policy
followed by Khrushchev in 1955-1957 was to reduce the influ-
ence of Titoism, rather than seek the return of Tito to
socialist internationalism as defined by the Soviets. The
events of the winter 1956-1957 support this view to a cer-
tain extent. Tito apparently accepted at face value the
Khrushchev pronouncements at Belgrade and Moscow in 1955
and 1956 regarding equality and independence of parties and
socialist states, no interference in the internal affairs
of others, etc. As a result, Tito encouraged independent
action in the other East European capitals in the latter








communism had become legitimate, and that the Tltoist road
to socialism was valid for Yugoslavia's socialist neighbors.
Accordingly, it is likely that Titoism had a major influ-
ence on the activities in Poland and Hungary in 1956, even
though the intellectual revolt in this area had been in
progress for several months.
As the rebellious activities of the intellectuals in
the East European states increased, and the extent of popu-
lar dissatisfaction became evident, Khrushchev was com-
pelled to advise the satellite leaders in strong terms in
September, 1956, not to attempt "mechanically" to follow
the course of Tito, and in two more meetings with Tito he
sought Tito's assistance in restraining the devisive
j, 14forces
.
The crisis in Hungary in October-November provided
the source of new tensions in Moscow-Belgrade relations.
Tito was highly critical of the first Soviet intervention
in the Hungarian revolution, calling this intervention a
"fatal error" committed against the people of Hungary,
"• • . where quite a large part of the working class and
progressive people fought in the streets with arms in their















extent of Tito's involvement in the ferment of these months,
and the bluntness of his language on the Soviet tactics,
official Soviet reaction was relatively mild, although
positive in its criticism of Yugoslav comment. Soviet dis-
cipline, intended not only for Yugoslavia but the entire
satellite group, was reserved for June of the following
year when the Hungarian government announced the trial and
execution of Irme Nagy. Nagy had sought refuge in the
Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest toward the end of the revolt,
and had been guaranteed safe passage by the Hungarian
government out of Hungary when arrested. This Stalinist
tactic must have had its desired effect on those East Euro-
pean communists disposed toward a "liberal" course for com-
munism.
It has been typical of the Titoists to attempt to
"shore up" their Ideological framework whenever their dis-
pute with Russia intensifies, for domestic reasons as well
as relations with the bloc. After the Hungarian revolt,
and Soviet criticism of Yugoslav lack of socialist inter-
nationalism, the Yugoslav leaders began to condemn the
Hungarian policies that led up to the revolt, such as the
development of top-heavy Stalinist bureaucracy, the police
quoted in Robert Bass and Elizabeth Marbury, The Soviet-
Yugoslav Controversy
,
1948-58: A Documentary Record "OTew







methods of Rakosi and Gero, etc. In a December, 1956,
speech, Kardel j , the Yugoslav Vice President, stressed
the "traditionally revolutionary role" of the workers* and
revolutionary councils, or Soviets, in the revolt of 1917
in Russia, and lamented the fact that similar councils had
been liquidated in Hungary during the November revolt be-
cause of their opposition to the Kadar regime.
The intensity of the dispute fluctuated throughout
195 7, as Khrushchev sought not only to discover a basis for
renewed ties with Yugoslavia but also to emphasize the need
for unity in the socialist camp along with the recognition
of separate roads to socialism. An article in Kommunist in
17April, 1957, criticized Yugoslavia's attitude toward the
course of events in Hungary in the fall of 1956. Despite
some correct interpretation of the nature of the Hungarian
revolution, complained the author, Yugoslav views were a
"• • • fundamentally incorrect stand on such important
questions as . . . the class nature of the Hungarian events
or the aid given the Hungarian people by the Soviet Army."
The Yugoslavs had not based their interpretation either on
reality or the Marxist method of "class analysis."




A. Berkov, "Unity and Solidarity are the Guarantees
of New Successes of the International Communist Movement,"











On the second anniversary of the Belgrade Declara-
tion, the Soviets warned that they were not going to make
all the concessions to Yugoslavia:
It goes without saying that for this friendship
to he consolidated it is necessary for our Yugoslav
comrades to display a desire to further improve re-
lations with the Soviet Union and with all countries
of the socialist camp.^8
Criticism of the Polish revisionist, Professor L.
Kolakowski, was at the heart of the anti-revisionist cam-
paign throughout 1957, Kolakowski not only symbolized the
role of the intellectual in the events in Poland leading up
to the "Polish October," he was a leading revisionist in
the school of philosophers and other intellectuals attempt-
ing to devise a humanist Marxism, The Soviets responded
that Kolakowski \/as "profoundly mistaken," that freedom of
opposition to Marxism-socialism cannot be permitted, and
that Kolakowski had forgotten "the role of the USSR in
19human progress."
The Soviets again had occasion to criticize Kolakow-
ski^ views later in 1957, Kolakowski had indicated that
Marxism's primary value lay in its interpretation of the
social conditions of the 19tt Century, and that Marxism
18Pravda , June 2, 1957, p. 5; translated in CDSP ,
IX, 22, p. 19.





became institutionalized and lost its revolutionary-
20interpretive content.
Any hopes for a lasting settlement of the dispute in
1957 vanished, however, at the Moscow gathering of communist
leaders in November, 1957. Khrushchev had been working
diligently during 1957 to repair the damage done in late
1956 to the unity and coherence of the bloc. He had met
with some success in this endeavor, and as a result the
Yugoslav delegation found itself rather isolated during the
ideological maneuvering in Moscow. At this conference, the
Yugoslav delegation accepted the principles and proposals
of the "Peace Manifesto," which was simply a statement of
agreement among sixty-four Communist Parties to serve the
aspirations of the socialist group of states. Another
declaration, commonly referred to as the Twelve Party Dec-
laration (the twelve parties actually in power), attacked
revisionism as an attempt to "exorcise the revolutionary
spirit of Marxism, to undermine faith in socialism among
the working class . . . ," etc. This blast at revisionism
was included in a list of "basic laws" applicable to all
countries making the transition to socialism. Also un-
acceptable to the Yugoslavs was the statement that the
".
. . cause of peace is upheld by the powerful forces of




our era: the invincible camp of socialist countries headed
by the Soviet Union . . . . "21
The refusal of the Yugoslavs to endorse these basic
laws, and thus recognize their own sins of the past, led to
yet another storm in the already-turbulent relations be-
tween Yugoslavia and the USSR. This storm, in the nature
of an ideological dispute, was not to erupt in full force
until the following spring.
The basis of the second Soviet-Yugoslav dispute, as
the fir3t, '/as primarily political. Tito desired a loose
arrangement with the Soviet bloc that would allow him free-
dom to pursue his policy of "active co-existence." Khrush-
chev wanted either to pressure Tito back into the camp, or
isolate Yugoslavia between the Soviet and Western blocs,
and effectively destroy the influence of Titoism in the
satellites. It has been suggested that the latter was
Khrushchev' 3 policy, as it was based on a more realistic
interpretation of the situation in the communist world.
Despite the fundamental role of power politics in
the dispute between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, ide-
ology has provided the framework for this second controversy
Prayda, November 22, 195 7, translated in CDSP , IX,
47, pp. 3-7; for the text of this declaration officially
entitled the Declaration of the Conference of Representa-
tives of Communist and Workers • Parties of the Socialist
Countries, also zee Benes, ejt al
•





to a much greater extent than the first. The role of ide-
ology is not limited merely to providing terms of reference
for the dispute; if this were so, the ideological battle
within the socialist world over revisionism and opportunism
could have been carried on in a much simpler fashion. Con-
sidering the extent to which Yugoslavia has pursued its own
road to socialism in domestic policy, and even more impor-
tant its independent foreign policy based upon radical
interpretations of Marx, it seems clear that the ideologi-
cal basis of the dispute is quite real.
Of course, it is difficult to separate the ideologi-
cal from the purely political factors in such a controversy
between two communist states. Any form of revisionism that
tends to fragment the socialist camp, undoubtedly, threatens
the future viability of the movement and thereby threatens
the position of the CPSU as its leader. The ideological
charges of revisionism, non-Marxism, opportunism, etc.,
even if valid in the sense of interpretation of Marxist
theory, become tools for maintaining not only ideological
purity but also the political hegemony of the leading power.
Although there are several documents pertinent to
the ideological bases of this dispute, two of these can be
singled out as providing the most important source of the
Yugoslav and Soviet positions. These are the first three










22the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, and an article in
Pravda, April 15, 1953, criticizing several aspects of the
Draft Program which had been prepared for the consideration
of the Seventh Congress of the League of Communists, It is
of interest to note the changes made in the Draft Program,
illustrated by the Program as finally adopted by the Seventh
Congress.
Other available documents provide additional insight.
For example, Khrushchev's speech in East Berlin three
months after the Pravda article contrasts sharply with that
article in Khrushchev's vitriolic attack on the Yugoslav
Program, Although the cause of Khrushchev's temper display
may be the failure of the Yugoslavs to effect more substan-
tial revisions in their Draft Program as a result of Soviet
criticism, it is also probable that Khrushchev was looking
beyond Yugoslavia with the intent to influence satellite
23policies. noted that the Yugoslav leadership was try-
ing to "impose" its incorrect views on the Yugoslav people,
22Sherman, o£. cit., p. 264, considers the program
"•
• • an attempt to provide a coherent ideology for inde-
pendent Communism, reconciling absolute power of the Com-
munist Party within the boundaries of the national—or
multinational—state with undiminished state sovereignty
vis- d-vis other states, Communist and non-Communist alike."
The result is a program full of contradictions.
23Pravda
, July 12, 1958, translated in CDSP , X, 28,











that the Yugoslavs had failed to subject themselves to cri-
ticism, and that Yugoslavia's poor relations with the other
communist parties was Yugoslavia's fault, and not a con-
tinuation of the 1948 dispute which had been superseded,
Khrushchev also made it clear that revisionism not only
damages the socialist camp unity directly, but it also aids
the cause of the imperialists.
The main force of the Soviet attack in Pravda was
directed at the Yugoslav view of the present course of
capitalist development, and the class struggle. This, of
course, is fundamental to other Marxist tenets. If it is
correct, as the Yugoslavs contend (according to Pravda ) t
that the state in a bourgeois democracy is detached from
the interests of either the bourgeois or proletariat class,
and serves as a "regulator" of the struggle between these
classes; and if the increased role of the state in the eco-
nomic sector of present capitalist states is a step toward
socialism; and if there is a possibility of an evolutionary
2.
~^ee supra
, p. 209, fn, 11 for Pravda article; it
is interesting to note that the Soviet criticism of the
Draft Program of the Yugoslavs was based both on Yugoslav
departure "from the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism
and the theory and practice of the world Communist movement .
"
p. cir,, pp, 95-96 Litalics added J, The Soviet
ideologues were not going to do battle with the Yugoslavs
strictly on the basis of "pure" Marxism-Leninism, but on
the creative (Soviet) development of theory in recent years,






transition from present bourgeois democracy to socialism,
what is the raison d
»
Itre for the international communist
movement, with Moscow at its head?
Assuming that the above interpretations represent in
simplified form some of the Yugoslav views, general accept-
ance of these theories in the socialist camp would be fatal
to the movement as it has been structured. For this reason,
it becomes imperative that the Soviets, Chinese, and others
attack and discredit what they consider to be Yugoslav
revisionism.
Both the extent and the tone of the Soviet rebuttal
to the Yugoslav views on the class struggle indicate the
seriousness with which the Soviets view this vital princi-
25pie of Marx's theory. Pravda criticized the Yugoslavs
for concentrating their attention on the political rather
than the economic aspects of modern capitalism. The authors
of the Pravda article reminded the Yugoslavs that the es-
sence of the class struggle includes the basic truth that
the state is a means of oppression controlled by the ruling
25One reason the Soviets objected so strongly to the
Yugoslav attitude toward the class struggle is that Lenin,
in his theory of imperialism, had projected the concept of
class struggle as an internal phenomenon to the struggle
between imperialist countries and socialist countries, i.e.,
an international problem. -o reject the class struggle in
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class, and that the state cannot act in a neutral fashion
with respect to both the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
The Yugoslavs correctly assessed the growth of monopo-
listic capital in the present capitalist system, stated
i. l avda but then failed to assign the proper role of the
state, which is controlled by monopolistic capital. Rather
than curb monopolistic activities through increased partici-
pation in the econoiay of the bourgeois democracies, the
monopolies use the power of the state, which they control,
to increase their economic stranglehold of the proletariat,
the Soviets claimed. In reality, continued Pravda , the
monopolies have "unloaded" certain unproductive industries
such as coal, electricity, etc., in those bourgeois states
that have attempted nationalization measures, so that they
can devote their attention to more profitable industries
and further exploit the workers. Thus, instead of the
state assuming more control over the national economy
through nationalization in such countries as Great Britain
and France, the monopolistic capitalists have foisted their
losses in these industries upon the workers through taxa-
tion to support the nationalized industries, and have,
therefore, realized still greater profits from other indus-
tries. The bourgeois capitalists can do this only through
control of the state institutions and increased oppression
of the workers.







The Soviet authors also took the Yugoslavs to task
for Incorrect interpretation of two other present features
of the capitalist system: (1) restrictive measures by the
state against small and middle capitalists; and (2) social
and political concessions granted by bourgeois capitalism.
The Pravda article noted that the capitalist states occa-
sionally acted contrary to the interests of some small and
"middle" capitalists, but the state "... always and in-
variably acts in the general interests of the bourgeoisie
and in the interests of monopolistic capital." In other
words, state action against the weaker capitalist enter-
prises is merely symptomatic of the increasing concentra-
tion of capital in the hands of the monopolists and is
certainly no evidence of the impartiality of the state
relative to the two classes.
The second incorrect Yugoslav interpretation of
modern capitalistic systems concerned concessions granted
by the bourgeois state. The Soviet authors emphasized that
these concessions were forced upon the bourgeois govern-
ments by the successes of the socialist system, and in no
way reflected a position of the state as an "unbiased"
regulator between the two classes.
26Pravda , May 9, 1958, translated in CDSP , X, 19,






The Yugoslavs did not contend, however, that there
had been, in fact, a metamorphosis of the capitalist system,
but rather that some conditions had changed. When discus-
sing the acts of the state in restricting the role of pri-
vate capital, the Yugoslavs added that this condition had
occurred "without affecting the foundations of the capi-
27talist system itself," This phrase had been omitted in
*-ne Pravda version,
Soviet fear of the results of such views of capital-
ism as those expressed by the Yugoslavs is illustrated by
the comment that
:
The thesis of the "independence" of the state in
the conditions of contemporary capitalism obliterates
tne class essence of the bourgeois state and dis-
tracts the attention of the proletariat from the
historic task of the revolutionary conquest of
power. 22
For present Soviet leaders , the principle of social-
ist internationalism, or solidarity of the proletarian
revolution, as a Marxist basis for successful strategy, is
secondary only to the Marxist-Leninist principle of the
nature of capitalism in terms of the class struggl
Khrushchev dwells on the need for (and existence ofl)
socialist unity, almost to the extent of a personal
27
nes, 0£. cit . , p. 36.
28Prayda, May 9, 1958, translated in CDSP , X, 19,











obsession. The Soviet critics expressed keen disappoint-
ment that the principle of socialist unity in the Draft
Program was "buried in oblivion," and that the Yugoslavs
thought primarily in terms of "principles of equality and
non-interference in each other 1 s internal affairs" in rela-
tions between socialist states. The Soviets considered
such nonsense as "petty bourgeois nationalism," and empha-
sised that socialist cooperation and mutual support cannot
result in a violation of equality because of the very
nature of socialism.
This self-evident "law" of socialist goodness serves
as a proper introduction by the Soviets of the subject of
the locus of authority for the socialist system. They had
been stung by the Yugoslav charge of Soviet "hegemonism,
"
and responded that "Marxism-Leninism does not deny the pos-
sibility of one or another Communist party or socialist
country playing the leading role during a certain historic
29period." They noted that it so happens that during this
period the center of the world revolutionary movement hap-
pens to be in Russia, where the transformation of society
has been practically completed. The present center of the
9Kommunist , April 15, 1958, translated in CDSP , X,
18, pp. 3-11; also see 3enes, 0£. cit • , p. 124. The
Soviets also criticized the Yugoslav Draft Program for not
















socialist revolution Is in the Soviet Union because that is
the first socialist state, and the socialist state that has
been warding off the blows of imperialist reaction to
socialist success. This position of the USSR requires it
to "render fraternal aid" to the other socialist states,
such as its suppression of imperialist counter-revolutionary
intervention in Hungary in 1956.
The Soviets also had been wounded by Yugoslav at-
tacks on Soviet failure to implement the process of wither-
ing away of the state. The autnors of the Pravda article
were perhaps on their firmest ideological footing in attack-
ing the Yugoslav concept of the state withering away. The
Soviets defended thei- ition not only in Marxism-
Leninism, but also in logic. They made it clear that the
socialist state could not wither away immediately after the
victory oi tac proletariat because:
1. It neeus to defend itself against the inevitable
imperialist reaction (such as in Hungary);
2. Society needs to be educated for the transition
from socialism to communism, a process that
requires many state functions; and
3. National sovereignty must by necessity wither
prior to the state itself , but as the people
need to adjust to socialism so do states.
'The merging of nations does not begin with














A Yugoslav position that drew particular Soviet
wrath was the Yugoslav treatment of the two world bloc sys-
tems as equally responsible for international tension.
Tito had made this charge on several previous occasions in
his capacity as a neutral "observer," but, nevertheless,
the Yugoslavs modified their position on the two blocs in
the program adopted by the Seventh Congress,
The Soviet critics concluded their attack on the
Draft Program with a lengthy dissertation on the nature of
proletarian internationalism and the failure of the Yugo-
slavs to appreciate the historic and vital role of the
Soviet Union in building socialism. The Soviets claimed
that the Yugoslavs equated proletarian internationalism
with national equality and non-interference in each other 1 s
affairs, which is "characteristic of petty bourgeois
31
nationalism,"
The authors of the Draft Program were reminded that
the November, 1957, Declaration (which the Yugoslavs had
not signed) noted "... that the invincible camp of social-
ist states is headed by the Soviet Union;" it was also
stated that this leading role is not determined by "sub-
jective desires" but by "objective conditions," i.e., the











movement." The Soviet Union occupies the center because
of its vast experience, its sacrifices for world socialism,
its rescue of other socialist states after World War II, and,
of course, because of its "fraternal aid" to the Hungarian
people in the fall of 1956. 33
It should be obvious, continued the criticism, that
the nature of relations among socialist states precludes
the possibility of one socialist state exploiting another:
exploitation is a characteristic of imperialism.
Throughout the rest of the spring and summer of 1958,
the Soviets continued their attacks on Yugoslav revisionism,
and the attacks became stronger as time elapsed. In early
June, Khrushchev felt confident enough that he could either
force Yugoslavia into some sort of reunion with the social-
ist camp, or completely discredit Yugoslav policy, that he
reindorsed the 1948 Cominform resolution as " . . . correct
and ... in accordance with the revolutionary movement."
A month previous to this an editorial in Pravda noted that
... the Communist and Workers • parties regard
themselves as a component part of the great inter-
national Communist movement and display a lively





Nollau, op . cit
. ,
p. 300, refers to this as Soviet
ex post facto justification for their intervention in
"Hungary.""
34 35







The Soviets had renewed their attack on the Yugoslavs
with great vigor. Not only had the Soviet and other Commu-
nist comradely criticism b^Gii rebuffed by the Yugoslavs,
the Yugoslavs had engaged in "sharp hysterical attacks" on
fraternal parties and had ". . . defended stubbornly their
erroneous, essentially anti-Leninist positions on a number
36
of issues."
Despite the lengthy polemics over Marxist theory and
the construction of socialism, the essence of the dispute
was in the determination of bloc leadership. The Soviets
insisted that the "most important question" is the relation
of the individual parties to the international Communist
movement} ' • • • the slightest deviation from the principles
of Marxist-Leninism, any manifestation of disassociation or
sectarianism, inevitably leads to the quagmire of revision-
37ism . . . ." J
Whether the Yugoslav approach is called "socialist
democracy," liberal communism, or revisionism depends on
one's point of view. It is probably not nearly as liberal
as some Western observers feel—nor as revisionist as the
Soviet critics claim. Although the Yugoslav concept of
socialism has experienced some domestic success, and
Titoism was a significant factor in the East European







developments of 1956, the example of Yugoslavia for the
other socialist states has not proved to be a major threat
to socialist unity as it has evolved since 1956, It is
true that the CPSU does not enjoy today whatever ''mono-
lithic" control it may have possessed under Stalin* s leader-
ship, but as far as t: i . .ropean satellites are con-
cerned the bloc is not disintegrating, either. Since th
ilure of t paratist movement in Hungary, the organic
differences between Yugoslavia and other £ast European
socialist states has become much more obvious.
If one assumes that during the 1956-1957 periou of
Soviet-Yugoslav negotiations that Tito wanted to return to
the bloc an autonomous status , and that Khrushchev was
intent upon full Yugoslav participation, it appears that
both Tito and Khrushchev failed to reach their objectives.
We have attempted to demonstrate, however, that whereas
Tito actually hoped for some sort of informal tie with the
bloc, Khrushchev sought not necessarily the return of Tito
to pre-1948 conditions but rather the neutralization of
Titoism as a threat to socialist unity. In this light,
Khrushchev has achieved a degree of success and Tito has
failed.
Khrushchev has been able to neutralize Titoism
through an astute combination of practical politics and








socialist cooperation in 1956, Khrushchev soon discarded
his references to "separate paths" and concentrated instead
in both word and deed upon the theme of socialist unity
•
He placed renewed emphasis upon personal contacts, espe-
cially with the satellite leaders, and stressed not only
the advantages of mutual socialist cooperation, but also
the dangers to the entire bloc system through nationalistic
approaches. Khrushchev continually emphasised that poly-
centric communism, of fragmentation, would blunt the revo-
lutionary momentum of the bloc and lead to eventual
disintegration; on the other hand, positive, centralized
leadership was required to continue the building of the
socialist revolution. The leadership of the CPSU was im-
plicit in this argument.
It can also be demonstrated that Khrushchev has been
the tentative victor in the ideological struggle with Tito,
for what little this victory might be worth. Although it
can also be shown in different ways how most of the commu-
nist leaders are guilty of "revisionism," it seems obvious
that the extent of Yugoslav revisionism is tantamount to
the movement of the social-democrats at the turn of the
38By means of agreement in principle to the "dif-
ferent paths" concept, and also through economic assistance.
Tito consented to give public support to Gomulka and Kadar















century, a movement that still espouses the ideals of Marx
and Engels but has forsaken the revolutionary tactics of
Lenin, Although the "socialist democracy" of the Yugoslavs
is not the course advocated by DJilas, a path that would
have most likely led to Western style democracy, it is a
program of national communism with the emphasis on
"national," Khrushchev is convinced, as was Lenin, that
socialist solidarity is essential to his cause; Yugo-
slavia* s revised position on modern capitalism removes the
requirement for this militant solidarity, and, therefore,
the reason for Khrushchev's leadership.
Here the manuscript comes to an abrupt end, due to
the candidate's untimely death in the service of his
country.
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